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Abstract
In this thesis I assess the role o f well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a tlueefold 
charge against the importance o f well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other 
Scanlon argues (1) that the concept o f well-being plays very little role in the thinldng o f an 
agent; (2) that no unified theory of well-being can be found; (3) Üiat welfaiism is false. In 
Part I, I argue that the concept o f well-being does play an explanatorily and justificatorily 
im portant role in the thinking o f  a rational agent. I arrive at this conclusion by 
distinguishing levels o f thinking activity as well as by considering the implicit rather than 
explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. I conclude this part o f the thesis by 
illustrating the relation between the idea o f well-being, its parts and its sour ces. In Par t II, I 
put forward a unified theory o f  well-being and I do so by talcing on board with a slight 
modification Scanlon's own buck-passing accoimt o f value. I argue that something is a part 
of a person’s good if, and only if, there is reason for this person to desire it. I clami that 
this account does not fall prey to the ‘scope problem’. I also discuss a rrimiber of different 
though connected issues such as the defence o f the claim that well-being is itself a 
normative notion and issues concerning tire various parts o f well-being. In Part III, I begin 
to sketch the normative role o f well-being both first-personally and impartially. With 
Scanlon, I agree that welfarism is false. Yet, I argue in favour o f a moderate form of 
welfarism, a view that takes a positive function o f each individual’s well-being to afford 
the ultimate criterion of practical reason.
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Introduction
Introduction
Recently, Thomas Scanlon has claimed that well-being is commonly supposed to have the 
following features:^
1. Well-being is a single or unitary notion and is normally assigned the following 
tlnee roles: (1) it serves as a basis for the decisions o f a single rational being, at 
least as far* as he alone is concerned (that is, leaving aside moral obligations and 
concern for others); (2) is what a concerned benefactor, such as a friend, has reason 
to promote; and (3) is the basis on which an individual interests are taken into 
account in moral argument. O f these tlu'ee roles, the first is generally held to be of 
primary importance: well-being is important in the thinking o f a benefactor and in 
moral theory because o f its importance for the individual whose well-being it is. It 
is also conunonly supposed that although the notion o f well-being is important fo r  
morality, it is not itself a moral notion. It represents what an individual has reason 
to want for him- or herself, leaving aside concern for others and any moral 
restraints or obligations. Well-being is thus an input into moral thinldng that is not 
already shaped by moral assumptions.
2. Well-being is also assumed to admit o f at least rough quantitative comparisons o f at 
least the following kinds: comparisons o f the levels o f well-being enjoyed by 
different individuals under various cfrcumstances, comparisons o f the increments in 
a single individual’s well-being that would result from various changes, and 
perhaps also comparisons o f the amounts o f well-being represented by different 
lives, considered as a whole. It is taken to be an important task (important both for 
moral theory and for theories o f “rationality” or “prudence”) to come up with a 
theory o f well-being: a systematic account o f “what makes someone’s life go 
better” that clarifies the boundary of this concept (the line between those things that 
contribute to a person’s well-being and those that are desirable on other grounds)
* See Scanlon, 1998, Ch 3, esp. 108-112. The following points reproduce Scanlon's own words or give a very 
close paraphrase of them.
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and perhaps provides a clearer basis for quantitative comparisons o f the kind just 
mentioned.
3. It is commonly believed that value is teleological, i.e., all values are “to be 
promoted”. One way to defend this claim is to show that well-being is a “master 
value”; all other things are valuable insofar as they contribute to well-being.
Scanlon, however, is sceptical about the plausibility o f these conunonly held beliefs about 
the importance of well-being in ethics. Rather, he believes that:
1. Though individuals do have reason to be concerned with the things that contribute 
to their well-being, in regard to their own lives they have little need to use the 
concept o f well-being. This concept has surprisingly little role to play in the 
thinking o f the rational individual whose life is in question. Also, the notion o f 
well-being used in moral theory is a notion shaped by moral theoretical concerns, 
not the intuitive notion that individuals might use in assessing their own lives.
2. We are not likely to find a general and unified theory of well-being on the basis of 
which one could see why the diverse things that contribute to well-being do in fact 
do so. Also, no accoimt is likely to be found, capable (a) o f delimiting the boundary 
o f the concept of well-being— the line between contributions to one’s well-being 
and things one has reason to pursue for other reasons; and (b) o f providing a 
standard for making more exact comparisons o f well-being— for deciding when, on 
balance, a person’s well-being has been increased or decreased and by how much.
3. Well-being is not a “master value”.
The ultimate aim of this thesis is that of assessing the role of well-being in ethics. This is a 
rather wide topic, and though I do not take this thesis to exhaust all possible aspects o f it, I 
believe that addressing Scanlon’s tlueefold charge against well-being will go a good way 
towards reaching the proposed aim. The thesis, then, is divided in three parts.
The aim o f Part I is to assess the role o f the concept o f well-being in the thinking o f a 
rational agent, and the alleged “moral” nature of the concept o f well-being. In Chapter 1 ,1
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present Scanlon’s charge against the importance o f the concept of well-being from a first 
person point o f view, and the relevance o f this charge to moral argument. Scanlon’s 
argumentation heavily relies on two features: firstly, the fact tliat well-being is an inclusive 
good and secondly, the two criteria he uses in order to assess the importance o f goods from 
a first personal perspective. In Chapter 2, I examine the Aristotelian distinction between 
the activity o f statesmen and that o f citizens, and the Aristotelian views concerning the 
formal natm-e of eiidaimonia. Consideration of these topics will afford us material capable 
o f reversing Scanlon’s conclusions about the concept of well-being as a “moral” notion 
and begin to show the way in which the concept o f well-being does play an important role 
in first-personal deliberation. This type o f historically informed strategy also occupies part 
of Chapter 3. This time, however, I look at the philosophies of J. S. Mill and Joseph Butler. 
The ultimate aim of this chapter is that o f providing an analysis o f the concept of well­
being. This analysis will provide us with an answer to this part o f Scanlon’s charge against 
well-being.
Part II is concerned with theories o f well-being and the scope and limits o f the concept o f 
well-being. These two topics are intimately connected: if  a theory allowed that rational 
pursuit o f well-being can involve rational self-sacrifice then this theory can be considered 
not as a theory o f well-being but as something wider, maybe as a theory o f rational action. 
That’s because this theory would single out a concept whose limits are too wide for it to be 
considered as the concept o f well-being. In Chapter 4 , 1 put forward what I will call the 
reason-to-desire theory of well-being: particular attention will be given to the role desires 
play in accounts of well-being. In Chapter 5, I determine what would be the scope and 
limits of well-being on our theory. It turns out that the concept of well-being is very wide 
in scope as a person’s well-being would be contributed to by things as diverse as the well­
being o f other persons, all sorts of projects the outcomes of which (in one sense) do not 
involve the person, and even states of affairs tliat obtain after the death o f the person whose 
well-being they contribute to. Yet, I will claim that this account o f well-being does not 
include instances o f rational self-sacrifice as contributions to a person’s well-being. In 
Chapter 6, I discuss some of the issues concerning the various goods that our theory of 
well-being singles out as parts or constituents of a person’s well-being. Finally, in Chapter 
7, I shall apply Scanlon’s charges against the possibility of theories of well-being to our 
own account as developed in the preceding tliree chapters.
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In Part III, I assess the normative weight of well-being in ethics both under the artificial 
assumption that an agent’s own well-being is the only well-being at stake and, more 
realistically, when an agent has to take into account the well-being of other individuals. In 
Chapter 8, I shall agree with Scanlon in rejecting the claim that well-being is a “master 
value” . To say that, is to exclude what we shall call a radical form o f welfarism. In the 
remaining part o f the thesis, however, I will defend a more moderate form o f welfarism 
which I will formulate as follows: there can never be most reason for an agent to do 
something that doesn’t bring about the best outcome in terms of the impartial good. The 
bulk o f Chapters 8 and 9 will consist in explicating and defending this thesis. Defending 
this thesis amounts to considering well-being as the ultimate standard o f practical reason.
In this sense, I will defend the view that well-being is of fundamental impoilance or plays 
a fundamental role in ethics.
In due course I will have much to say about the concept of well-being and its meaning. It is 
important however to make a short terminological note at this early stage. The notion of 
one’s well-being is a general and unarticulated notion: it is the notion o f one’s interest, 
advantage, private or personal good, or benefit. This notion is articulated by the various 
things that contribute to well-being. To say that x is part of my well-being is to say that my 
obtaining o f x would contribute to my well-bemg, be in my interest, etc. We could also say 
that X is good for me though this notion needs a fiuther comment. As many have noted, 
‘good for’ can refer to the specific fimctioning o f organisms and artefacts: lubricant, for 
example, is good for the engine. Or again, my doctor may tell me that smoking is not good 
for me, meaning not good for the proper fimctioning of my organism. Yet, on the sense of 
‘good for’ I intend to use, even if  the doctor were right, smoking may still be good for me 
if, for example, it gave me a lot o f pleasure. Finally, note that though something may 
contribute to my well-being, be in my interest or be good for me, it might not be the thing 
that maximised my well-being, most in my interest or best for me. When we talk o f well­
being in this latter sense, we talk of a person’s good on the whole and we refer to a notion 
that extends to this person’s whole life and, maybe, even beyond it.
The topic of this thesis is at the very core of ethical research. A thorough examination o f 
the role o f well-being in ethics is necessary to assess the relation between theories o f the 
right and theories o f the good (at least insofar as ‘the good’ is understood as a positive 
function o f the well-being o f all individuals), and the balance between egoism and
10
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impartialism in ethics. Though in the last two chapters I begin to establish my own 
conclusions concerning these points, the bulk o f this thesis is intended to be a preliminary 
to that project. This preliminary work, however, is also important in itself. Questions 
concerning the role of well-being in our first-personal thinking, the relation between the 
idea o f one’s well-being and the various goods that we often take to contribute to it, and 
the possibility o f formulating a theory o f well-being are very old questions, worth 
exploring whatever their usefulness for other purposes.
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PART I The Role of Well-Being in First-Personal
Deliberation
Chapter 1 The Alleged Unimportance of the Concept
of Well-Being
1. Introduction
Scanlon is particnlaiiy in disagreement with the idea that the concept o f well-being is an 
important concept from the point o f view of the agent whose well-being it is, as well as 
with the idea tliat well-being is a non-moral notion on which morality is grounded. In what 
follows, I examine these claims. I will focus in particular on Scanlon’s way o f testing the 
importance o f a concept such as ‘well-being’ (§2), on the idea o f importance itself (§3), 
and on the overall structure of Scanlon’s argument in his chapter on well-being (§4).
2. The Importance of well-being the inclusive good
According to Scanlon:
There are two related ways in which the importance o f  the concept o f  well-being in a given 
mode o f thinking might be shown. First, it might be shown in the role that concept plays in 
explaining and helping us to understand the importance o f  the particular things that 
contribute to well-being. Second, it might be shown in the significance o f the boundary o f  
that concept— the difference it makes whether something is or is not a contribution to w ell­
being.’
' Scanlon, 1998, 126.
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Let us extract what we take to be Scanlon’s two criteria for the importance of the concept 
o f well-being:
(C l) The concept o f well-being would be important if  it played a role in explaining 
why in our thinking we take certain things to be important, namely, if  we take them 
to be important because we take them to contribute to well-being.
(C2) The fact that the boundary o f the concept of well-being is significant in 
someone’s mode o f thinking, i.e., that it makes a difference (in this agent’s mode of 
thinlcing) whether something is or is not a contribution to one’s well-being, is good 
evidence that well-being is important to an agent.
In the case o f (C l), the concept o f well-being must be the one we use in explaining why we 
take certain things to be important in our deliberation, i.e., we must make frequent appeals 
to the concept o f well-being in order to explain why we take ourselves to have reason to 
desire and pursue many o f the things we do. As for (C2), it is stipulated that the concept of 
well-being must have precise boundaries and that whether something falls inside or outside 
them has significant repercussions in our mode of thinldng. That is, the fact that I conceive 
o f (j)-ing as contributing or not contributing to my well-being makes a significant difference 
in my consideration as to whether I should or shouldn’t 0. Let us clarify further each of 
these two criteria.
2.1. The first criterion
Scanlon tells us that there are at least two levels o f practical thinking at which the idea of 
one’s well-being might be significant: either the level of everyday decisions about what to 
do or what particular goals to aim at, or the level of lai’ger-scale decisions about how one’s 
life is to go, such as what career to pursue or whether or not to be a parent. At each o f these 
two levels, we may apply the two criteria in order to see whether the concept of well-being 
is or is not important. Here is an example o f the first criterion applied to smaller-scale level 
decisions:
Chapter 1
... it is certainly true that we have reason... to aim at things that contribute directly to our 
well-being, intuitively understood. We have reason to seek enjoyment, for example, to 
avoid illness and injury, and to do what will promote success in our aims. But the idea o f  
well-being plays little if  any role in explaining why we have reason to value these things. If 
you ask me why I have reason to listen to music, I may reply that I do so because I enjoy it.
If you asked why that is a reason, the reply “A life that includes enjoyment is a better life” 
would not be false^ but it would be rather strange. Enjoyments, success in one’s main aims, 
and substantive goods such as friendship all contribute to well-being, but the idea o f  w ell­
being plays little role in explaining why they are good. This might be put by saying that 
well-being is what is sometimes called an “inclusive good”— one that is made up o f  other 
things that are good in their own right, not made good by their contribution to well-being.'
This passage is of particular interest as it introduces the idea of well-being as an inclusive 
good. The example reads as follows: the concept of well-being is unlikely to feature in an 
agent’s explanation of why he did a certain action even though it might be true that that 
action does, in fact, contribute to that agent’s well-being. Therefore, according to (C l), 
there is no evidence that the concept o f well-being is important to us. In order to make his 
claim intelligible Scanlon appeals to the notion of well-being as an inclusive good. That 
means that well-being is not a separate good, but a good which is made up by other Ihings 
which are good in themselves or, at any rate, which are good not in virtue o f their 
contribution to well-being. There are tluee remarks to be made about this passage from 
Scanlon.
The first remark regards the inclusiveness of well-being. Is Scanlon making a claim about
(a) the nature o f well-being, (b) the way we value well-being or (c) both (a) and (b)? I 
believe Scanlon is making a claim about both. More precisely, Scanlon explains (a) 
through (b). The fact that we value for themselves the various things that contribute to a 
person’s well-being is evidence that well-being is an inclusive good. This is an important 
point insofar as in the rest of this thesis I shall not question the conclusion that well-being 
is inclusive in the way described by Scanlon.^
' Scanlon, 1998, 126-127, my emphasis.
~ I will however qualify this claim by spelling out what it means to have reason to desire and pursue /or their 
own sake the various things that contribute to a person’s well-being. Also, in Chapter 2, I briefly consider the 
possibility of well-being as a dominant rather than an inclusive good.
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Our second remark has to do with the stringency o f Scanlon’s claim that agents do not 
value the things that contribute to their well-being because they contribute to their well­
being. Is Scanlon claiming that each thing that contributes to an agent’s well-being is 
valued in itself and not because o f  its contribution to well-being? Scanlon is not as 
categorical as that. He writes that the idea of well-being plays little role— rather than no 
role— in explaining why we take things such as enjoyment to be good in themselves. 
Elsewhere, he writes:
On the one hand, when we say that something contributes to a person’s w ell-being it 
sounds as if  we are saying that it benefits him or her. But from an individual’s own point o f  
view  many o f the things that contribute to his or her well-being are valued for quite other 
reasons. From this point o f  view the idea o f  one’s own well-being is transparent. When we 
focus on it, it largely disappears, leaving only the values that make it up.^
The transparency of the idea o f well-being is explained by the fact that we value the goods 
that make up well-being for themselves. Scanlon, however, is not firm about the stringency 
of this transparency. In the last two sentences o f this quotation he seems to be making two 
contradictory claims: the concept of well-being is said to be both transparent and largely 
transparent. Which o f these two views, the more radical or the less radical should one 
attribute to Scanlon? When considering the role of well-being in deliberation over larger- 
scale choice Scanlon writes:
...the fact that it could make sense... to reject a life o f  devotion to some project because o f  
the sacrifices in well-being that it would involve... seems to show that well-being is at least 
one important factor in such choices. Many o f  the things that contribute to one’s w ell­
being, such as health, enjoyment, and freedom from pain and distress, are certainly 
important factors in such a choice. The idea o f  overall well-being may also play a role, but 
this is less clear, in part because the notion o f  well-being that can be appealed to in this 
context is unavoidably abstract and indeterminate.'’
Scanlon’s thought is not unequivocal. I thinlc, however, that the more radical claim that the 
concept of well-being is always transparent caimot be endorsed. Suppose that you offer me 
an unspecified reward on condition that I carry out a great labour (and that I have reason to
Scanlon, 1998, 133.
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believe you are not cheating me): do I have reason to carry out the labour? Most o f us 
would think that the prospect o f increased well-being, even when it comes in an 
unspecified guise, would provide anyone with a reason to carry out the labour. It seems 
undeniable that we prefer greater well-being to less. The fact that the notion of well-being 
appealed to here might be “abstract and indeterminate” does not make this claim any less 
true.^
My third remark has to do with the expression “things that are good in their own right” or 
in themselves or things that are desired and pursued for their own sake. Scanlon mentions 
enjoyment as such a good: “If  you ask me why I have reason to listen to music, I may reply 
that I do so because I enjoy it.” A good deal o f both Chapter 2 and 3 will explore the 
different meanings and ways in which something can be said to be good in its own right or 
desired and piusued for its own sake. I will be concerned with two issues in particular. The 
first has to do with the meaning of “for its own sake”. Though Scanlon is not explicit about 
this issue, on his view it seems that if  we desire and pursue, say, enjoyment for its own 
sake, then we are not desiring and pursuing it for the sake o f our well-being. As our 
discussion o f Aristotle will show, however, we do not have to agree with that view. The 
second issue we need to clarify is the way in which enjoyment is a good in its own right. 
Consider this: is a beautiful work o f art “good in its own right” as well? Surely, it is, 
though it seems to me we need an account o f goodness capable o f distinguishing aesthetic 
value from other kinds o f value. If there are kinds o f value, or ways in which things are 
good, what kind of “good in its own right” is enjoyment? It wouldn’t be farfetched to think 
that it belongs to the category o f things that are good fo r  someone. But if  that is so, then it 
seems that the concept of well-being is still very much part o f the picture.’’
2.2. The second criterion
Let us now move on to the second criterion, (C2). Scanlon seems to be making at least two 
points. Firstly, that, in our practical thinldng, we do not often need or use a notion of net 
overall well-being, i.e., “a notion that brings together and balances against one another all
Scanlon, 1998, 131.
 ^ It should be noted that Scanlon does not think that the notion of well-being is always or largely transparent 
From points of view other than the first-person one. See Scanlon, 1998, 138.
 ^ 1 will develop this argument further in Chapter 3 §2. As made clear in the Introduction, I am assuming that 
‘.V is good fory’ is equivalent to ‘,v contributes toy’s well-being’,
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the disparate things that contribute to the quality o f a life.”  ^What do we need to do if, for 
example, we must decide whether we should make some sacrifice in order to achieve a 
goal? According to Scanlon, we do not need to estimate the net effects on our well-being 
by determining the contribution that achieving this goal would make to our well-being, 
separating this from the other reasons for pursuing it, and balancing it against the cost in 
well-being that this pursuit would involve. Consider, for example:
the reasons which move us to promote the interests o f  our families and o f  groups or 
institutions with which we have other special relations. ... On the one hand, we would not 
want to think that we promote the interests o f  our friends, families, and institutions for 
“selfish” reasons, but, on the other hand, we would not be good friends or family members 
or loyal members o f  our institutions i f  we did not feel a loss to them as a loss to us. From a 
first person point o f  view , however, we have no reason to resolve this ambiguity by 
deciding where the limits o f  our well-being should be drawn. It is o f  course important to 
us— important in our moral self-assessment— that our concern for our friends and family is 
not grounded entirely in benefits they bring to us. But, given that we care greatly about our 
family or friends, we have no need to determine the degree to which we benefit from  
benefiting them f
In our first-person practical thinldng, we need not and do not determine the limits of our 
well-being. I may benefit from benefiting the people I care about, but it is not the fact that I 
stand to be benefited that motivates me to act. Thus, well-being can be a concept whose 
boundai ies are not precise because they need not be, because even if  they were, that would 
not make much o f a difference to our mode of thinking. The second point Scanlon makes 
concerning (C2) follows from this conclusion and relies on a point reached while 
discussing (C l). Given that many o f the things that contribute to well-being are valued 
primarily for other reasons (i.e., well-being is an inclusive good), it follows that the 
boundaries o f the concept o f well-being are blurred. But they would not need to be 
otherwise, as that would not make much of a difference in our practical thinking. The last 
example, Scanlon thinks, can be taken to provide an illustration of this second point as 
well. An agent may value benefiting her family or friends for reasons other than its 
contribution to her own well-being and yet it will be true that she would benefit by 
benefiting them. Or again, with Scanlon, we may believe that success in one’s rational aim
’ Scanlon, 1998,128.
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will contribute to one’s well-being and yet “we generally pursue these aims for reasons 
other than the contribution that this success will make to our well-being, and from a first- 
person point o f view there is little reason to try and estimate this contribution.”^
In conclusion, according to Scanlon, the concept o f well-being is not important from a 
first-person point o f view. That is so, firstly, because the concept o f well-being does not 
help us understand or explain the importance of the particular things that contribute to our 
well-being. Secondly, because the boundary of the concept o f well-being, i.e., whether a 
particular object or state o f affairs contribute to one’s well-being or not, is mostly 
insignificant to agents in their deliberation. What is more, given the particular nature o f 
well-being as an inclusive good that boundary is bound to be blurred.
3. The concept of well-being and well-being
Scanlon’s account may leave one wondering about what exactly is being assessed by him. 
Is he trying to understand the importance of M>ell-being to agents or the importance of the 
concept of well-being to agents? The section where he discusses this topic is entitled “The 
Importance o f Well-Being: First-Person Perspectives”. One may assume, then, that 
Scanlon intends to assess the importance o f well-being itself, rather than the importance of 
the concept o f well-being. And yet, he concludes the section in the following manner:
I conclude, therefore, that the concept o f  one’s overall w ell-being does not play as 
important a role as it is generally thought to do in the practical thinking o f  a rational 
individual.”'
Since what may or may not be increased by our actions (or by the actions of others) is of 
course not the concept o f well-being but rather a person’s well-being itself, the thing which 
we are here to assess the importance o f should be well-being rather than the concept o f 
well-being. To demonstrate the unimportance o f the concept o f well-being to agents is not 
eo ipso to demonstrate anything about well-being itself.
Scanlon, 1998, 129, my emphasis. 
Scanlon, 1998, 129.
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Some confusion arises from the fact that Scanlon uses the notion o f “importance” in what I 
take to be two distinct ways. Thinlc back to Scanlon’s description o f the first criterion. 
Scanlon writes that the “the importance[ 1 of the concept o f well-being in a given mode of 
thinking... might be shown in the role that concept plays in explaining and helping us to 
understand the importance|_] of the particular things that contribute to well-being.” There 
are two occurrences o f “im portance” . To understand whether the two notions o f 
“ importance” are distinct we might ask whether they are both intended to have some 
normative content. It seems clear that Scanlon intends the second instance of “importance” 
to have some normative content. He thinlcs that we take something such as enjoyment to be 
important in this sense if  we take ourselves to have reason to value it or to want it and 
pursue it.'^ As for the first instance of “importance”, Scanlon would say that the concept of 
well-being would be important^ if  we frequently appealed to it to explain why we take 
ourselves to have reason to want and pursue things such as enjoyment (i.e., things that are 
important to us in the normative sense). The importance_ o f the concept o f well-being 
might have is o f an explanatory kind, not o f a normative kind, and according to Scanlon, 
the concept o f well-being has no such explanatory importance from a first-person 
perspective.
The question now is: does Scanlon think that well-being itself (not its concept) is 
normatively important? Here is what Scanlon says:
The particular goods that make up well-being are important from the point o f  view o f  the 
individual whose well-being it is ... But the boundary between one’s own well-being and 
other aims is unclear, and we have no need to clarify it. ... We rightly view the world 
through a framework o f  reasons, largely shaped by the aims and values that we have 
adopted, and we rightly make particular decisions by determining what these reasons 
support on balance, not by comparing the net changes in our overall balance o f well-being. 
Among these reasons are those provided by ideas o f  right and wrong, justice and moral 
values. These values constitute some o f  the individual’s most important “aims”... and ...
10Scanlon, 1998, 132.
" Henceforth we shall avoid using the expression “having reason to value something” and use instead 
‘having reason to want (desire) and pursue something”.
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they also play an important role in shaping a person’s other goals, including the most 
comprehensive ones.'^
The goods that make up one’s well-being are normatively important to the agent from his 
perspective; agents have reason to aim at them. However, they are not aimed at because 
they contribute to well-being, as the concept of well-being is not explanatorily important. 
These goods are aimed at as ends in themselves. A concept that plays a large role in our 
practical thinking, in our “framework o f reasons and values” , will be able to have an 
influence on our actions and our life.'^ But that is not the case o f the concept of well-being. 
On the other hand, Scanlon goes on to show, the concepts o f right and wrong, o f justice 
and moral values in general are normatively important ends o f ours, and their concepts 
shape our lives in ways in which the concept o f well-being does not.
4. Scanlon’s overall argument against well-being
Scanlon cautiously writes that the goods that make up a person’s well-being are 
normatively important to the person whose well-being it is though not qua contributors to 
her well-being. That is shown by the fact that the concept of well-being is not explanatorily 
important from that perspective. W hat’s the upshot of this argument? At the outset of 
Chapter 3 o f What We Owe To Each Other, Scanlon spells out as follows the view that he 
intends to deny in that chapter;
[W]ell-being is important in the thinking of a benefactor and in moral argument because of 
its importance for the individual whose well-being it is. In particular, although the notion of 
well-being is important for morality, it is not itself a moral notion. It represents what an 
agent has reason to want for him- or herself, leaving aside concern for others and any moral 
restraints. Well-being is thus an input into moral thinking that is not already shaped by 
moral assumptions.'''
Scanlon, 1998, 136. Or again, in the concluding section of his chapter on well-being Scanlon writes: 
“From a first-person point of view, the things that contribute to (one’s own) well-being are obviously 
important, but the concept of well-being plays little role in explaining why they are important, and the 
boundaries of this concept are not very significant.” Scanlon, 1998, 142.
For a more detailed exposition of this part of Scanlon’s thought see Scanlon, 1998, Cli.l, section 10.
Scanlon, 1998, 109.
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Let us extract the following two claims from this passage:
(a) Well-being is important in moral argument because it is important from a first- 
person point of view.
(b) The concept o f well-being is not a moral concept and it is not shaped by moral 
assumptions.
In the concluding section o f the same chapter, Scanlon claims to have shown that:'^
(c) Even though the goods that make up well-being are important from a first- 
person point o f view, the concept o f well-being is not im portant from that 
perspective.
(d) The concept o f well-being is a notion shaped by moral theoretical concerns.”’
It must be noted that claim (a) is about the “importance o f well-being” both in moral 
argument and from a first-person perspective. Given Scanlon’s next claims (c) and (d) and 
in light of our preceding discussion, how are we to understand (a)? My suggestion would 
be this:
(a') an individual’s well-being is normatively important in moral argument because 
the concept of well-being is normatively important from a first-person point of 
view.
I would take this thesis to mean something like the following: when acting morally, we 
have reason to promote/take account of (some positive function of?) people’s well-being 
because each person has reason to want her well-being. Tlu'ough criteria (C l) and (C2), 
however, Scanlon would challenge (a'): her own well-being is not what each person 
typically takes herself to have reason to want and pursue from her perspective (though she
Scanlon, 1998, 142-143.
More precisely, Scanlon writes: “these conceptions of well-being will be moral conceptions, that is to say, 
they derive their significance, and to a certain extent their distinctive shape, from their role in the moral 
structure in which they figure.” Scanlon, 1998, 110. Scanlon also claims to have shown that well-being is not 
a “master value”, i.e., it is not the case that all things are valuable only insofar as they contribute to individual 
well-being. I shall postpone the discussion of this point until Chapter 8.
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takes herself to want for themselves the various things that contribute to it). Therefore, it is 
not deal' that (a positive function of) people’s well-being is what we have reason to 
promote/take account of when we act morally. Scanlon, however, never goes as far as 
claiming that well-being itself not normatively important from either the third-person or 
the moral perspective. He claims only to have shown that the concept o f one’s own well­
being has a surprisingly small role to play in the thinlcing of the rational individual whose 
life is in question and (consequently?) that the concept o f well-being that we use in moral 
ai'gument must derive its shape from some moral theoretical assumptions.*^
The conceptions o f well-being used in philosophy -says Scanlon- aie moral conceptions: 
they derive their significance, and to a certain extent their distinctive shape, from their role 
in the moral structure in which they figure. To illustrate his point Scanlon points to the 
conceptions o f well-being used for the purposes o f distributive justice in political 
philosophy. More specifically, Scanlon refers to Jolm Rawls’s primary goods and Amartya 
Sen’s capability sets as examples o f criteria o f well-being that would not quite correspond 
to our intuitive first-person notion o f well-being; they would not capture all o f the 
dimensions along which we could assess how well someone’s life goes. Two people 
enjoying the same primary goods, for example, may give completely different assessments 
o f their respective lives and be justified in doing so. Scanlon explains this divergence by 
pointing to the fact that these criteria are supposed to measure only those aspects of a life 
that it is the responsibility o f basic social institutions to provide for. On this point, one 
ought to agree with Scanlon: there is indeed a divergence between the aspects of a life that 
these criteria are intended to capture and a complete picture o f how well a person’s life 
goes. Contrary to Scanlon, however, I shall argue in Chapter 2 that there is no necessity to 
let one’s moral theoretical assumptions and needs shape one’s concept of individual well­
being.
Scanlon writes: “Well-being has its greatest significance from a third-person point of view, such as that of 
a benefactor, and, at least arguably, in our thinking about right and wrong. From both of these perspectives it 
remains true that... the things that contribute to a person’s well-being are important because of their 
importance to the person. But the importance of well-being as a category, and the shape and importance of 
particular conceptions of well-being, derive from the distinctive concerns of a (certain kind of) benefactor, 
and from the special requirements of moral argument.” Scanlon, 1998, 142. At this point it might be 
wondered why Scanlon lays so much stress on the issue concerning the moral or non-moral status of the 
concept of well-being. Scanlon is concerned with the charge of circularity that may be levelled against a 
moral theory such as his that is grounded on moral concepts. In his work, Scanlon intends, on the one hand, 
to show that even theorists who ground their moral theory on well-being are after all grounding it on a moral 
concept. On the other hand, Scanlon also tries to show how the circularity of his theory is not a vicious one 
but has to be understood as a positive form of holism. See Scanlon, 1998, Chapter 5.
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If  Scanlon is right, there is no such thing as a non-moral notion o f well-being in which to 
ground moral argument. Our well-being is not something that we typically take ourselves 
to have reason to desire and puisue. The things that are normatively important from an 
agent’s own point of view, are both things that contribute to his well-being as well as many 
other things, such as considerations o f right and wrong and various forms of excellence. 
What makes these things worthwhile, however, is not the fact that they contribute to one’s 
well-being.*^
5. Conclusion
We began this chapter by spelling out Scanlon’s two criteria for the importance o f the 
concept o f well-being from a first-person perspective, (C l) and (C2). Scanlon takes the 
concept o f well-being to fail the test set by these two criteria. In short, it would seem that 
any inclusive good is bound to fail the test and well-being is such a good. In the remaining 
two chapters of Part 1 ,1 will show how the work of Aristotle, Jolm Stuart Mill, and Joseph 
Butler can provide us with some elements to counter some of Scanlon’s conclusions. More 
precisely, 1 will focus on two areas. Firstly, I will challenge the appropriateness o f the 
conclusions Scanlon derives from the two criteria. More precisely, 1 will argue that care 
must be talcen when applying the two criteria at the level of ordinary practical thinlcing.
Secondly, 1 will examine the inclusive natme o f the concept of well-being. More precisely, 
1 will examine the natur e o f the relation between the various things that contribute to a 
person’s well-being and this person’s well-being itself. Though Scanlon thinks that the 
concept o f well-being is unimportant from a first-person perspective, he does extensively 
claim that certain goods contribute to a person’s well-being. So there is an x such that
According to Scanlon there are at least two classes of values that are worthwhile and are not grounded in 
well-being. Firstly, moral values; treating others fairly may make one’s life as well as that of others go better, 
but that would not be the reason for taking this aim to be worthwhile. Rather, it is worthwhile because it is 
required by the more general value of treating others in ways that could be justified to them. It may be true 
that living in accordance to these requirements of right and wrong may make our life better but this does not 
give us reason to be concerned with this kind of value. The second example concerns the value of various 
forms of excellence. What makes these pursuits worthwhile is not their contribution to one’s well-being but 
the fact that they constitute serious attempts to understand deep and important questions. See, Scanlon, 1998, 
142-143.
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various goods can be contributors to x and yet (a) we do not seem to make much use of the 
concept o f x from a first-person point of view; and (b) x is not a separate good but an 
inclusive one. 1 would like to get a better grasp o f the nature o f this x. What kind of 
relation is there between this x and its contributors? Does the fact that we pursue its 
contributors for their own sake exclude that we, at the same time, pursue them as 
contributors o f x? Scanlon does not consider these questions. But as I intend to show in 
Chapters 2 and 3, answers to these questions have a direct bearing on Scanlon’s 
conclusions concerning the importance o f the concept of well-being. These answers will be 
found with the help of the tliree philosophers mentioned above. In the end, however, 1 will 
put forward my own conceptual analysis of well-being.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 Levels of Reflection and Categorlally
Different Goods
1. introduction
In what follows I help myself to a pool of concepts to be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachecm 
Ethics and in the most recent conmientaries it generated. This chapter is not an exercise in 
Aristotelian exegesis. I do not question which of a number of views can be most plausibly 
attributed to Aristotle. Rather, I examine the philosophical cogency o f some of the views 
rightly or wrongly attributed to Aristotle. In particular, 1 focus on two kinds o f topics 
discussed by Aristotle and his commentators. The first has to do with the distinction drawn 
by Aristotle between the activity of statesmen and that o f citizens. I will later try to bring 
this distinction to bear on Scanlon’s criteria of importance (C l) and (C2) (§2).* The second 
topic has to do with Aristotle’s views on the formal nature of eudaimonia. The overall aim 
here is to see whether it makes sense to hold, for some x, both that x is constituted of 
various goods pursued for their own sake, and that in aiming for those goods one aims for 
X. As we shall see, some Aristotelian commentators took eudaimonia to be such an x. Next, 
1 consider whether well-being too can be a case o f x (§4).
2. Levels of activity and points of view
Aristotle aimed his Nicomachean Ethics at statesmen. The book is intended to gain an 
understanding of the kind o f life statesmen would want their citizens to live. The subject 
matter, then, is what life should ordinary individuals live, though the investigation is 
conducted from the point o f view o f would-be political leaders. Even though these
‘ (Cl) The concept of well-being would be important if it played a role in explaining why in our thinking we 
take certain things to be important, namely, if we take them to be important because we take them to 
contribute to well-being. (C2) The fact that the boundary of the concept of well-being is significant in 
someone’s mode of thinking, i.e., that it makes an important difference (in this agent’s mode of thinking)
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statesmen take the everyday experiences and thoughts o f ordinary individuals as the 
starting point of their reflections about the highest good, they themselves are well-educated 
and reflective people. Thi-ough his two criteria, (C l) and (C2), Scanlon too seems to start 
from our everyday experiences and unai'ticulated thoughts about our lives. However, as we 
will show below, Scanlon wrongly assimilates the first-person point o f view to the pre- 
reflective level and from there concludes that the concept o f well-being is not important 
from a first-personal point o f view. To that conclusion, however, he adds that some 
concept of well-being might be important in moral argument, but that that concept would 
not be the same as our intuitive first-person notion o f well-being (think back to our 
discussion o f Rawls’s primary goods and Sen’s set of capabilities in Chapter 1), as it would 
have inevitably been shaped by our moral theoretical concerns. In this section, 1 intend to 
show that the pre-reflective and reflective levels do not coincide exactly with respectively 
the first-personal perspective and what Scanlon calls the “moral perspective”. We can 
reach reflective conclusions about what is normatively important first-personally that are 
not shaped by our moral theoretical assumptions.
2.1. Scanlon’s “strange reply"
Remember Scanlon’s example for the first criterion o f importance;
If you ask me why I have reason to listen to music, I may reply that I do so because I enjoy 
it. If you asked why that is a reason, the reply “A life that includes enjoyment is a better 
life” would not be false, but it would be rather strange. Enjoyments, success in one’s main 
aims, and substantive goods such as friendship all contribute to well-being, but the idea o f  
well-being plays little role in explaining why they are good."
We should focus on the “strange reply” : “A life that includes enjoyment is a better life” . 
As noted in Chapter I, Scanlon is here in the process o f showing the explanatory 
unimportance o f the concept o f well-being by showing how it would fail the test set by 
(C l). Typically, we do not explain why we have reason to desire and pursue our aims by
whether something is or is not a contribution to one’s well-being, is good evidence that well-being is 
important to an agent.
-Scanlon, 1998, 126.
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appealing to considerations o f well-being. It would be “strange” to do so. Scanlon is right 
but for the wrong reason. The strange reply is strange because it is platitudinous. I do not 
express a platitude to someone else because I take it that they know it already. This point 
can be revealed by slightly changing the example. Suppose that you enjoy listening to 
music so much that it causes you to be tachycardiac. A friend who knows about your 
medical situation will ask: “Why do you listen to music?” . By that, however, he clearly 
means “Wliy do you listen to music given that it makes you miserable?”. At that point, you 
might be justified in saying “A life that includes the enjoyment o f listening to music is a 
better life”, meaning that you prefer a life with some enjoyment but some suffering to a life 
with no enjoyment but no suffering. Your reply would not be strange.
Suppose now that the claim ‘enjoyment contributes to a person’s well-being’ were in fact 
true. Would the “strange reply” then be considered to be strange at any level of enquiry or 
for any context? Suppose that an agent is investigating what ends he has reason to aim at in 
his life, what things would make his life go well. Suppose, more in particular, that he is 
reflecting on the particular question as to whether he has reason to pursue enjoyment 
embodied in the activity o f listening to music. After careful reflection, introspection, and 
debate with fellow thinkers, the agent concludes that “A life that includes enjoyment is a 
better life” and that he has reason to pur sue it by listening to music whenever it does not 
conflict with his other rational aims. In this context that would not be a “strange reply” at 
all.
It might be remarked, however, that that would be a reply to a different question, a 
question along the lines of “is enjoyment something that would make your life go better?”. 
This takes us right to the core o f our argument against Scanlon. The context in which 
Scanlon’s question is asked can be taken to be a first-person, short-term, everyday context. 
What about the context in which the strange reply no longer seems so strange? Is it a first- 
person context? Scanlon would have to say that it is not, otherwise he would undermine the 
conclusion he reached through (C l) that the concept o f well-being is not important from 
that perspective. He would rather have to say that the concept of well-being that is being 
implicitly appealed to in a context in which the strange reply no longer seems strange is 
one shaped by moral theoretical assumptions. In the remaining part o f this section, 1 will 
attempt to show that Scanlon would be wrong to think so. The answer would not 
necessarily be one shaped by moral assumptions; we are not asking, as for example Rawls
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and Sen do, what goods should be justly distributed. We are simply asking what things 
would make our life go better. In order to prove this point, in what follows 1 will avail 
m yself o f some o f the conclusions reached by Sarah Broadie in her discussion o f 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics^
2.2. What level of activity?
According to Broadie, in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle:
... operates on two levels, using similar language on both. He begins by arguing that the 
supreme good is the statesman’s objective, and goes on to investigate the nature o f  that 
objective. This second stage continues through the rest o f  the work, but in Book I it 
culminates in the definition o f happiness as virtuous or excellent activity. Now, this activity 
is distinct from that o f  the statesman as such. The statesman aims, we are told, at making 
excellent citizens; but his ultimate aim, the measure o f  his success, is the excellent activity 
o f  individual citizens— which is to say their happiness. The statesman’s own happiness 
does not appear at either stage, although we can infer that his fulfilment as statesman lies in 
achieving his goal as such. This is the happiness o f citizens..
There are then two levels or kinds of activity involved in the Nicomachean Ethics: that at 
which the statesman operates and that at which ordinary individuals or citizens operate. 
The Nicomachean Ethics is addressed to the statesman. His task is that o f bringing about 
the conditions for his citizens’ eudaimonia. In order for him to do that, it is necessary to 
understand what each citizen’s eudaimonia consists in. The subject o f the Ethics consists 
precisely in that. Broadie goes on:
Confusion o f  the levels is not surprising, since the difference between ‘statesman’ and 
‘ordinary individual’ is more conceptual than real. Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is meant to 
educate the statesman about his proper goal. So far as any o f us partakes in such an inquiry 
with a view to making its conclusions tell in our own lives and the lives o f  those around us, 
we too are ‘statesmen’.^
■’ See Broadie, 1991,45-48.
Broadie, 1990, 45.
 ^Broadie, 1991, 46.
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One point we want to retain from this passage is that any individual could, at least in 
principle, engage in the ethical investigation into what constitutes his or her eudaimonia. 
This is very important. Yet Broadie believes that there is a conceptual difference between 
‘statesman’ and ‘ordinary individual’. This, I think, is also true. What is not clear is what is 
entailed by this conceptual difference. Following Scanlon, I think we could look at this 
difference as a difference in the point of view or perspective occupied by the inquirer. It is 
not clear, however, what ‘pomts of views’ are involved and what the shift in points of view 
would involve. Let us examine this question fiirtlier.
2.3. Scanlon, well-being, and points of view
Scanlon thinks that there are three points o f view from which the concept of well-being 
might be taken to matter. That o f the first-person, that o f the benefactor and the moral point 
of view. In Chapter 1, we discussed the first-person point of view. Let us omit discussion 
of the benefactor point o f view here and focus directly on the moral point of view. Scanlon 
thinlcs that a moral theory might rely on the concept of well-being in three ways:
First, the notion lo f  well-being] might figure in the content o f  moral requirements. For 
example, we may be morally required, at least in certain circumstances, to promote the 
well-being o f  others... Second, well-being might play a role in the justification o f  moral 
principles even when it does not figure in their content. A principle requiring us to respect 
a certain right... might be justified on the ground that its observance would promote 
individual well-being. ... Third, insofar as a moral theory needs to provide som e 
justification for morality as a whole— some answer to the question “Why be moral?”— it 
might seem, again, that this is best supplied by showing how morality contributes to each 
person’s well-being.*’
The point Üiat Scanlon makes for each of these potential roles for the concept well-being in 
moral theory, is that the concept we would be dealing with in any o f these moral 
theoretical roles, would not be the same as the intuitive notion of individual well-being. To 
put it simply: if  x is our intuitive notion o f first-person well-being, then the concept of
Scanlon, 1998, 137.
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well-being used in moral theory must be something other than x, call ity . What is more, as 
we will soon see, y  would have to be a moral notion. The best illustration of this point can 
be found in the moral principles used by social justice theorists. The content o f these 
principles involves overall assessments o f how well-off various individuals are (they 
would need a concept o f well-being fulfilling the first type o f need in the quote above). 
Rawls’s primary social goods and Sen’s capability sets, for example, are narrower concepts 
than our intuitive ideal o f well-being. On the other hand, the utility function underlying 
social choice theories would be a concept wider than our intuitive idea o f well-being.^ In 
short:
All these notions are shaped by moral ideas arising from the particular moral questions that 
they are supposed to answer: in the case o f  social choice theory by a conception o f  citizens’ 
right to have their preferences taken into account in shaping social decisions, and in the 
case o f  Rawls’s and Sen’s accounts by ideas about the line between those aspects o f  
individuals’ situations that are the responsibility o f  social institutions and those that are 
properly left to individuals themselves.^
Scanlon rightly thinks that the notion o f individual well-being is not co-extensive with the 
notions of well-being specific to social justice theories. But why would any one think that 
well-being should be the x that social justice requires to be fairly distributed? As Scanlon 
himself reminds us in a footnote, after all, Rawls and Sen did not intend to offer accounts 
of what makes a life better from the point o f view of the person who lives it.*^  And yet, that 
is precisely what we are after. Scanlon, however, thinlcs that the argument he gave for 
social justice theories applies to moral theory more in general:
... what are employed in moral argument are generally not notions o f  well-being that 
individuals would use to evaluate their own lives but, rather, various moral conceptions to 
show how w ell-off a person is— that is to say, conceptions that are shaped by one or 
another idea o f  what we owe to and can claim from another. ... I believe that the 
conceptions o f  well-being that figure in moral thinking more generally can be expected to 
diverge in similar ways from the conceptions that individuals might use in assessing their 
own lives. Whether they diverge or not, however, these conceptions o f  well-being will be
] See Scanlon, 1998, 116-118 and 138-139
** Scanlon, 1998, p. 139
 ^Scanlon, 1998, 385 n. 1. See Rawls, 1971, Section 15; Sen, 1992, Chapter 3.
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moral conceptions, that is to say, they derive their significance, and to a certain extent their
distinctive shape, from their role in the moral structures in which they figure.'**
The claim that moral tlieories in general can only avail themselves of moral conceptions of 
well-being largely divergent from individual conceptions of well-being is not fully argued 
for by Scanlon. 1 thinlc Scanlon is conflating two related questions: the question “what is 
the human good?” with questions such as “how do we fairly and or impartially weigh/take 
into account the good o f each individual?” or again “what is that x that should be fairly 
distributed?” (primary social goods, according to Rawls, capabilities sets, according to 
Sen). Though treatment of the first question is normally necessary to answer at least some 
o f the questions of the second type, these two types of questions are separate. This is most 
clearly seen in Aristotle. The statesmen have to (1) understand what is the good for human 
beings in order to (2) bring about the conditions for each individual to tluive. The second 
task might be one that may involve the kind o f moral assumptions that seem to worry 
Scanlon. But these two tasks though related are separate."
At this stage the remark concerning the more-conceptual-than-real difference between the 
statesmen level and the ordinary individuaTs level can be fully appreciated. As an ordinary 
individual you may decide to reflect on what it is that makes your* life go well, with an eye 
to making the conclusions of your reflection bear on your life. As an ordinary individual, 
you become a statesman for a while. Will your* conclusions inevitably be shaped by moral 
assimiptions such as concern for the just distribution of some basic goods? Would your 
conclusions be ones “which derive their significance, and to a certain extent their 
distinctive shape, from their role in the moral structures in which they figure” where 
“moral structiu'es” are, as in Scanlon, structures o f justice and relations with others? The 
answer is no, and that is because there still is an important difference between the 
statesman and yourself. You are here concerned with well-being understood as an agent- 
relative  and universalisable value, not w ith well-being as an agent-neutral and 
universalisable v a l u e . I n  other words, you are attempting to understand how each life is 
valuable to the person whose life it is, not how to act (first personally, or as an impartial 
administrator) given that each person’s life has impersonal value.
Scanlon, 1998, 110.
" Some may regard the philosophical statesmen as engaged in ethical even if not moral thinking. 
A full explanation of this terminology will be broached in Chapter 9.
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Finding an answer to the question “what is the human good?”, however, might require a 
level o f reflection above that which ordinary individuals are used to employ in the daily 
conduct o f their lives. Each reflective agent may begin to answer the question by 
examining his or her unarticulated experiences. The question, however, may become a 
broader and more abstract one. It would concern human beings in general, and their 
intersubjectively intelligible interests. This question would be one within philosophical 
antlii'opology. Contrary to what Scanlon might think, however, answering this question 
from a philosophic-anthropological point of view is not to make an appeal to any special 
set o f moral assumptions.'^ From this point of view, we are simply trying to understand 
what things make a life fulfilling or good for the agent whose life it is. We are not yet 
concerned with what would be the fair way o f considering each individual’s good, nor are 
we concerned with the just distribution o f primary social goods.
2.4. Scanlon’s contention
We need to consider exactly what is involved in Scanlon’s conclusion to the effect that the 
concept o f well-being is not important from the point of view o f the person whose well­
being it is. If  he means that we don’t usually make our moment to moment decisions by 
reference to our well-being, then he may well be right. If  he means, however, that it makes 
no sense for an agent to reflect on the anthropological question so as to shape a better life 
for himself, tlien Aristotle would certainly disagree, and so would 1.
True enough, Aristotle saw reflection as the task o f the statesmen. I would thinlc, however, 
that practical and normative questions such as “what things would make one’s life go 
well?” or “what things are good for one?” or even “is this end, activity, or action better for 
one than this other?” are recurrent questions for any individual with some capacity for 
reflection, and what is more these are typically questions asked with an eye to praxis. We 
see these questions often being asked in the newspapers: “are people in our kind of society
The term “moral”, here, has to be understood in Scanlon’s sense. Some, however, may argue that this sense 
oF moral is somewhat artificial -  an artefact of twentieth century emphases in ethics or “moral” philosophy. If 
“moral” philosophy were mostly concerned with the Aristotelian question, we would find it natural to call 
assumptions concerning it, ‘moral assumptions’. Also, the individual who engages in thinking about the 
human good so as to improve his own life could be thought of as flilfilling the duty of self-improvement -  a
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too addicted to working and earning money?” As we shall see more in detail later in this 
chapter, the idea of well-being lurks behind each of these questions. Would it make sense 
to ask whether we are too addicted to work unless we suspected that too much work is not 
good for us? Everyone is faced with some choices that will partly determine one’s short­
term and long-term well-being. Should 1 go to the cinema tonight or should 1 keep 
working? How far should 1 pursue my career when it is not so compatible with other aims 1 
have? What o f my children, what should 1 want for them? Wliat things should they have in 
order to have the best possible life? Starting from these basic questions, it is in principle 
open to each individual to engage in further reflection, though at its highest level, 
reflection on these issues is normally conducted by philosophers. What life is most 
fulfilling for a human being? Is it the pursuit o f all and only rational aims? Or are there 
rational aims the pur suit of which will not make one better off? If  so, can it ever be rational 
for me to pursue them?''* In virtue of what is an action, an object, or a state of affairs better 
for one than any other?
2.5. Conclusion
Let us bring these conclusions to bear on our initial discussion. 1 started off by asking in 
what circumstances the “strange reply” would be considered strange. 1 put forward the 
example o f the tachycardiac to show that even at an everyday level and from a first person 
perspective it might not be strange to give the “strange reply”. Now, 1 thinlc that examples 
o f this kind are not rare; this undermines Scanlon’s conclusion concerning the 
unimportance of the concept well-being by using his own criteria (C l) and (C2).
Scanlon, however, might still think that though undermined, the main gist of his conclusion 
remains imtouched: the concept o f well-being has surprisingly little role to play in the 
thinking o f each agent. At this stage, we considered what exactly Scanlon takes the 
normative and practical force o f this conclusion to be. It may be agreed with him that our
moral duty, many would say (e.g., Kant). In the rest of this section, however, I will use the term ‘moraP the 
way Scanlon does.
' ' Rational egoists would deny it and so would metaphysical egoists. Rational egoism is the view that an 
action is rational just insofar as it would promote the agent’s own interest (note the difference with ethical 
egoism: an action is morally obligatory just insofar as it would promote the agent’s own interests). 
Metaphysical egoism claims that when the agent’s own happiness or interest is correctly understood we will 
see that the good of others is, in the appropriate way, part of the agent’s own good so that acting on other-
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moment to moment decisions are not usually taken by reference to the concept o f well­
being. But one cannot infer from that that it makes no sense for an agent to reflect on the 
question o f how to shape his life into a better life for himself. That question, we argued, is 
central and may come in different forms and at different levels o f intellectual 
sophistication.
Though at its most highly reflective level this question is explored by philosophers, we 
argued, firstly, that this question need not be shaped by moral theoretical assumptions as 
Scanlon thinks. We are asking what human well-being is, not what would be the fairest 
positive impartial function o f well-being or its fairest distribution. Secondly, we found that 
the difference between the ordinary individual’s level and the statesman’s level, i.e., the 
difference between a pre-reflective and a reflective level, is more conceptual than real. 
That is best understood when we realise that the pre-reflective level provides the ground or 
material from which given experience and reflection, the abstract ethical thinking of the 
reflective level can take o f f ^  Thus, the pre-reflective level is incorporated into the 
reflective one.
It might be wondered at this point why anyone would bother with the reflective task. We 
may have a reasonable purely theoretical interest in the question of imderstanding what 
things it is reasonable for us to pmsue. I think, however, that in most cases each individual 
engages in this type o f enquiry with an eye to its practical applications. It ought to be 
noticed here again that the practical interest is not necessarily one having to do with moral 
issues of the type Scanlon seems to have in mind. An agent might be unsatisfied with the 
way his life is going and may want to find a way to improve it. But just as often, at least 
today, those who engage systematically on this type of reflection will want to gain an 
understanding of what things contribute to a person’s quality of life, and then devise the 
social and political arrangements that could best promote the quality o f life of every 
individual. We are not quite at the same practical level as Aristotle’s statesmen but the task 
is indeed very similar.
regarding moral requirements is a way of promoting his own interests. For an interesting discussion of these 
definitions see Brink, 1992.
Braodie, 1991, 47, makes a similar point.
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Let us end this section with an important remark. To claim that the pre-reflective level 
provides the material for the reflective level is not to claim that whatever verdicts one 
arrives at the first level are also true at the next level. We have seen that with the “strange 
reply” . The fact that at tliis level “considerations o f well-being” (as Scanlon would put it) 
do not explain many o f our actions (if  that is indeed true) does not establish that 
“considerations of well-being” are not important from an individual’s perspective. On 
reflection, this pre-reflective judgement may be revised. Let me give an example to 
establish this point.
Suppose you have a choice between going to the cinema or going to a jazz concert. 
Suppose, at a pre-reflective level, you take yourself to have a reason to pursue both these 
activities because you enjoy them. Someone like Scanlon might conclude from this as well 
as other similar examples that the concept o f well-being is not important at this level. 
Suppose, however, that whenever faced with a choice between these two particular 
activities you always choose to go to jazz concerts, because you enjoy that more. It will 
then be remarked to you that you are appealing to a new principle, namely that {ceteris 
paribus) one has reason to do that winch one enjoys more rather than less. But where in the 
concept o f enjoyment can we find the idea that, ceteris paribus, more is better? Later on, I 
shall argue that this idea is not to be foimd in the concept o f enjoyment alone but rather in 
the thought that enjoyment is desired under the idea o f one’s well-being. Something similar 
to that is certainly involved in Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia}^ Any complete answer 
to this question can only be found at a level that can hardly be characterised as pre- 
reflective. Thus, contra Scanlon, even a good number of examples from the pre-reflective 
level cannot establish that the concept o f well-being does not matter to the person whose 
well-being it is, as that judgement might have to be revised from a reflective standpoint. 
More to the point, the fact that fi'om a pre-reflective point of view we pursue a number o f 
intrinsic goods for their own sakes does not rule out any reflective conclusions as to their 
connection with well-being. This is the topic o f the following sections.
I am thinking about eudaimonia’^  formal criteria, self-sufficiency and completeness. See Aristotle, 
A£,1097 b 16-21.
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3. Intermezzo: some conceptual clarifications
3.1. Eudaimonia as a dominant or as an inclusive good
In this intermediary section, I will clarify a number of concepts that will be central to the 
following discussion. In Chapter 1, we concluded that an inclusive good, such as Scanlon 
takes well-being to be, has two relevant features: (1) it includes other intrinsic goods; (2) 
agents largely take themselves to have reason to pursue the included goods for their own 
sake and not because they contribute to their well-being.'^
Some Aristotelian commentators take eudaimonia to be an inclusive good. At least on 
some readings, however, eudaimonia  differs considerably from Scanlon’s conception of 
well-being with respect to (1). It is not merely the case that eudaimonia includes other 
intrinsic goods. Rather, on these interpretations o f Aristotle, eudaimonia would include all 
intrinsic goods: we could call eudaimonia an all-inclusive good. Scanlon does not conceive 
o f well-being in these terms, as he thinks that there are intrinsic goods that do not 
contribute to well-being.'^ In §4,1 shall examine some inclusivist accounts of eudaimonia 
and compare tlieni with the second feature o f Scanlon’s inclusivist account of well-being.
1 should mention here, however, that other Aristotelian commentators take eudaimonia to 
be a central or dominant good. On this view eudaimonia is a particular substantive good 
(e.g., the activity o f theoria) that has a central or dominant role within a life.'^ The central 
good in question paradigmatically has eudaimonia: the centrality o f this good in the 
context of a human life characterises that life as a happy {eudaimon) one. Some versions of 
the dominance view accept that the happy life, to be happy, requires other intrinsic goods
The ‘mostly’ reflects Scanlon’s hesitation on this issue. As illustrated in Chapter 1, he does think that, 
sometimes considerations of well-being, i.e., the fact that a certain course of action might be the one that 
most contributes to one’s well-being might be a good reason for action.
Note that some Aristotelian commentators would call what Scanlon calls an inclusive good, a plwal or 
composite good. White S., 1990, Crisp, 1994b. Then they would claim that eudaimonia is both all-inclusive 
and plural. See Crisp, 1994b. That would amount to saying that there are no intrinsic goods outside 
eudaimonia and that there are several intrinsic goods included under the heading of eudaimonia. On another 
view, eudaimonia could be exclusive (the opposite of all-inclusive) and plural: there would be at least one 
intrinsic good outside it and several constituent goods within it. White, S., 1990, seems to hold that view.
See Broadie’s discussion, 1991, esp. 27-32.
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beside the central good/** These goods stand in a particular relation to the central or 
dominant good: without eudaimonia these goods would lose much of their point.
On both interpretations, eudaimonia is not the same kind o f good as respectively (a) the 
goods that it includes, and (b) the goods that are not central or dominant. Eudamonia is a 
functionally or categorially different good. Scanlon did not envisage the possibility that 
well-being could be a dominant good and in order for us to argue against Scanlon on his 
own terms we shall not examine that possibility either. In defence o f Scanlon, however, we 
shall say that to think that well-being could be a substantive master-end o f the kind 
‘dominant’ commentators take eudaimonia to be, would be too unlike what anyone 
nowadays means by well-being. Also, on the dominance view, the central good is 
identified with one particular end or activity (e.g., theoria). Is it plausible to think that each 
agent’s well-being is identified with the same end or activity (whichever we decide it 
should be)? Suppose, however, that we do allow each rational agent to have his own or her 
own particular central activity. What ai'guments would tliere be to believe that each rational 
agent’s well-being is structured around one central activity? It is simply not generally true 
that what makes a person’s life go well is the pursuit o f one central activity (though that 
doesn’t exclude that some individuals’ well-being might be identified with one central 
activity in that way). It is perfectly conceivable that an agent may reasonably pursue a 
number o f things that are good for him and that are unconnected under any one particular 
end or activity. On the basis o f these points, I would take it that well-being cannot be 
plausibly conceived o f as a dominant good. Scanlon’s failure to consider this possibility 
does not seem to have been a serious fault.
In §4, we will consider the interpretation of eudaimonia as an inclusive good. In fact, we 
will consider two interpretations o f this view and assess whether they provide us with a 
model on which it makes sense to hold, for some x, both that x is constituted o f various 
goods pursued for their own sake, and  that in aiming for those goods one aims for x. 
Before broaching these issues, however, we should say a few words concerning the way in 
which the words 'eudaimonia', ‘happiness’, and ‘well-being’ will be used in what follows.
We will say more about this later on. Note that, as Ackrill remarks, there is at least the possibility of 
another kind of dominance view. He writes; “By “a dominant end” might be meant a monolithic end, an end 
consisting of just one valued activity or good, or there might be meant that element in an end combining two 
or more independently valued goods which has a dominant or preponderating or paramount importance.” 
Ackrill, 1980, 17. The dominance view we sketched in the text belongs to Ackrill’s second type.
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3.2. Eudaimonia, Well-being, and happiness: terminological issu es
The standard translation o f eudaimonia in English is ‘happiness’. In the sections below, 
whenever the discussion will be conducted on my own terms, I will refrain from translating 
eudaimonia  in any way and will use the Greek term itself. The reason is simple; I doubt 
that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is equivalent to our term ‘happiness’ in either its everyday use 
or its philosophical use. In fact, as I will claim in Chapter 6, the use o f the term happiness 
in ethics is liable to give rise to confusion. The observation that eudaimonia does not 
translate well as ‘happiness’ is not an original one. As early as 1884, in a footnote to his 
Medwds o f  Ethics, Henry Sidgwick wrote:
A risto tle ’s selection o f  eudaimonia  to denote w hat he elsew here calls “ H um an” or 
“ Practicable” good, and the fact that, after all, we have no better rendering for eudaimonia 
than “ Happiness” or “Felicity,” has caused no little misunderstanding o f  his system. Thus 
when Stewart ... says that “by many o f  the best o f the ancient m oralists... the w hole o f  
ethics was reduced to this question ... W hat is m ost conducive on the w hole to our 
happiness?” the rem ark, if  not exactly false, is certain to m islead his readers; since by 
Stewart, as by m ost English writers, “H appiness” is definitely conceived as consisting o f  
“Pleasures” or “Enjoyments.” *^
Thus, according to Sidgwick, English writers, at least towards the end o f the nineteenth 
century, ‘definitely conceived o f  [happiness] as consisting o f “P leasures” or 
“Enjoyments.” ’ And, o f course, that is not what Aristotle meant by the term eudaimonia, in 
either o f its formal or its substantive guises. In Methods o f  Ethics, Sidgwick decides to 
resolve this ambiguity by referring to eudaimonia as “Well-being”. In fact, 1 thinlc there is 
reason to object to even this move. ‘Well-being’ is not a better translation for eudaimonia 
than ‘happiness’. It might be thought that what Sidgwick had in mind was Aristotle’s 
formal definition o f eudaimonia as the ultimate desirable end. I f  we want to allow for an 
understanding of ‘well-being’ such that it is possible to have reason to sacrifice one’s own 
well-being, however, it might not be wise to take ‘well-being’ as a direct translation of 
eudaimonia, as on Aristotle’s account eudaimonia is not something virtuous agents can 
rationally sacrifice.
Chapter 2
4. Eudaimonia as an inclusive good
4.1. Ackrill and Irwin
John L. A ckrill’s inclusivist interpretation o f eudaim onia  involves a relation o f 
subordination between eudaimonia and the various activities that constitute it; yet, Ackrill 
claims, this relation is not necessarily a means/end relation. Ackrill is alluding to the 
constitutive or part-whole relation between eudaimonia and the goods and activities that 
are its parts, ingredients, or elements. These are AclailTs own examples:
[0 ]n e may think o f  the relation o f  putting to playing golf or playing go lf to having a good 
holiday. One does not putt in order to play go lf as one buys a club in order to play golf; ... 
It will be “because” you wanted to play go lf that you are putting, and “for the sake” o f  a 
good holiday that you are playing golf; but this is because putting and golfing are 
constituents o f  or ingredients in golfing and having a good holiday respectively, not 
because they are necessary preliminaries. ... That the primary ingredients o f eudaimonia 
are for the sake o f eudaimonia is not incompatible with their being ends in themselves; for 
eudaimonia is constituted by activities that are ends in themselves.^"
One could choose the activity o f putting because one wants to play golf; similarly, one 
could choose the activity o f playing golf fo r  the sake o f  a good holiday. The pursuit of 
these activities, however, is not instrumental to respectively playing golf or having a good 
holiday. Rather, it is constitutive o f each of them. It seems then that the expression fo r  the 
sake o f  does not necessarily indicate the presence o f an instrumental relation. So far so 
good. Aristotle, however, thought that the parts o f eudaimonia are chosen both for their 
own sake as well as for the sake o f eudaimonia. I f  we take the example o f the good 
holiday, we would have to say that playing golf is chosen for its own sake as well as for the 
sake o f a good holiday. Now, playing golf is (for some) constitutive o f having a good 
holiday. But what if  it suddenly wasn’t? 1 suppose we would have to say one should not
Sidgwick, 1907, 92 n. 2.
" Ackrill, 1980, 19.
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choose to play golf anymore. But, then, does it make sense to say that one should play golf 
for its own sake? Compare this with the case of something that is never chosen for the sake 
of something else, such as eudaimonia. Whatever else happens, we should always choose 
it. There is then a clear difference between things that are chosen only for their own sake, 
and things that are chosen for their own sake as well as for the salce of something else.
In effect, I am asking the following question; is the fact that x is chosen "as a constituent of 
happiness” compatible with the fact that x is chosen “for its own sake”? These two 
expressions would surely be compatible if  they were close to being synonymous. Broadie 
indeed remarks that Ackrill uses the expressions ‘for the sake of happiness’ and ‘for its 
own sake’ almost as synonymous.^^ But, at least for Aristotle, this should not be the case, 
as he thinlcs that there is a difference between eudaimonia and the other intrinsic goods and 
the difference consisted precisely in that the former is always chosen for its own sake and 
never for the sake of something else while the latter are chosen for their own sake as well 
as for the sake o f eudaimonia. Aclaîll does not seem to have a good enough answer to my 
question.
Commentators on Aristotle wishing to explore the connection between choosing a good for 
the sake of happiness and choosing it for its own salce often turn to J. S. Mill. '^* According 
to Terence Irwin, Mill and Aristotle might agree insofar as they both claimed that “it is 
possible to desire some things for their sakes as parts o f happiness” .^  ^ In more proper 
Aristotelian terms one should say:
... we can choose som e things both for their own sakes and for the sake o f happiness 
because w e choose them  as parts o f  happiness, and not ju s t  as instrum ental to 
happiness...^**
So far, Irwin does not seem to have gone beyond the point we reported Ackrill as making.
To choose something for the sake o f happiness does not mean that we are choosing it as an
According to Broadie, Aristotle would not claim this, as he rather suggests that there are instances in which 
choosing some of the ingredients of happiness like pleasure and honour for their own sake may turn out to be 
incompatible with choosing them for the sake of happiness. See, Broadie, 1991, 55, n. 25.
See Irwin, 1975, 341; Irwin, 1995, 290-2; White, N., 1995,276-8.
Irwin, 1995, 290. Aristotle and Mill would however be in disagreement if Mill defended the stronger thesis 
that “desiring X for its own sake is always the same as desiring X as a part of happiness.” Irwin, 1995, 290.
Irwin, 1995,291.
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instrument to happiness; we might be choosing it as a part of happiness. Irwin seems to 
think that since we are not choosing the parts of happiness as instruments we are simply 
choosing them for their own sake. As shown above, however, that step might be 
unwarranted. There seems to be a difference between choosing something for its own sake 
tout court and choosing something for its own sake as well as for the sake of something 
else. Irwin, however, has more to say concerning this question. Consider the case of an 
intrinsic good such as friendship. What would be implied by the view stating that we 
choose friendship “for its own sake and for the sake o f happiness because we choose it as a 
part o f happiness”?
To take this v iew ... is not to imply that we ought to be concerned for friendship, say, partly 
for its own sake and partly for its contribution to happiness. For the very features o f  it that 
make it choice worthy for its own sake also make it a part o f happiness; in choosing it for 
the features that make it a part o f  happiness we are also choosing it for its own sake. There 
are some features o f  friendship that would make it choiceworthy even if  it did not belong to 
a life that achieved happiness; when we choose it for the sake o f happiness, we choose it 
for the sake o f those features."’
Irwin claims that the good-making features of friendship are identical with the happiness- 
contributing features of friendship. It seems to me, however, that someone like Scanlon 
might still ask: why on any token choice o f friendship, is an agent choosing friendship? 
The agent may answer in at least three ways: (a) because friendship is worth choosing for 
its own sake (Scanlon would be satisfied with this answer); (b) because friendship 
contributes to happiness (substituting “well-being” for “happiness”, Scanlon would think 
we do not generally give this answer); (c) as Irwin would say, one chooses friendship for 
its own sake because he chooses it as part o f his happiness. Look at (a) and (b), first. 
Clearly, the fact that my choosing friendship for its own sake always contributes to my 
happiness is not enough to show that on any occasion if  I choose friendship under 
description (a), 1 thereby choose friendship imder description (b) (Scanlon would still be 
able to press his point concerning the unimportance of the concept o f well-being).
Irwin, 1995, 291. Similarly, in the case of virtue Irwin says: “when we decide on something as a 
constituent of happiness, and regard it as contributing to happiness for this reason, we thereby decide on it for 
its own sake, choosing it as a good in itself. If this is right, then Aristotle’s account of virtue shows not only 
that he believes we can consistently choose something both for its own sake and as a part of happiness, but 
also that he believes we can show how something is worth choosing for its own sake by showing how it 
contributes to happiness.” Irwin, 1995,291-2.
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Thus, the only option Irwin has is description (c). According to Irwin, at the ontological 
level, there is one single feature F  with two descriptions: F  is the featuie that makes 
friendship worthwhile; F is  identical to the feature that makes friendship a part o f 
happiness. At the motivational level (cf (c)), I choose friendship for its own sake (as a 
worthwhile good) because 1 choose it as part of my happiness. The 'because' indicates that 
at the motivational level what makes me choose friendship for its own sake is the fact that 
it contributes to my happiness. That this is indeed Irwin’s thought is confirmed by this 
further comment:
... when we decide on something as a constituent o f  happiness, and regard it as 
contributing to happiness for this reason, we thereby decide on it for its own sake, choosing 
it as a good in itself.
Two remarks ought to be made at this point. Starting with our discussion of Ackrill, the 
expression “for its own salce” seems to have caused us some trouble. An ambiguity is at the 
source of this trouble. On a stronger understanding, ‘for its own sake’ can be understood to 
mean irrespective o f  context. On this understanding of the expression, something cannot be 
both chosen for its own sake and for the sake o f something else. On a weaker reading, 
however, for its own sake means not as a means to something else. Irwin clearly cannot 
take on board the stronger meaning. When our reason to choose friendship for its own sake 
is that it is a constituent of happiness (as he says in the last quotation), then take away the 
idea that friendship is a constituent of happiness and you no longer have a reason to choose 
it for its own sake. This of course entails that neither friendship, nor any other constituent 
of happiness, is an intrinsic good irrespective o f context. An example o f a good chosen 
irrespective of context would be eudaimonia itself, something we always choose for its 
own sake and never choose for the sake o f something else. We now have it, then, that 
choosing friendship for its own sake as a constituent of happiness, is simply not to choose 
it as a means to something else rather tlian choosing it irrespective o f context.
Notice, however, and this is our second remark, that this reading of (c) is very far from 
what Scanlon would thinlc, as he claims that we take ourselves to have reason to choose
Irwin, 1995,291.
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various things (that contribute to well-being) for their own sake irrespective o f their 
contribution to well-being. Let us develop this point further in the next subsection.
4.2. Back to Scanlon: lesson s from Aristotelian inclusivism
As we saw in §3, Scanlon thinks: (1) that well-being includes other intrinsic goods; and (2) 
that agents largely take themselves to have reason to pursue the included goods for their 
own sake and not because they contribute to their well-being. The crucial point here is (2). 
Contrary to Scanlon, Irwin thinks that when we choose something as a constituent of 
happiness {eudaimonia), and regard it as contributing to happiness for this reason, we 
thereby choose it for its own sake, not as a means to something else.
Let’s translate Irw in’s thought in the terms relevant to our discussion of Scanlon. 
According to Irwin, if  I choose enjoyment as part o f my well-being, and regard it as 
contributing to my well-being for this reason, 1 thereby choose it for its own sake. The 
deliberative route taken by Irwin’s agent seems to rmi in exactly the opposite direction to 
that taken by Scanlon’s agent. On Irwin’s account, an agent considers as the reason for 
choosing enjoyment the fact that it is a part o f his happiness; when he chooses enjoyment 
for that reason he chooses it for its own sake (in the weak sense o f the expression). On 
Scanlon’s account, the agent considers the fact that something is enjoyable to be itself the 
reason for choosing it; enjoyment is good in its own right. That enjoyment also contributes 
to one’s well-being seems to be a fact largely irrelevant to the agent’s deliberation; that 
fact is something of an epiphenomenon, motivationally and justificatorily largely inert.
This is a crucial difference and it is time to take a stance on this issue. With Scanlon, 1 
agree that often when deliberating we do not seem to consider the fact that something is or 
is not a constitutive o f our well-being. More precisely, 1 think that often, this fact is not 
considered explicitly . This, however, can be explained by the fact that most o f our 
deliberation relies on direct and indirect experience and knowledge o f what objects and 
activities are good for us, or part o f oui" well-being. In our deliberation, then, more often 
than not we need not attend to this issue, as the fact that something is or is not good for us 
is part of the background knowledge in our deliberative process. Consider Scanlon’s 
cinema example: “why do you take yourself to have reason to go the cinema? Because 1 
enjoy it.” Our well-being does not explicitly appear anywhere in our deliberation. Suppose,
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however, that a friend of mine with insider laiowledge tells me that in the last month the 
cinema I want to go to has received several bomb threats. In other words, my friend is 
telling me that going to the cinema might not be good fo r  me. Sensibly, I take myself to 
have reason on the whole not to want to go the cinema. What would justify my choice not 
to go? Most of us would find it perfectly satisfactory to say that it is my well-being, i.e., 
the idea that it would not be good for me to go.^^
Thus, though the idea that something is or is not part o f my well-being is not always 
explicit in our deliberation, it definitively is an implicit part o f it. As soon as, on the basis 
o f our experience and information, we become unsure as to the outcomes o f our choices it 
seems in most cases appropriate to ask the question "Is this good for me?” or "Is this the 
best alternative for me?”. In these cases, considerations of well-being become apparent and 
explicit.^** My view on the role o f well-being in our deliberation, then, is different from 
Scanlon’s though it is not the same as Irw in’s either.^' Agents do not often start their 
deliberative process by considering whether what they choose is a part o f their well-being. 
These considerations become explicit only in certain cases.
Finally, we ought to consider another one of the lessons our discussion o f Aristotle brought 
to the fore. In what sense are we to use the expression “for its own sake” when we say that 
an agent has reason to want and pursue, say, enjoyment for its own sake? Scanlon does not
This example might need further spelling out. Suppose, for example, that my friend is the bomber and 
knew that a bomb capable of disintegrating the whole block would go off at the time I intended to be at the 
cinema, just a few minutes before the session started. In this case there is no reason for me to desire to go to 
the cinema as nothing good for me would be obtained by going to the cinema. Next, consider the case in 
which the bomb would in fact go off just as the session reaches its end. In that case there would be some 
reason to desire to go to the cinema, as 1 would get to enjoy the movie, though there would be stronger reason 
to desire not to go, as that would not be overall good for me. This is the case I had in mind in the text above. 
It might be thought that the “bomb-threat” example is too extreme, though of course that would depend on 
what part of the world one lives in. The same point can be easily made with everyday type of cases. A child 
asks his mother: “Why do I have to go to school? I hate it!” The mother answers or thinks to herself 
“Because that is good/best for you”. Or again, my friend is trying to convince me to try some hash/a new 
machine at the amusement park/to take a course in culinary arts. It would be appropriate and natural on my 
behalf to consider how and whether each of these things would be in my interest or good for me.
1 am not here making the claim that it is always irrational to choose something we believe not to be good 
for us. 1 am not excluding that we may rightly consider ourselves to have most reason to do what is morally 
obligatory though it clashed with what would most be in our interest. Some, however, may want to say that 
deliberation about moral actions should not at all involve consideration of one’s own well-being. I believe 
this position is too moralistic. If there were two courses of actions to do what is morally obligatory and one 
demanded a much lesser sacrifice in my well-being shouldn’t I let this consideration count in favour of it? 
Suppose that in fact one course of action required no sacrifice in my well-being at all. Why should 1 not 
consider it and prefer it?
Insofar as we can take Irwin’s conclusions about eudaimonia to bear on our discussion about well-being.
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mention the possibility o f there being a stronger and a weaker sense in which something 
can be pursued or chosen for its own sake. Surely, however, Scanlon cannot think that an 
agent has reason to want and pinsiie enjoyment for its own sake irrespective o f  context at 
least if  Scanlon also thinks that enjoyment is a part of well-being. Think back to our 
cinema example above. Would 1 still be justified in taking myself to have reason to want to 
go to the cinema if  1 knew it wasn’t good for me? As far as my view goes, I shall rest 
content with the weaker sense. Though there is reason to desire enjoyment for its own 
sake, there is no reason to desire any particular enjoyment unless the agent rightly regarded 
it as good fo r  him or her or in his or her interest. This can consistently be asserted when 
“for its own sake” means “not as a means to something else” rather than “irrespective of 
context” .
5. Conclusion
At the end o f the last chapter, I listed a number o f unanswered questions arising from 
Scanlon’s discussion of the concept of well-being. The first set of questions concerned the 
two criteria Scanlon used in order to assess the importance of the concept of well-being in 
the thinking of an agent. In the first part o f this chapter I concluded that what answers these 
criteria yield partly depends on the level o f reflection at which they are applied and 
contended that Scanlon did not apply them at the right level. Contrary to Scanlon, I also 
showed that there is a first-person, non-moral notion of well-being that agents appeal to in 
their everyday life though, at a higher level of reflection, this notion is also used for moral 
theoretical purposes.
The other set of questions raised at the end o f the last chapter had to do with the relation 
between the concept of well-being and the various things that contribute to well-being. 1 
asked what was the nature o f this x that is contributed to by the various things we have 
reason to desire and pursue in their own right and what kind of relation ties this x to its 
contributors. Does the fact that we pursue its contributors for their own sake exclude that 
we, at the same time, pursue well-being for its own sake? From our analysis o f the 
inclusivist reading of eudaimonia, we learned that the expression “for its own sake” is 
liable to a weaker and a stronger reading. On the former reading, the fact that one takes
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oneself to have reason to pursue a certain good for its own sake does not exclude that one 
could take oneself to have reason to pursue that good for the sake o f his well-being.
Moving away from Aristotelian commentators, we discovered that the concept o f well­
being might implicitly be part of our deliberative process in a way unexamined by Scanlon. 
Even when we take ourselves to have reason to desire and pursue, say, enjoyment for its 
sake, we would take ourselves to have stronger reason not to do so if  further information 
showed us that it might not be good for us to desire and pursue enjoyment on that occasion.
In its weaker sense, we may still be able to say that we desire and pursue enjoyment for its 
own sake, under the idea o f it as good for one. The upshot is that contra Scanlon the 
concept o f well-being does play a significant role in the thinlcing of a rational individual. 
The relation between well-being and its constituents, however, needs to be examined in 
greater detail. That is the task of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 The Concept of Well-being and its Role in 
Practical Deliberation
1. Introduction
The ultimate aim o f this chapter is that o f providing a final reply to Scanlon’s claim 
concerning the unim portance o f the concept o f well-being from a first personal 
perspective. This reply will be expressly stated only in the concluding section (§5): it is not 
the case that the concept o f well-being “has surprisingly little role to play in the thinlcing of 
the rational individual whose life is in question”. More positively, my conclusion will be to 
the effect that for each and every final good constituting a person’s well-being, remove the 
idea that this good contributes to this person’s well-being and you will remove the idea of 
that thing as what this person has most reason to want. 1 will reach this conclusion by 
turning to the work of Joseph Butler (§3) as a source o f inspiration for my own analysis of 
the concept o f well-being (§4). First, however, we need to clarify a difference in the way 
Scanlon and 1 would analyse the various things that contribute to a person’s well-being 
(§2).'
2. Mill, Scanlon, desiring and willing
2.1. The buck-passing account of goodness
Scanlon considers enjoyment to be something we have reason to desire and pursue for its 
own sake. He would equally say that enjoyment is a good in its own right. That is because 
Scanlon endorses what he calls the buck-passing view of goodness. In what follows I shall 
m yself endorse this account, though, as we are soon to see, 1 will endorse it with an 
important qualification.^ On this view something is good if, and only if, it displays other
' Though the relevance of this difference is going to be most crucial to Part 11 and III it is convenient for 
expositoiy reasons to introduce it at this stage of the thesis.
~ In Chapter 8 I will defend the buck-passing account against an important charge.
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properties that provide reason to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. “Exactly what these 
reasons are, and what actions and attitudes they support will be different in different 
c a s e s . I f ,  for example, the putative good in question is a work o f art we may say that it is 
good if  and only if  it displays other properties that provide an agent with a reason to 
admire it. The attitude o f admiration will in turn support certain kinds o f actions such as 
those that express admiration.
Now consider the case o f enjoyment. Agents rightly take it that objects or pursuits that 
display the property o f being enjoyable are good. The question we need to examine, 
however, is whether these things are good in the same way in which a work of art is good. 
They clearly aren’t. These objects or pursuits do not primarily have properties providing 
reason to feel admiration. In other words, these objects or pursuits are not aesthetic goods.
In what way are they good then? I can find no answer other than that they are prudentially 
good or good fo r  the agents who attain these goods. This point may sound like a point 
against Scanlon: it seems now as if  we have reintroduced the idea of well-being through 
the back door. On the contrary, however, the subtlety of Scanlon’s argument can be fully 
appreciated only now. Scanlon argues that just as we have reason to value in themselves 
the various things that contribute to our well-being we have reason to value in themselves 
things that do not contribute to our well-being. Hence, Scanlon would say, it is not 
important from an agent’s point o f view whether something is or isn’t good for him.
In order for Scanlon’s argument to go tlirough, however, there must be no difterence in the 
way we have reason to value things belonging to these two different categories. In other 
words, the pro-attitudes the things that contribute to a person’s well-being give us reason to 
have must be the same as the pro-attitudes the things that do not contribute to a person’s 
well-being give us reason to have. Unsurprisingly, Scanlon seem to thinlc that just as we 
have reason to want and pursue tilings that are good for us we have reason to M’ant and 
pursue things that are not good for us. He also refers to both types of things as to what we 
have reason to care about.
Scanlon’s argmiient may be countered by individuating one kind o f pro-attitude that all and 
only prudentially good things would give us reason to have. In what follows, I will claim
Scanlon, 1998, 97.
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that there is one such pro-attitude, namely our desires: something is good for an agent if 
and only if  there is reason for an agent to desire it. I will take this account to be an instance 
of the buck-passing account o f goodness. If  am successful in this task, I will have shown 
that tlie goods contributing to an agent’s well-being can be distinguished from the goods 
that don’t, and that from the agent’s own perspective. As we shall see, this point can be 
endorsed while maintaining that, by and large, an agent has reason to want the things that 
are good for him for themselves and under the idea o f his well-being. The work o f J. S. 
Mill will be central to develop this argument.
2.2. Mill: desiring and willing
In Utilitarianism Mill says:
There is in reality nothing desired except happiness."^
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence o f pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
privation o f pleasure.^
Concerning the notion of a desire Mill says:
...desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking o f  it as painful, are 
phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts o f the same phenomenon; in strictness 
o f  language, two different modes o f  naming the same psychological fact; that to think o f  an 
object as desirable (unless for the sake o f  its consequences), and to think o f it as pleasant, 
are one and the same thing; and to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea o f  it is 
pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility.*’
Mill seems to suggest that desiring something and finding that thing pleasant are two 
different ways o f referring to the same psychological fact. It has been noted that there is 
some ambiguity in the expression “finding a thing pleasant” .^  It can mean feeling pleasure 
at the thought o f doing that thing, or thinking of that thing as a pleasant thing to do, or
‘jMill, 1998, 84, IV8.
 ^ Mill, 1998, 55, 112. Firstly, note that this formulation is mute as to whose happiness is being desired. In 
Ulilitarianism Mill seems indeed to be shifting from the agent’s own happiness to general happiness. 
Secondly, note that Mill did not maintain Motivational Hedonism, i.e., the thesis that agents are always and 
exclusively motivated to act by a concern with their own happiness/pleasure.
*^ Mill, 1998, 85, IVIO.
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both. M ill must mean that whenever a person wants something he wants it in virtue of 
thinking it will be pleasant. If  that was not so then Mill could not claim that nothing is 
desired except happiness, i.e., pleasure and the absence of pain. What is important here, 
however, is that according to Mill, to desire something is to conceive o f something as 
pleasant. For our pmposes, 1 would like to make two amendments to M ill’s view. Firstly, it 
does not seem true that all things we desire, we desire under the idea o f them as pleasant. 
Suppose 1 am sitting at the hospital waiting to hear whether 1 tested positive for AIDS. 1 
clearly desire to loiow the result o f my blood test though it is hardly plausible to think that 
I do so under the idea o f pleasure. In other words, there seem to be other desirability 
features beside pleasure. In the example 1 just mentioned, the desirability feature in 
question might be taken to be ‘knowledge of my situation’.
Next, focus on the last three lines o f the quote. We can read the following two thoughts: (a) 
judging an object to be desirable for itself is the same as judging it to be pleasant; and (b) 
to desire something for itself is the same as judging it to be pleasant. We have already 
noted that we may desire things other than pleasure. Here, however, we should focus on (a) 
and (b) jointly, and note how they suggest that when we desire something we thinlc o f that 
thing as desirable. Once again, 1 here feel M ill’s position to have been too radical. Is it 
really impossible to have a desire for something, knowing that that thing is after all not 
desirable? And couldn’t someone find something desirable without thereby desiring it? 1 
would however rest content with a weaker version of this Millian thesis: having a desire 
for something involves the tendency to see that thing as desirable, worthy of desire, or 
good to have under the idea of it as being pleasant or under some other desirability feature.
It is important for our project to notice that Mill does not think that desires are the only 
kind of motivation for action. In the System o f  Logic he writes:
When the will is said to be determined by motives, a motive does not mean always, or 
solely, the anticipation o f  a pleasure or o f  a pain. ... As we proceed in the formation o f  
habits, and become accustomed to will a particular act or a particular course o f  conduct 
because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it without any reference to its being 
pleasurable. Although from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to 
find any pleasure in the action, or perhaps to anticipate any pleasure in the consequence o f
’ See for example Skorupski, 1989, 300.
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it, we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to do it. In this manner it is that 
habits o f  hurtful excess continue to be practised although they have ceased to be 
pleasurable; and in this manner also it is that the habit o f  willing to persevere in the course 
which he has chosen does not desert the moral hero, even when the reward, however real, 
which he doubtless receives from the consciousness o f  well-doing, is anything but an 
equivalent for the sufferings he undergoes or the wishes he may have to renounce.^
The title o f this subsection o f the System is quite telling: “A motive not always the 
anticipation of a pleasure or a pain.” The motive is still a desire: "we still continue to desire 
the action.” However, it might be the case that the action no longer yields pleasure or that 
we cease to anticipate pleasure or pain in the action. That is, even though originally we 
used to think o f the action as pleasant, i.e., we desired that kind o f action for its 
pleasantness, now, we no longer evaluate the action in those terms, the action is no longer 
conceived as a pleasant action. We no longer attend to our desire to act in that way; we 
simply, and luireflectively, act in that way. Even more to the point. Mill concludes:
A habit o f  willing is commonly called a purpose; and among the causes o f  our volitions, 
and o f  the actions which flow from them, must be reckoned not only liking and aversions, 
but also purposes. It is only when our purposes have become independent o f  the feelings o f  
pain or pleasure from which they originally took their rise that we are said to have a 
confirmed character. "A character,” says Novalis, “is a completely fashioned will;” and the 
w ill, once so fashioned, may be steady and constant, when the passive susceptibilities o f  
pleasure and pain are greatly weakened or materially changed.^
These quotations are clear enough. Even if  originally all of our actions originated from 
motives related to pleasure and pain, that needn’t necessarily be the case once habitual 
willing takes over. Agents capable of habitual willing display volitions that are not caused 
by the idea of pleasme and the avoidance of pain. Yet Mill says, ‘we still continue to desire 
the action, and consequently to do it’. This claim, however, seems to be in contradiction 
with what Mill says concerning desires as necessarily involving the idea o f pleasure. In 
Utilitarianism., Mill seems to be addressing this point:
" Mill, 1936, 551,vi.ii.4.
 ^Mill, 1936, 551-2, vi.ii.4
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W ill, the active phenomenon, is a different thing from desire, the state o f  passive 
sensibility, and though originally an offshoot from it, may in time take root and detach 
itself from the parent stock; so much so that in the case o f  an habitual purpose, instead o f  
willing a thing because we desire it, we often desire it only because we will it.... The 
distinction between will and desire thus understood, is an authentic and highly important 
psychological fact; but the fact consists solely in this— that will, like all other parts o f our 
constitution, is amenable to habit, and that we may will from habit what we no longer 
desire for itself, or desire only because we will it.’*^
It seems clear from this paragraph that, leaving aside the role o f desires as the ‘parent 
stock’ o f habitual willing, when we act out o f habitual willing the object of our desires is 
no longer ‘desired for itse lf. Even though Mill does not tell us what the role o f these 
residual desires might be, one might take Mill to have thought that any action must 
necessarily spring from a desire. Thus, this desire would be somehow instrumental, a 
desire to bring about the action which one wills. At any rate, it would not be the same kind 
of desiring-as-pleasant we reported Mill to describe at the start o f this subsection. It would 
be true, then, that in these cases it is not because an agent finds an object pleasant that he is 
disposed to pursue that object, but that one is disposed to act irrespective o f the pleasurable 
nature o f the object. Mill distinguishes this kind o f disposition from that that we normally 
have when acting out o f desires, by saying that this is not a ‘desire for the object itse lf. In 
conclusion, there seem to be two kinds o f motives: desires as passive sensibility, i.e., as 
conceiving o f something as good to have under the idea o f pleasure (and as we postulated 
even under other desirability features) and willing something. When we will something we 
are still moved to act by a desire, but, in this sense, desires are not passive sensibility, there 
is no idea o f pleasure or o f any other desirability feature involved. Next, we shall see how 
these distinctions will help us make oiu case against Scanlon.
2.3. Scanlon’s  Millian desires  
Similarly to Mill, Scanlon claims that:
Mill, 1998, 85, IY .il.
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Desiring something involves having the tendency to see something good or desirable about 
it. ... [HJaving what is generally called a desire involves having a tendency to see 
something as a reason. Even if  this is true, however, this is not all that desire involves. 
Having a desire to do something (such as to drink a glass o f  water) is not just a matter o f  
seeing something good about it. I might see something good about drinking a glass o f  foul- 
tasting medicine, but would not therefore be said to have a desire to do it, and I can even 
see that something would be pleasant without, in the normal sense, feeling a desire to do it. 
Reflection on the differences between these cases leads me to what 1 call the idea o f  desire 
in the directed-attention sense. A person has a desire in the directed-attention sense that P if 
the thought that P keeps occurring to him or her in a favourable light, that is to say, if the 
person’s attention is directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as 
counting in favor o f P. "
In this passage, Scanlon makes some very important points: we might see something good 
in doing things we clearly have no desire to do (think about the foul-tasting medicine 
example) and, sometimes, we might have no desire to do something that would be 
pleasant, i.e., occasionally, we might have no desire to do things that we normally take to 
be good. So far, I agree with Scanlon. According to Scanlon, the idea o f  desires in the 
directed-attention sense:
...capture[s] an essential element in the intuitive notion o f  (occurrent) desire. Desire for 
food, for example, and sexual desires are marked by just this character o f  directed 
attention. And this character is generally missing in cases in which we say that a person 
who does something for a reason nonetheless “has no desire to do it,” as when, for 
example, one must tell a friend some unwelcome news. ...[W ]e most commonly speak o f  
“having a desire” in this sense for things that involve the prospect o f  pleasant experiences 
(or the avoidance o f  unpleasant ones). But while it seems to be a fact about us that pleasure 
and pain are particularly able to attract our attention, they are not the only things that can 
do so. People can “have a great desire” in the directed-attention sense to succeed in some 
endeavor, to achieve fame (even posthumous fame), to provide for their children after their 
death... [I]t is just as appropriate on this account to say that someone with a very active 
conscience “has a strong desire to do the right thing” as it is to say o f  a person who is 
utterly unscrupulous that he “has a strong desire for personal gain”.*"
Scanlon, 1998, 38-39.
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Once again, I am in agreement with this part o f Scanlon’s thought What I would like to 
show, however, is that this part o f his thought is compatible with the Millian distinction 
between desiring and willing. In Scanlon we find an important distinction: (a) we desire 
something in the directed-attention sense, i.e., we see that thing as good in some respect; 
and (b) we may see something good in doing things we have no desire to do. Now, suppose 
that in the first case an agent rightly takes himself to have reason to desire the thing he 
desires, i.e., the agent is right in considering that thing to be good in some respect. What 
are we to say about desires for cases such as (b)? Suppose that even in that case the thing is 
good in some respect: must the agent have reason to desire it? My contention is that there 
may be no such reason; the agent may simply have reason to do it but no reason to desire 
it. Why think that agents must have reason to desire to do every action they have reason to 
do?'^
Nothing we have reported Scanlon as claiming would prevent him from endorsing M ill’s 
distinction between desiring and willing in the following terms: we may have reason to 
desire to do certain actions but we may also simply have reason to do them. In the first 
case, it would be appropriate for the agent to have a desire to do that thing. In the second 
case, it would be appropriate for the agent to simply will the action that brings about or 
realises that tiling. In both cases, the thing one has reason to do is good in some respect. 
The question is, however, in what respect are things we have reason to desire good, and in 
what respect do they differ from things we have reason to will? The idea is simple: an 
agent has reason to desire all and only things that are good for him or part of his well­
being. All other good things an agent has reason to have all sorts o f other pro-attitudes 
towards, including willing. This is a central idea o f this thesis and a full defence of it will 
be developed throughout the chapters to come. In this section, however, I intend to lend 
initial plausibility to it.
'J Scanlon, 1998,39.
It might be helpful here to introduce what I take to be three distinct ways of using the concept ‘desire’ in 
philosophy, (a) Substantive or directed-attention desire: this is the sense of desire we discussed above, to 
which Mill referred as ‘passive sensibility’, (b) Purpose-eliciting desires: to say that 1 want or desire 
something is to say that the object of my desire is on my agenda. For example, if I knock on someone’s 
office-door it is because I want to see this person (that’s my purpose). It is a further question to ask whether 
my desire is substantive as in (a). Finally, (c) Humean desire: this is a psychological entity that on a Humean 
theory of desires always ultimately motivates and justifies our actions.
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Consider Mill once again: when an agent desires something he conceives o f that thing as 
pleasant and good in that respect. Clearly, however, the thing is pleasant fo r  the agent. 
Even if  the course o f action the agent desires is intended to, say, benefit someone else, if 
the agent desires to do that course of action he will conceive of that course of action as 
(bringing about something) pleasant for him. As claimed above, however, pleasure should 
not be considered as the only desirability featine of our ends. Take the testing for AIDS 
example. I am miserable not Imowing because I desire to know. I conceive o f the state in 
which I will come to Imow the truth about my situation as desirable. But the expressions 
‘desirable’ and ‘desirability featme’ aie not as specific as we would want them to be. Sure 
enough, I find it desirable to Imow: but does that mean that I consider it is good tout court 
that I Imow or, more modestly, that I consider it is good/hr me to know? I believe that the 
second interpretation is what we really mean in these circumstances. As far as I can see, it 
might not at all be good tout court that I know but that is not what is at stake here. I desire 
to know because I take it to be good for me to know. It is desirable fo r  me to know; 
nothing is being implied as to whether it is good toitt court.
It might be retorted that suiely we desire things that we take to be good tout court. I would 
agree and add that we would call virtuous those agents that do so with unerring constancy. 
Agents o f this type must be contrasted to another type of moral character that we will call 
conscientious. The former desire to do that which is good; they conceive o f that which is 
good as also being a part of their good. When an agent acts conscientiously, however, the 
action is not accompanied by a corresponding desire. The agent must conceive o f the 
action as his duty, not as good or deshable fo r  him. The agent will take himself to have 
reason to will the action though we camiot say that he has reason to desire it.
2.4. The upshot
We now have enough elements to counter Scanlon’s argument to the effect that just as we 
have reason to desire and pursue the various things that contribute to our well-being we 
have reason to desire and pursue for themselves things that do not contribute to our well­
being. Contra Scanlon, we individuated desire as the one kind o f pro-attitude that all and 
only prudentially good things would give us reason to have. More precisely: something is 
good fo r  an agent if  and only if  it has a property that gives reason to the agent to desire it. 
Note that this account (1) is an instance o f the buck-passing account o f goodness; (2)
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allows agents to have reason to do things that do not contribute to their well-being; in those 
cases, we would say they have reason to will those actions; (3) is capable o f separating the 
goods contributing to an agent’s well-being from the goods that don’t. As we shall see, this 
accoimt can be endorsed while maintaining that we have reason to want the things that are 
good for us for their own sake. This will be fully shown in §4 below.
3. Butler, self-love, the passions, and happiness
3.1. Why Butler?
We concluded Chapter 2 with the following picture: we take ourselves to have reason to 
desire and pursue a variety of things for their own sake, i.e., not as a means to something 
else. Many o f these things, however, contribute to our well-being even though that is not 
what gives us reason to desire and pursue them in the first instance. Yet, we claimed that 
Scanlon’s conclusion to the effect that well-being does not play an (explanatorily) 
important role in our deliberation does not follow, because this concept is implicitly part of 
our deliberative process. What we need to get a better grasp of in this chapter is precisely 
what this concept of well-being is and how it and the things that make it up are related. For 
these purposes, a discussion o f Butler is very much in order as the picture he put forward 
shares many similarities with the picture we have presented so fai*.
According to Butler, our happiness is realised by the gratification o f a number o f things 
that we desire in and for themselves, not because they contribute to our happiness (switch 
Butler’s happiness with M>ell-being and you will begin to see the resemblance between his 
picture and ours). Our desires for these things Butler called the particular passions. 
Furthermore, Butler wanted to say that, though we desire these various things in their own 
right, we also have a concern for our happiness itself, what he calls self-love, and that it is 
self-love that should guide the piu'suit o f the various things we desire. In a vein similar to 
Butler’s, I will conclude my own analysis o f well-being by saying that it is the idea o f 
well-being that guides the pursuits of many of the things we talce ourselves to have reason 
to desire for their own sake. We shall limit our discussion o f Butler’s ethics to a critical
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presentation of only some o f its fundamental elements. In particular we will discuss tlnee 
notions, i.e., self-love, the particular passions, and happiness, and the way they are related.
Accordhig to Butler self-love is one of the four principles of action*"* that constitute our 
hum an nature, the other three being the passions (or affections or appetites);*^ 
benevolence; and conscience. These elements are arranged in hierarcliical order according 
to the (rational) authority o f each o f them. The passions have the least authority while 
conscience, a "rational” or "reflective” principle, has the most authority.'*’ Self-love and 
benevolence stand somewhere in between conscience and the passions. In order to 
understand this ranking we must understand the notion of authority as Butler uses it. The 
authority o f a principle of action is not to be imderstood in terms o f its felt strength. The 
strength with which a certain appetite may press someone into acting may override the 
more authoritative contrary judgement (‘the disapproval’ in Butler’s terminology) o f that 
person’s conscience. In this circumstance, Butler would say, a man is acting against his 
nature,'^ The authority o f a principle o f action, then, is part o f its nature and has ultimate 
normative force. Butler intends self-love to be distinctively more authoritative than the 
passions.'^
3.2. Self-love, the passions, and happiness: Part I 
Butler described self-love as
Penelhum, 1985, 26, tells us that the term ‘principle’ is Butler’s “commonest general name for all the 
motives he discusses, and there does not seem to be any implied contrast between ‘principle’ and 
‘instinct’... The term ‘principle’, then, appears to be used indifferently for any conscious inner source of 
human action.”
Henceforth, I will use the word “passions” to refer to the appetites, the passions, and the affections.
The fact that conscience is reflective and a rational principle did not exclude, for Butler, that “affections” 
were involved in its workings.
The concept of nature, in Butler, is not a merely descriptive concept, or at least not in the contemporary 
sense of “descriptive”. According to him, teleology has a clear role in our nature: each principle is to serve a 
certain function and its authority over the other principles has been established by God as He implanted them 
in us. It is in this sense that when one acts on a principle which defies the authority of a higher principle, one 
acts against one’s nature.
Most commentators agree in saying that self-love is a second-order desire, i.e., a desire about one’s desires: 
Duncan-Smith, 1952. Penelhum, 1985. Henson, 1987, disagrees. Butler, of course, never uses the term 
‘second-order desire’.
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... the principle o f  an action proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my 
advantage ...
Elsewhere Butler writes:
... men form a general notion o f  interest, some placing it in one thing, and some in another, 
and have a considerable regard to it throughout the course o f  their life, which is owing to 
self“love.^°
In other places still, Butler talks of self-love as a person’s desire for his known, or manifest 
and real, interest. There are two interesting features in Butler’s discussion: firstly, self-love 
is a desire or principle of action with regard to one’s interest; secondly, this interest will be 
placed in different things by different people. Let us read more about what these things are 
and how self-love is “placed” in them.
Every man hath a general desire o f  his own happiness, and likewise a variety o f particular 
affections, passions and appetites to particular external objects. The former proceeds from 
or is self-love; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures who can reflect upon 
themselves and their own interest or happiness, so as to have that interest an object to their 
m inds... The object the former pursues is somewhat internal, our own happiness, 
enjoyment, satisfaction; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular perception what 
it is, or wherein it consists: the objects o f the latter are this or that particular external thing, 
which the affections tend towards, and o f  which it hath always a particular idea or 
perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks anything external for the sake o f  the 
thing, but only as a means o f  happiness or good: particular affections rest in the external 
things themselves. One belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own 
interest or happiness. The other, though quite distinct from reason, are as much part o f  
human nature."'
M ost generally, this passage distinguishes self-love from the passions along three 
dimensions: (1) self-love is a general principle of action while the passions are particular
Butler, 1949, XI, 7, 168-169. I will refer to the W. R. Matthews edition, 1949. This edition, in turn, uses 
the paragraphing introduced by J.H. Bernard’s edition. The reference will be made up by three numbers: in 
order the (roman) number of the Sermon (except in the case of the Preface), the paragraph number, and the 
page number.
Butler, 1949, Preface, 37, 22.
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principles of action; (2) the object o f self-love is internal while the objects o f the passions 
are external; (3) self-love is a rational principle while the passions aren’t. In what follows 
we shall examine what I take to be the most important o f these two criteria, namely (1) and
(3).
Self-love is an unmotivated desire for a general type of object, i.e., one’s own happiness.^^ 
We saw how Butler defined self-love as the principle of an action done because it would be 
to one’s own advantage, or interest. This is what Butler also cdXls di general desire for one’s 
happiness. Tliis desire is general insofar- as, at this stage, it is an unarticulated, unmotivated 
desire, not to be identified with the desire for any specific or more articulated object or 
state o f affairs.
Self-love, or the desire for one’s own happiness, can also be articulated more specifically.
In order to do so, however, we must introduce the notion of the particular passions. Just as 
we have an immotivated general desire for our happiness, we have a variety o f particular 
unmotivated passions for particular  (external) objects. We have a number o f different 
primitive desires each for its naturally suited object (for example, an appetite such as 
hunger would have food as its naturally suited object). The particular passions are 
connected to self-love to the extent that happiness arises out of the enjoyment by certain 
particular passions of their suited object:
...the very idea o f  interest or happiness consists in this that an appetite or affection enjoys 
its object.^^
Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment o f  those objects which are by 
nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and affections. ... [HJappiness 
consists in the gratification o f  certain affections, appetites, and passions, with objects 
which are by nature adapted to them. '^*
Butler seems to be putting forward two theses: according to the first happiness would arise 
whenever a passion enjoys its object. According to tlie second, however, happiness would
Butler, 1949, XI, 5, 167.
"  Motivated desires are desires whose force is entirely borrowed from another motive; remove that motive 
and we would no longer have that desire. Unmotivated desires are primitive in the sense that their 
motivational force rests completely within themselves.
Butler, 1949, Preface, 37, 22.
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arise only when certain passions enjoy their o b je c ts .W h ic h  o f these two views does 
Butler want to defend? The following passage might be taken to support the second, 
though in this passage Butler is actually putting forward an argmiient against psychological 
egoism:
. ..w e  should want words to express the difference between the principle o f  an action 
proceeding from cool consideration that it will be to my advantage, and an action, suppose 
o f  revenge or friendship, by which a man runs upon a certain ruin to do evil or good to 
another. It is manifest the principles o f  these actions are totally different, and so want 
different words to be distinguished by; all that they agree in is that they both proceed from 
and are done to gratify an inclination in a man’s self. But the principle or inclination in one 
case is self-love, in the other, hatred or love o f  another. There is then a distinction between 
the cool principle o f self-love or general desire o f our happiness, as one part o f our nature 
and one principle o f  action, and the particular affections toward particular external objects, 
as another part o f  our nature and another principle o f  action."^
Butler writes that a “man runs upon a certain ruin to do evil or good to another”. When he 
does, some o f his particular inclinations are gratified. What is clear, though, is that it is not 
self-love which is being gratified since, by definition, that is not the m an’s motive and, 
also, because this man knowingly acts so as to incur “a certain ruin”. According to Butler, 
writers such as Hobbes are confused when they call “actions interested which are done in 
contradiction to the most manifest laiown interest, merely for the gratification o f a present 
passion” .^  ^ On Butler’s view, the simple fact that a passion enjoys its natural object or is 
gratified is not in and of itself sufficient to claim that the agent’s self-love is being served 
(even though it might still be open to Butler to say that some happiness might arise out of 
it). Interestingly, then, more than just satisfaction o f simple desires is required in order for 
(all things considered) happiness to aiise.
The gist o f Butler’s idea is that self-love is a general desire o f one’s happiness and 
happiness is constituted by the enjoyment of certain, not all, particular passions of their
Butler, 1949, XI, 9 and 16, 170 and 178.
Phillips, 2000, 425-6, n. 19, makes a similar point when he writes: “Butler is clearly committed to some 
subjectivist account of happiness. What is less clear is just what version of subjectivism. Sometimes Butler 
writes as if happiness is a matter of the satisfaction of prior desires; at other times, the point seems to be the 
weaker one that things make us happy only if we are constituted so as to enjoy them.”
Butler, 1949, XI, 7, 168-169.
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suited object. Someone (and I do have Scanlon in mind) might find it easy to agree with 
Butler insofar as he claims that there are particular passions. Yet, he may disagree with 
him insofar as he believes that there is such a thing as a general desire for happiness such 
as self-love. Butler may try to persuade him in this way:
Suppose another man to go through some laborious work on the promise o f a great reward, 
without any distinct knowledge what the reward will be; this course o f  action cannot be 
ascribed to any particular passion.^®
Let us refer to this example as the ‘laborious work’ example. I find this example rather 
persuasive in establishing that there is an ultimate or mimotivated desire for happiness that 
is general and unarticulated. This example shows that what we would find motivating is 
the abstract idea that my interest would be served, whatever concrete things I place my 
interest in. Yet, Butler also says,
It is not because we love ourselves that w e find delight in such and such objects, but 
because we have particular affections towards them. Take away these affections, and you 
leave self-love absolutely nothing to employ itself about.
It is not because we desire our happiness that we find eating delightful (a source of 
happiness), but because we have a desire for food itself. The point is that more than 
satisfaction o f self-love is needed in order for happiness to arise. But, and this introduces 
the second difference between self-love and the passions, satisfaction of any passion is not 
likely to yield happiness unless it is assisted by self-love, the rational principle. According 
to Butler, in fact, the passions are “blind” occurrences; they can’t ‘see’ further than the 
satisfaction o f their object. They express or embody “a prior suitableness between” 
themselves and their object;^** they imply “a direct simple tendency towards such and such 
objects, without distinction o f the means by which they are to be obtained.” '^ For Butler 
the passions are essentially p a ss ive :  God implants them in us and it is a feature
Butler, 1949, Preface, 35, 21. 
Butler, 1949,1, 7 ,, 36 n. 5. 
Butler, 1949, Preface, 37,22. 
Butler, 1949, XI, 6, 167. 
Butler, 11, 13,56.
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(independent from our will) that they naturally  tend towards their o b j e c t . T h e  
suitableness between a desire and an object is prior in that it is a relation that just happens 
to exist by nature (or by the will o f God) whether or not we intentionally intervene in it to 
let it run its course. At this level, reason can certainly play an instrumental role: it can help 
us calculate the best way to satisfy our passions. But even that is not on its own enough to 
guarantee happiness. Purely instrumental reason might help us choose the best means to 
satisfy a particular passion that is avowedly against oin interest (think about the vengeful 
man example).
That is why we also need self-love. O f course, self-love too is an affection:
It is an affection to ourselves; a regard to our own interest, happiness and private good: and 
in the proportion a man hath this, he is interested, a lover o f  himself.
Were it not an affection, says Penelhum, Butler would have not called it self-/ove.^"* 
However, it can also be classed as a rational principle. According to Penelhum:
It is a rational principle in the sense that it requires a rational being’s capacity to distinguish 
between such a general and second-order object as happiness and other objects o f  want, 
and in the sense that it is an affection that can only be exercised through judgements that 
particular objectives will, or will not, contribute to this general one, [Butler] brings out this 
necessary element o f  calculation by calling it ‘cool self-love’ and ‘reasonable self-love’.
The passions are blind; when acting with an eye to one’s “private good”, however, we 
should only act on those particular passions the satisfaction of which is believed to bring 
about one’s happiness. When acting out o f self-love, then, reason plays two roles: that of 
selecting which passions to pursue and which not to pursue and the instrumental role we 
mentioned above.^*’ In other words, self-love requires rationality about the ends, as well as 
rationality about the means. Borrowing Butler’s own example, a man can see that he
See Penelhum, 1985, 29.
Butler, XI, 8, 169.
Penelhum, 1985, 29.
Penelhum, 1985, 30.
On this point see McNaughton, 1992, 280-281.
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desires to kill another man for revenge but he can also see that that would bring certain 
ruin upon him; out of self-love he can see he should not act on this vengeful motive.
3.3. Self-love, the passions, and happiness: Part II
Butler insists on distinguishing self-love from its object, i.e., happiness:
Happiness does not consist in self-love. The desire for happiness is no more the thing in 
itself, than the desire o f  riches is the possession or enjoyment o f  them. People may love 
themselves with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable. 
... if  self-love wholly engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other principle, there can 
be absolutely no such thing as happiness, or enjoyment o f  any kind whatever; since 
happiness consists in the gratification o f  particular passions, which supposes the having o f  
them. Self-love does not constitute this or that to be our interest or good; but our interest or 
good being constituted by nature and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and 
securing it.^ ^
A person’s happiness should not be confused with this person’s desire for his happiness, 
i.e., happiness and self-love are distinct things. Remarkably, in this passage Butler also 
offers an early formulation o f the paradox of hedonism: a person’s desire for his happiness 
may be so strong as to impede him from being happy. Often, when this situation occurs, 
the agent no longer sees that happiness arises from the satisfaction o f certain particular 
passions. Which passions? Part of the reply is already mentioned in the quotation above: 
“our interest or good being constituted by natme”. Another part o f the reply conies a few 
paragraphs below in Sermon XI, 15-17. Here, Butler examines one by one the objects of 
some of oiu’ particular passions. He begins with the enjoyment of those objects, “which are 
by nature adapted to our several faculties” . They are supposed to arise from riches, 
honours, and the gratification of sensual appetites. But, then, he goes on:
... men o f  all ages professed to have found satisfaction in the exercise o f  charity, in the 
love o f  their neighbour, in endeavouring to promote the happiness o f  all they had to do
Butler, 1949, XI, 9, 170.
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with, and in the pursuit o f  what is just and right and good, as the general bent o f their mind, 
and end o f  their life.^^
Butler goes as far as considering the gratification certain people would derive from 
“approving themselves to God’s unerring judgement, to whom they thus refer all their 
actions”/^  Even the gratification o f that kind o f passion may be part o f a person’s 
happiness. Butler, however, goes to a certain length to insist that:
Self-love may indeed set us on work to gratify these [affections, appetites, passions]; but 
happiness or enjoyment has no immediate connection with self-love, but arises from such 
gratification alone. ... they [the affections, appetites, and passions] equally proceed from or 
do not proceed from self-love, they equally include or equally exclude this principle.'**'
Happiness and self-love are two distinct things. What constitutes a person’s happiness 
depends on his or her nature even though the kinds o f things from which happiness may 
arise seem to be limited by our nature as human beings and by facts about each particular 
person. Some of us may be satisfied simply with honour, riches and sensual pleasures. 
Others may find satisfaction in other endeavours, such as promoting the good o f others, 
and even in acting in accordance with the will o f God. As for self-love, it “only puts us 
upon obtaining and securing” the various things from which our happiness arises. 
Interestingly, the impulse to satisfy the passions from which happiness might arise may or 
may not proceed from self-love. Take benevolence to be the particular passion to further 
another person’s good. One might “set to gratify benevolence” from self-love or, maybe, 
from the particular benevolent passion itself. In the first case, 1 suppose, to act 
benevolently might involve the realisation that one’s desire to help another is part of one’s 
good, interest, or happiness.
Let’s sum up Butler’s view. We do have a regal'd for our own interest tlu'oughout our lives 
but whenever we are to realise this interest we need to act on some o f our particular 
passions; “Take away these affections, and you leave self-love absolutely nothing to 
employ itself about.” That is because the object o f our self-love is happiness and happiness
Butler, XI, 15, 176. 
Butler, XI, 15, 177. 
Butler, XI, 16, 178.
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arises when some of our particular passions are gratified. Notice that the relation between 
self-love, the particular passions and happiness play a role at two different levels, a 
psychological one and an ontological one. At a psychological level we desire both our 
happiness in general as well as the various objects o f the particular passions. From an 
ontological point of view, then, the states in which my happiness can arise are only the 
states in which some particular desires that 1 have aie satisfied. Happiness, however, does 
not arise tlnough the gratification o f any o f the particular passions that 1 happen to have. 
Through self-love, reason informs our selection o f the particular desires we should act on 
in order to enhance our chances to see our happiness realised. Butler’s example o f the 
vengeful man is a good illustration. Only om* rationally informed desire for happiness is 
capable o f guiding our action towards what is in our interest by choosing to act on only 
some o f our particular desires."*'
4. The idea, the parts, and the sources of well-being
With this Butierian introduction in mind, in this section, 1 shall put forward an analysis of 
the concept of well-being. To anticipate a little, we shall see that the concept of well-being 
involves (I) the idea of well-being; (2) the parts o f well-being; and (3) the sources of well­
being. 1 shall take each o f these notions in turn and examine the way in which they are 
related to each other. Finally, 1 shall note that both rational and non-rational creatures may 
be capable o f well-being though what the concept of well-being should be understood as 
involving when applied to either kind o f being is liable to change.
To the contemporary reader, Butler may seem confused on at least one count. He writes (1) that happiness 
is or consists in certain particular passions’ enjoyment or gratification of their naturally suited objects; and 
(2) that happiness consists in (a) the enjoyment by a man of honour, riches and sensual pleasures, or (b) the 
satisfaction of some men in the exercise of charity and the love of others, or (c) the gratification derived by 
some men in acting in accordance to the will of God. There seems to be some shift between the two senses of 
satisfaction, enjoyment, or gratification expressed by (1) and (2). (1) seems to point out to what today we 
would call the logical sense In which a desire is satisfied when the state of affairs that appears as its content 
obtains. (2) is the sense in which satisfaction, gratification, and enjoyment refer to the positive feeling that 
arises when one of the agent’s desires obtain. Today, we would want to associate the first type of enjoyment 
to desire-satisfaction theories of happiness or well-being and the second type of enjoyment with some form 
of hedonism or with mental statism (a view according to which a person’s happiness or well-being can be 
affected only by certain kinds of mental states). We shall not discuss from an exegetical point of view which 
of these options Butler would have to endorse. Nor shall we examine the relation between desire-satisfaction
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4.1. The idea of well-being
Suppose, with Scanlon, that we have reason to desire enjoyment for its own sake. Suppose 
that an agent is confronted with a choice between two courses o f  action with no 
consequences for anyone other than himself. Suppose also that the only desirability feature 
o f each action is its enjoyableness. We should agree that it would be most rational for the 
agent to choose the thing that brought about the most enjoyment. Wliat makes that the most 
rational choice? One answer would be ‘enjoyment itse lf given that we are postulating that 
we have reason to desire it for its own sake. But then we could carry out a simple test we 
already introduced at the end o f the last chapter. Suppose it could be shown that the most 
enjoyable thing was not in fact good for the agent. In other words, suppose that this thing 
was not part of the agent’s well-being: would we still think that he has most reason to want 
it? Clearly not, at least not in a case like the one we are considering. What confers 
rationality to our desire for that thing, then, is not simply enjoyment. Rather, it seems that 
the idea of the agent’s well-being determines what there is most reason to desire.
Let me run a slightly different version of this argument. We agreed that it would be most 
rational for the agent to desire the thing tliat brought about the most enjoyment. If  someone 
asked why that would be the most rational thing to desire and pursue one could answer that 
that is so simply because it is believed to yield the most enjoyment. Scanlon would have to 
be satisfied with this answer. But wouldn’t we find this answer satisfactory only insofar as 
we also took it to imply that that thing was the one most in the agent’s interest? If someone 
made us seriously doubt the fact that this thing is the one most in the agent’s interest, 
wouldn’t we ipso facto  doubt that the agent has most reason to desire it?
Next, let us alter the description o f our example in the following way. We can no longer 
assume that the consequences o f the agent’s choice are restricted to himself alone. Other 
persons might be involved. We also Imow that the choice resulting in the most enjoyment 
for the agent is the best in terms o f the agent’s well-being and, yet, he chooses something 
else. Wliat are we to conclude? 1 think we have three options: (a) the agent has acted on 
considerations other than his well-being; (b) the agent did act on what he believed to be his 
interest but held false beliefs concerning what was the best choice for him. Suppose,
theories o f well-being and hedonism/mental statism. An excellent discussion of this latter topic can be found
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however, that his choice cannot be explained by either (a) or (b), then, we will have to 
conclude that (c) the agent acted irrationally. In these circumstances, the agent’s rationality 
is criticisable on the grounds that he did not take the option that he had good reason to 
believe to be most conducive to his well-being. If  this conclusion is correct, then we can 
claim that the idea of one’s well-being is a normative idea. More precisely, as we saw in 
§2, the idea of well-being entails reasons to desire things for the agent whose well-being it 
is. Now, as we shall explain in Chapter 8, when we have reason to desire something we 
have reason to do what would realise the object o f our desire.
We have been using the expression o f the ‘idea or concept o f well-being’ and claimed that 
it entails reasons; but what is this idea o f well-being exactly? By ‘the idea of well-being’ 1 
mean precisely the same as Butler’s unarticulated “general notion o f interest” “advantage”, 
“private good”, or benefit, “some placing in one thing, and some in another”, and for 
which we have a considerable regard tliroughout the course of our life. 1 need say no more 
about it and 1 am confident the readers will Imow what 1 am referring to.
4.2. The parts and the sources of well-being
The idea o f well-being stands in a particular relation to the parts o f well-being. Butler 
thought that self-love would have nothing to employ itself about without the particular 
passions and that happiness could not arise without them. Similarly, 1 think that a person’s 
well-being could not arise without that person’s attaining the various things that he has 
reason to desire for their own sake. These things 1 will call the parts, components, 
constituents, or ingredients o f well-being. When a person’s well-being is said to arise, in 
substantive terms, we mean to say that one or another of the components (or a certain 
arrangement o f components) of this person’s well-being is being instantiated in his life. If 
enjoyment is one such component, then its instantiation in the agent’s life fleshes out or 
gives substance to this person’s well-being.
Or again, suppose that on one occasion, say, an enjoyment and a particular achievement 
were both part o f the agent’s well-being and came to conflict with each other: he can 
pursue one or the other but not both. In other words, he has reason to desire for their own
ill Kagan, 1992.
67
Chapter 3
sake both things taken individually though, unfortunately, pursuit o f the one excludes the 
pursuit of the other. After brief deliberation, the agent comes to the (right) conclusion that 
on this occasion he has most reason to desire enjoyment. In this case, the outcome in which 
the agent obtained more enjoyment and less achievement is better for him than the 
outcome in which he obtained less enjoyment and more achievement. Though it is true o f 
this outcome that it contains more well-being that should not be understood as meaning 
that this outcome contains anything other than a certain arrangement o f enjoyment and 
achievement. In substantive terms, a person’s well-being is nothing over and above (a 
particular arrangement of) its parts. This thought expresses my own view that well-being is 
not a separate but an inclusive good."*^
It should be emphasised, however, that in non-substantive terms the components of well­
being are not all there is to well-being. We have explored what we mean by the idea of 
well-being in the subsection above: it is the general, unarticulated idea of something being 
in a person’s interest, for his good or advantage or benefit. Remember how Butler found 
self-love to be motivating (think about his “laborious work” example). Just as Butler, and 
contrary (or largely contrary) to what Scanlon claims, 1 too believe that the idea o f well­
being is motivationally active though many times it is so only implicitly. True enough, we 
are primarily motivated by the various things that make up our well-being: pleasure or 
enjoyment, and whatever other desirability features we talce our ends to have. But both the 
motivational and justificatory power of these featuies is held in check by the idea o f well­
being. Take that idea away, i.e., show someone that desiring and pursuing these things 
would amount to no good for him, and away goes much o f their power. Implicitly or 
explicitly, the idea o f well-being is explanatorily and justificatorily important.
Griffin seems to share a similar point of view when he writes: “So when, for whatever purposes, we shift 
from everyday talk of pursuing various different ends to theoretical talk of maximising a single quantity, 
‘utility’, this quantity should not be understood as an end of the same kind, only grander. There is simply no 
case for reducing these various ends to a single end in this sense... When our various values conflict, we may 
attempt to resolve the conflict by trying to realize as much ‘value’ as possible...even in the absence of one 
substantive end as mediator.” Or again: “ ...when we assess various combinations of our ends, there is no 
further substantive value, no supreme or dominant end, to rank them.” And finally: “Since utility is not a 
substantive value at all, we have to give up the idea that our various particular ends are valuable only because 
they cause, produce, bring about, are sources of, utility. On the contrary, they are the values, utility is not.” 
Griffin, 1986, 32, 36, and 332 n. 24. Of course, I would not go as far Griffin’s last claim. Well-being is a 
value, namely, that which is good for one. Substantively, however, this value is realised only through its parts 
or components.
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Next, think back to Irwin’s view concerning the parts o f eudaimoma. Taking friendship to 
be something we have reason to desire for its own sake, Irwin took it that there is one 
single feature F  with two descriptions: F  is the feature that malces friendship worthwhile; F  
is numerically identical to the featme that makes friendship a part o f happiness. Within our 
modified version o f tlie buck-passing account of goodness, we would say that friendship is 
good for an agent if, and only if, friendship has a property F  such that F  gives reason to 
desire friendship. Contrary to what Irwin seems to imply, on our account friendship is not 
simply worthwhile, but it is worthwhile in a certain respect, i.e., as a part o f the agent’s 
well-being. This does not imply that friendship may not be good in other respects. Maybe 
we have reason to admire instantiations o f the purest and highest forms o f friendship. The 
question here, however, is whether we have reason to desire it for omselves, and if we do, 
then, on om* account, friendship is pai’t o f our good.
Finally, le t’s clarify the distinction between the parts of well-being and its sources. 
Suppose that enjoyment or pleasme was the only component (or part, or ingredient) o f my 
well-being. Suppose now that I find eating a chocolate bar pleasurable. In this case, the 
chocolate bar is the source o f my well-being. The chocolate bar contributes to my well­
being insofar as I find eating it pleasurable. The property of being pleasurable for me is not 
intrinsic to the chocolate bar. The relevant property intrinsic to the chocolate bar is the 
property of tasting like chocolate. It then just so happens that tliis property instantiated by 
the chocolate bai* causes pleasure to arise in me when I eat it. What is good for me is the 
state in which pleasme arises due to my eating of the chocolate bar. The chocolate bar is a 
source o f my well-being insofar as it contributes to the coming about o f this state. This 
state, however, is a part or component of my well-being not its somce,
4.3. Well-being: both normative and descriptive
From this discussion we ought to remark that a cluster of closely connected concepts are 
involved in our linguistic usage of the concept o f well-being. There is the idea of well­
being, the parts and the sources o f well-being. Next, think about the following judgement: 
my favourite plant is not doing as well now as it was doing last month. Clearly, this is a 
comparative well-being judgement. My judgement will probably be given on certain 
grounds specific to plants in general. I may for example have remarked that the leaves are 
falling and those that remain are not quite as green. I decide to get my plant back to her
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best shape. So, I ask myself what things make plants such as this one fare well. The answer 
is a certain quantity o f water per week and a certain quantity o f exposition to sunlight 
every day. Now, we could say that water and sunlight are the sources o f my plant’s well­
being. After a few weeks, the plant is green with new leaves. The plant is doing well again; 
we can assume it gets the right amount o f the things that are good for it. Its ‘doing well’ is 
the state in which the plant enjoys the right combination o f water and sunlight. More 
generally, we could say that well-being is intended as the sta te in \\>hich a  being  a tta ins a 
certa in  com bina tion  o f  th ings tha t are g o o d  f o r  it. Greater well-being is intended as the 
state in which a being attains a better combination o f the things that are good for it. 
Similarly for lesser well-being.
It is important to notice here that when we make a comparative well-being judgement as 
we did above we are making a descrip tive  kind o f claim. ‘The plant did better at time / ’ 
does not seem to imply any reason for the plant (though maybe that judgement may imply 
reason to act for those who are concerned with the well-being o f this plant). Things, 
however, are quite different from the point of view of rational creatures. Both rational and 
non-rational creatures are capable of well-being, but this fact should not let us overlook an 
important difference in the way the concept of well-being applies to these two different 
types o f being. In the case o f rational creatines, the fact that a state is described as one 
containing greater well-being can motivate and justify the desires and actions o f the 
rational being whose well-being it is. A claim expressing this fact would be a normative 
claim for that agent. However, only beings with the linguistic  and in tellectua l capacity to 
understand the meaning o f the idea  of well-being, i.e., the idea that something is good for 
one, or in one’s interest, advantage or benefit, would find this fact motivating and 
justifying. More precisely, only beings of this kind cou ld  be motivated by the description 
of a state as one containing a certain quantity of their well-being. To say that they co u ld  be 
motivated by this fact means that they have the capacity to be so motivated. Yet, beings 
with both capacities may on some occasion fail to be motivated to desire and pursue 
something that they recognise is good to have (in their interest, etc.). I f  they did so 
systematically, though, we would begin to doubt the claim that they understand the 
meaning of these terms.
The fact that we as rational beings can describe the conditions under which certain non- 
rational creatures would do well should not lead us to conclude that the notion of well­
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being that applies to us is the same as the notion of well-being that applies to them. These 
non-rational beings do not have the capacity to represent to themselves the state in which 
some measure o f their well-being obtains in these precise terms. O f course, they may 
naturally be inclined to pursue that state but not under that description or representation. 
The plant may struggle to reach its optimal conditions but not because it understands those 
conditions would be good for it. Or again, given a choice, a mouse may choose to go for 
cheese rather than lettuce. That, however, is not because it could in principle recognise that 
that state could be described as what is best for it. The only sense o f well-being that we can 
safely ascribe to non-rational beings is the descriptive notion of well-being. That notion, 
however, will not be sufficient to elucidate the full meaning o f the concept as it applies to 
rational creatures. The concept of well-being with which we are concerned here, is one that 
applies only to beings that could  describe their actions as aiming at a state containing a 
certain quantity of their well-being.
Importantly, the actions need not be described in those terms but must be capable of 
bearing that description. It is not my view that each and every action affecting the agent’s 
well-being on which the agent is motivated to act must be described by the agent in terms 
of its impact on the agent’s well-being. That is, if  I am asked why on one occasion I choose 
to go the cinema, I do not have to describe my action as aiming at a state containing more 
well-being. As Scanlon would want to say, I might take myself to have reason to go the 
cinema simply because I enjoy going to the cinema. Yet, we would want to add that if  the 
action could  be described as an action affecting my well-being negatively and, being aware 
of that fact I nonetheless decide to go, either I am acting against my better judgement or I 
am acting on considerations other than my well-being.
5. Conclusion
We now need to bring the conclusions reached so far to bear on our initial discussion. It 
might be best to bring back to our attention Scanlon’s main contention against the role of 
the concept of well-being:
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... this concept o f  well-being has surprisingly little role to play in the thinking o f  the 
rational individual whose life is in question. It sounds absurd to say that individuals have 
no reason to be concerned with their own well-being, because this seems to imply that they 
have no reason to be concerned with those things that make their lives better. Clearly they 
do have reason to be concerned with these things. But in regard to their own lives they have 
little need to use the concept o f  well-being itself, either in giving justifications or in 
drawing distinctions. In particular, individuals have no need for a theory that would clarify 
the boundaries o f  their own well-being and provide the basis for sharper quantitative 
comparisons.'*^
We are in agreement with Scanlon insofar as many times we need not make an explicit 
appeal to the idea o f well-being in order to explain and justify out* pui suits. But that is far 
from being sufficient evidence to show that the idea o f well-being does not play an 
important role in our first-personal deliberation, I have been illustrating the way in which 
implicit loiowledge of whether sometliing is or is not good for one may explain away the 
apparent absence of the concept of well-being in our deliberation. In order to prove that, I 
showed how explanatorily important the idea of well-being in fact is. An agent is justified 
in taking him self to have reason to desire something to the extent to which this thing is 
good for him. To say this is precisely to show that there exists a relation between the 
various parts o f well-being, i.e., the various things we take ourselves to have reason to 
desire for their own sake, and the idea o f well-being, i.e., the idea that something is in 
one’s interest, or to one’s benefit or advantage.
These conclusions relied on the results we reached in the preceding sections. Here, I ought 
simply to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Butler and Mill. The former provided the 
model on which I based my account o f the relation between the idea and the parts o f well­
being. The latter provided the distinction between desiring and willing. This distinction 
was essential in amending the buck-passing account so as to maintain another distinction, 
namely that between things that contribute to an agent’s well-being and things that don’t.
Finally, consider again Scanlon’s two criteria o f importance of the concept of well-being. 
Interestingly enough, we find ourselves in agreement with (C l) and (C2). Take pleasure to 
be an end in itself and part o f a person’s well-being. Now consider (C l): do we take
'•’ Scanlon, 1998, 109-110.
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pleasure to be important because we take it to contribute to well-being? There is a clear 
sense in which we do: remove the idea of well-being and pleasure ceases to be considered 
as what a person has most reason to desire and pursue. The answer is the same for (C2): 
does it make an important difference to know that the piusuit o f one’s pleasure does not 
contribute to one’s well-being? Siuely it does: tell yomself that a certain pleasurable end is 
not most in your interest, and you should cease to take yourself to have most reason to 
desire it.
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Part II The Theory, the Parts, and the Limits of
Well-Being
Chapter 4 A Theory of Weil-Being
1. Introduction
111 this chapter, I will defend an account o f well-being whose predecessors might be 
considered to be J. S. Mill and Sidgwick, On this view, well-being is characterised as what 
an agent has reason to desire/ More precisely, given that my view is a version o f the buck- 
passing account, we should say that something is good fo r  an agent if  and only if  it has a 
property that gives reason to the agent to desire it. I will defend this theory by examining 
the role desires play in determining an individual’s good. In a nutshell, I will argue that 
though desires play a very important epistemic role (§2) they do not semantically 
determine the good for an agent, not even under idealised conditions (§3). My view then 
must not be confused with another popular theory according to which a person’s well­
being or good is defined as what that person would desire under ideal conditions. The final 
section o f this chapter will spell out the difference between our reason-to-desire view and 
ideal preference type o f views (§4).
2. The epistemic role of desires
2.1. R easons
’ As we shall see in the next section, Mill can only be taken to be a very remote predecessor of this account. 
In §4.1., I shall claim that Sidgwick clearly put forward a version of the reason-to-desire account though 
scholarly opinion is rather divided on this point. More recently Skorupski, 1999a, Chapters 2 and 6; 1999b; 
2002; and Say re-McCord, 2001, have developed similar accounts.
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On my view, well-being is characterised as what there is a reason for an agent to desire/ It 
is important, then, to begin by saying something about reasons in general. Reasons are 
relational facts divided in three categories: reasons to believe, reasons to feel, and reasons 
to act.^ I will call these types o f reasons respectively, epistemic, affective, and practical 
reasons and give the following analysis of reasons: Reasons are sets o f facts standing in a 
certain relation to an agent and an act-type (a belief, a feeling, or an action). Reasons also 
have a degree o f strength and a time. Thus, for example, were 0-ing to give x pleasure, that 
would be a reason (of degree d  at time f) for x to 0. For example, were smoking to give Jim 
pleasure that would be a reason for Jmi to smoke. Thus, the reason relation in this case 
holds between an agent, Jim, an act-type, smoking, and the fact that Jim would find 
smoking pleasant. Desires are a kind o f affection. It will follow then that propositions 
about well-being, i.e., claims about what there is reason for an agent to desire, will belong 
to the wider category o f affective normative propositions.'^ In what follows, I will illustrate 
the way in which our desires fimction as the primitive criteria in judgements about well­
being.
2.2. D esires a s  the primary criteria for normative judgements about well-being
In Chapter 2 , 1 endorsed a Millian view according to which having a desire for something 
involves the tendency to see that thing as desirable, worthy o f desire, or good to have 
(under the idea o f it as being pleasant or under some other desirability feature), a view 
which was very similar to Scanlon’s conception of desires in the directed-attention sense. 
As we shall see. Mill is a somce o f inspiration even for our present task, i.e., showing the 
epistemic roles o f desires in our judgements about well-being. Mill famously argued that:
The only proof capable o f  being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. 
The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so o f the other sources o f
“ Henceforth, I will use this shorter formulation to express the view that something is good /by an agent if and 
only if it has a property that gives reason to the agent to desire it.
 ^ Unless specified otherwise, our discussion will be conducted in terms of pro tanto reasons and not siifficietU 
reasons.
* The connection between affective and practical reasons will examined in greater detail in Chapter 8. It 
suffices here to say that if there is reason for an agent to desire to do something there is ijjro tanto) reason to 
do that thing.
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our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.^
We take it that Mill does not hereby intend to give a proof in the deductive sense/ Mill 
believed that first principles were not capable o f proof by reasoning. That is true o f both 
the principles o f knowledge and the principles o f conduct. However, our senses and our 
consciousness provide us support or evidence for such principles. MilTs analogy between 
the epistemic roles o f the senses and desires is explained as follows by Geoffrey Sayre- 
McCord:
M ill’s suggestion is that, when it comes to the first principles o f  our conduct, desires play 
the same epistemic role that the senses play when it comes to the first principles o f  
know ledge... [T]he evidence we have for our judgments concerning sensible qualities 
traces back to what is sensed, to the content o f  our sense-experience. Likewise, ...the  
evidence that we have for our judgments concerning value traces back to what is desired, to 
the content o f  our desire.’
Thus, McCord goes on to say, when we are looking at sometliing that appears red, we have 
overrideable and defeasible evidence that the thing is red. Also, if  things never looked red 
to us we could never get evidence that things were red, nor would we have developed the 
concept o f redness.
Similarly, when we are desiring things, when what we are considering appears good to us, 
we have evidence (albeit overrideable and defeasible) that the thing is good. Moreover, if  
we never desired things, w e could never get evidence that things were good, and would 
indeed have never developed the concept o f  value.^
The parallel between sense perception and desiring is illuminating but does not work quite 
all the way tlrough. This can be seen with the help of something Kant said:
 ^Mill, 1998, 8l,IV3.
 ^ See for example McCord, 2001, 338. That is true whatever one takes Mill’s thought to be concerning the 
legitimacy of deductively valid arguments as proofs.
’ Sayre-McCord, 2001, 338.
Sayre-McCord, 2001, 339.
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Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible; that is it 
contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, 
which enables us to think object o f  sensible intuition is the understanding. To neither o f  
these powers may a preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would 
be given to us, and without understanding no one would be thought. Thoughts without 
content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.^
In the first Critique, Kant calls these two powers or capacities o f the mind respectively 
receptivity and spontaneity, or again sensibility and understanding. In the remaining part of 
the paragraph quoted above, Kant continues by claiming that these two capacities cannot 
exchange their functions. Though knowledge can only arise through their union, their 
respective contributions should not be confused. On the contrary, one should separate the 
two carefully and distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility (general aesthetic) from 
the science o f the rules of the understanding, which Kant calls general logic. Now, general 
logic in its pine form, Kant believes, deals only with a priori principles. Contrary to Kant, 
for our purposes it suffices to say that the principles issuing from spontaneity are 
warranted a priori but defeasible.
Let us go back to Mill. In the case o f perception, receptivity and spontaneity are 
distinguished from but interacting with each other. There is a sensible input and a 
spontaneous response to it. Without the contribution o f the two powers, no judgement 
would be possible, no thought o f anything being red would be possible. Supposing this 
picture to be true, can a parallel really be drawn with the case o f a desire for x and the 
judgement that x is good to have? The parallel does not work all the way, as, in the case of 
desiring, notliing can play a role comparable to the role played by receptivity in the case of 
sense perception. Desiring something involves no receptivity, no response to a sensible 
‘intuition’. On the one hand, under normal conditions, the judgement that x is visible (or 
red and visible) is stimulated by x. In this case, we must assume that receptivity is activated 
or stimulated by something, or else we have to postulate that we are subject to some form 
o f hallucination or delusion (i.e., we would not be under normal conditions).
On the other hand, when I judge that x is desirable, my judgement is not stimulated in the 
same M>ay by the object o f my desire. If  we believed that one’s receptivity is stimulated in
 ^Kant, 1968, A51/B75,93.
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this case as well, we would have to postulate that we could sensibly intuit desirableness 
along with sounds, coloms, odoins, etc. But wouldn’t that entail the existence of a sixth 
sense? Also what sensible thing would one be in contact with if one desired now a future 
state o f affairs, say, that I  have sweet dreams tonight^ The ‘passive sensibility’ o f desire 
does not require receptivity and involves no assumption that 1 am in contact with any 
worldly desirability feature. To make this assumption would involve that agents are 
directly in contact with an intrinsically desirable feature, and that what impinges on their 
receptivity is precisely this desirability. This type of featiue would have to have good-to- 
haveness (or, as J. L. Mackie would say, to-be-pursuedness) built into it and it would be 
queer to think that we are causally in contact with such normative entities.'®
If it is agreed that receptivity does not play any role in desire as experience or ‘passive 
sensibility’, then, desires must belong to the realm o f pure spontaneity. 1 will explore this 
possibility soon, not before having recapitulated my exposition so far. Mill takes it that an 
analogy can be drawn between the respective epistemic roles played by the senses in 
establishing the first principles o f Imowledge and the desires (‘as passive sensibility’) in 
establishing the first principles o f conduct. I then inquired into the validity o f this analogy 
by comparing the nature o f our judgements involving the senses with our judgements 
involving desires. Aided by some Kantian terminology, 1 concluded that there is at least 
one important difference between judgements about the world that involve the senses and 
judgements about desirability that involve desiring.
That, however, does not mean that there is no analogy at all between the epistemic roles of 
the two. The fact that I seem to see an apple on the table goes some way towards 
establishing that there is an apple on the table. Similarly, the fact that I desire an apple goes 
some way towards establishing that the apple is desirable or good to have." To put the 
same analogy in terms of reasons: the fact that I seem to see an apple on the table gives me 
reason to believe that there is an apple on the table. Similarly, the fact that I desire an apple 
gives me reason to think that the apple is desirable. In both cases, one’s disposition to
However, 1 disagree with Mackie’s next step, i.e., the conclusion that no objective values are true. See 
Mackie, 1977, Chapter 1.
” It should be pointed out here that these analogies are not exactly the ones put forward by Mill (“The only 
proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a 
sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I
78
Chapter 4
desire something or to believe something is accompanied by a corresponding disposition to 
find that thing desirable or credible.
In general terms: an agenf s spontaneous disposition to (j) (believe, act, feel) is the primitive 
criterion for judgements of what one has reason to </>. Thus, for example, the primitive 
criterion for the judgement that there is reason to admire x  is the feeling o f admiration for 
X. Or again, the fact that I desire g  typically carries with it a normative impulse, namely the 
evaluation or judgement that there is reason for me to desire g /^  In conclusion, desires, and 
affections in general, constitute the primary epistemic criteria for normative affective 
judgements. Wliat we should try to understand next is under what circumstances an agent’s 
primitive defeasible judgement that she has a reason to desire something can yield a 
warranted judgement to that effect.
In a nutshell warranted judgem ents about well-being will typically start from the 
disposition to see something as desirable. From there, however, we ought to ask two 
questions: is one’s spontaneous disposition genuine? And, what kinds o f defeaters are 
relevant to claims of the form ‘x has reason to desire y ?  I shall not develop here my own 
answers to these questions so much as rely on conclusions already fully worked out.'^ A 
spontaneous disposition is genuine when it is experienced by the agent as ‘his’. That, for 
example, would not be the case when the agent is disposed to desire something without 
being disposed to see that thing as desirable. Also, a disposition to see something as 
desirable would not be genuine if  it arises as the result o f indoctrination. Yet, when one’s 
genuine spontaneous disposition is wrong, it should normally be possible to ‘educate’ 
one’s spontaneity, being careful not to turn this process into a process o f indoctrination. 
The main defeater of our judgements about well-being is the disagreement of competent 
others in rational discussion. W arrant may come at different levels o f authority. Our 
warranted judgements may be defeated by the disagreement o f more authoritative judges.
apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually 
desire it.”)
This evaluation, however, does not ipso facto make it case that g  is desirable. In the words of Hume, to 
allow that step would amount to deducing an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. I believe that to be an invalid step. I also 
doubt that Mill fell into this trap, as G. E. Moore famously suggested. Many readers of Mill jump to that 
conclusion from the infelicitous wording of Mill’s proof together with his remark that ‘to desire something is 
the same phenomenon as thinking that thing to be good’. Notice, however, that the claim ‘desiring x is the 
same phenomenon as thinking x to be desirable’ does not commit Mill or anyone else to the claim that is 
desirable if and only if is desired’. It commits Mill only to saying what we thin/c to be desirable. And that is 
all very well.
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Convergence with the authoritative judgements is not what makes judgements true, 
however. Rather, it is a regulatory ideal, an indicator that one’s judgements are on the right 
track. Finally, this view does not exclude the possibility that on certain normative issues 
there will always be an irresolvable fiacture in the opinions of authoritative judges.
2.3. Ex ante and ex post desires
How do we laiow whether there is reason for someone to desire something? Experience 
and reflection teach us that we have umnotivated desires for very many objects and states 
of affairs and that there are several types of desirability features under which we desire 
these objects and states o f affairs. We may form intrinsic desires for various particular 
objects or states o f affairs. Surely, reflection and experience-based agreement o f 
dispositions shows that there are other desirability features beside pleasure. In Chapter 6, 
we will discuss some of these desirability features in some detail.
Let us suppose that D  is one such desirability feature. The question we should ask now is: 
how can we tell that there is reason for an agent to desire object o as a source o f D? We 
saw how the primary criterion for something being desirable is whether we are disposed to 
desire it. Suppose that I have a desire for an object o under the idea of D. The question then 
is: is this a genuinely spontaneous desire? Suppose that it is and that it is accompanied by 
my disposition to talce m yself to have reason to desire o. Now, the question is, is there 
reason to desire o? Is o desirable? In order to find an answer I might attempt to gather 
information about o and see whether the judgements of people who are well acquainted 
with it converge in finding o desirable.
So far, we have considered spontaneous desires as primitive criteria for judgements about 
well-being as they occur before the object of one’s desire is obtained. We will call these 
desires ex ante desires. However, desires may also be useful as ex post criteria. One 
common way to Imow about what thmgs are good for one is reflecting on the spontaneous 
affections one feels once the putative good has already been obtained. Rather than being a 
desire for the obtaining of a certain object or state affairs, one wants one’s situation to 
remain unchanged with respect to what one believes to be a certain feature and in virtue of
See Skorupski, 1999a, 1999b, 2002.
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that feature. When one is disposed to have an ex post desire for something and the 
accompanying disposition to take oneself to have reason to desire it, one should examine 
the spontaneity o f the desire and the relevant opinion of competent judges. Ex post desires 
in the sense just described are also referred to as endorsements.
Note that ex post desires can be associated with the attitude o f ‘being happy witlE 
something. Being happy or satisfied with something is different from being happy in the 
experiential sense entailed by hedonists. It is also different from what we may call the 
feeling  o f  happiness where that involves joyfulness, high-spiritedness and similar 
feelings.*'' When one is happy with D  one wants one’s situation to remain unchanged with 
respect to what one believes to be a certain feature and in virtue of that feature. However, 
being happy with something is not necessarily linked to one’s well-being. I may for 
example say “I am happy with the way the elections went” without necessarily thinking 
that the result of the elections is good for me. Alternatively, we may be happy with our 
lives in general, as well as with particular parts of it. Wayne Sumner, for one, thinks that;
Being happy in this sense means having a certain kind o f  positive attitude toward your life, 
which in its fullest form has both a cognitive and an affective component. The cognitive 
aspect o f  happiness consists in a positive evaluation o f  the conditions o f  your life, a 
judgement that, at least on balance, it measures up favourably against your standards or 
expectations. This evaluation may be global, covering all the important sectors o f your life, 
or it may focus on one in particular (your work, say, or your family). In either case it 
represents an affirmation or endorsement o f  (som e or all of) the conditions or 
circumstances o f  your life, a judgement that, on balance and taking everything into 
account, your life is going well for you. ... However, there is more involved in being happy 
than being disposed to think that your life is going (or has gone) well. The affective side o f  
happiness consists in what we commonly call a sense o f  well-being: finding your life 
enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it.'^
In Sumner, we can see both the affective side o f happiness, i.e., “a sense o f well-being: 
finding your life enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it” and a 
cognitive side, a positive evahfation that one’s life or some aspect o f it is measuring up
‘‘‘ In Chapter 6 I discuss the distinction between the sense of ‘happiness’ used by hedonists such as Bentham, 
Mill, and Sidgwick, and ‘happiness’ as joyfulness or high-spiritedness.
Sumner, 1996, 146-147.
81
Chapter 4
well against one’s standards or expectations. The structure of Sumner’s concept o f being 
happy with one’s life mirrors our ex post disposition to desire something and our taking 
ourselves to have reason to desire it. We could say along with Sumner that feeling 
emiched, rewar ded, satisfied and fulfilled with one’s life or some aspects o f it is the ex post 
kind o f  affection that one could feel for one’s life or some aspects o f it, and that the 
disposition to have that affection is typically accompanied by the disposition to take 
oneself to have reason to have that affection. Sunnier, however, takes this attitude to be a 
single one with both a cognitive and an affective component, while I would think that it is 
perfectly possible to desire something without thinking that one has reason to desire it and 
vice versa, one may take oneself to have reason to desire it something without desiring it.
2.4. An exam ple
Let us illustrate our position with an example. Suppose that it is an irreversible fact about 
my physical/mental constitution that I can never derive any pleasure from a certain kind of 
activity, say, listening to music. Suppose also that listening to music could never be 
subsumed under any other desirability features. No matter how much information I gather 
about music, I can never form a desire for listening to it, nor can I consider that activity to 
be good for me. I think that oui' account of well-being would have no difficulties in dealing 
with this kind o f case. There is no reason for me to desire to listen to music; listening to 
music is not and cannot be part o f my well-being. The reason-to-desire relation must obtain 
between an agent, and a set o f facts (including facts about the agent), at a time. The fact 
that there is reason to desire pleasuie does not in and of itself show that there is reason to 
desire any activity that is normally taken to be pleasant. Maybe a certain activity does not 
cause pleasure to arise in a certain agent. For this agent, the reason-to-desire relation 
cannot obtain.
Suppose now that the agent does not, at time t, derive any pleasure from listening to music 
but has a potential to do so, which would take some time to develop, and which he could 
have developed at f+i. Suppose that he has developed this potential. Does he have reason at 
t+ \ to desire listening to music at time t+i7 The answer is yes (saying that there is reason to 
desire it does not entail that there are no reasons of greater degree to desire other things at 
/+i). Now go back to time t. Does the agent have reason to develop his potential? This 
would be an instrumental end towards the good o f listening to music at t+i. The right
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question to ask then should be: does the agent have reason at t to desire to listen to music at 
/+!? The answer will depend on facts about the agent’s fiiture life. Given that the agent has 
the potential to enjoy music, and supposing that in his life he will have a chance to listen to 
music, and that listening to music would not otherwise be detiimental to him, then, I thinlc 
we could suppose that there is reason for him to desire to listen to music and thus to 
develop his potential. If, on the other hand, it could be predicted that the agent, say, would 
never have a chance to listen to music, and in fact would derive great frustration from that 
fact, then it seems that there is no reason for him to desire to develop his potential. Finally: 
is there reason to desire at / to listen to music at t l  The answer is negative. We postulated 
that in order for music to be a good for the agent, developing a potential was required. 
Listening to music would otherwise yield no pleasure and, as stipulated, pleasure is the 
only desirability feature under which listening to music is subsumable.
3. The semantic role of desires
3.1. Subjective or objective theories
Since Parfît’s Reasons and Persons, scholar s working in this area o f philosophy lay a lot of 
stress on the distinction between subjective and objective theories o f well-being. As with 
many distinctions in philosophy, however, there is no clear agreement on what the 
distinction is. As we shall see the question revolves around the role played by a person’s 
desires and/or positive endorsements in determining the notion of well-being. Let us begin 
with a recent attempt to define objectivity. Arneson writes that a theory of well-being is 
objective just if it holds
that claims about what is good can be correct or incorrect and that the correctness o f  a 
claim about a person’s good is determined independently o f  that person’s volition, 
attitudes, and opinions.
A theory o f well-being is subjective if  it denies just that. Two elements can be clearly 
discerned in Arneson’s definition. (1) Claims about a person’s good can be correct or
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incorrect; and (2) the correctness of claims about a person’s good is or is not determined by 
that person’s attitudes towards the putative good in question. I take Arneson’s definition to 
imply that both (1) and (2) must be true in order for a theory to be considered as objective. 
Now take a theory such as the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being: x is good forj/ iff x 
is the satisfaction o f one o fy ’s desires. According to this theory, claims about well-being 
can be correct or incorrect, even though their correctness is entirely determined by the 
agents’ positive attitudes (desires etc.). In this sense, on this theory claims about well-being 
could be correct or incorrect and some conditions for their assertibility are stated.
Desire satisfaction theories, then, would satisfy (1) but not (2). This second dimension is 
the real point o f contention between philosophers who purport to defend ‘objective’ 
theories of well-being and pliilosophers who purport to defend ‘subjective’ theories. More 
specifically, the point o f contention between subjective and objective theories focuses on 
what requirement or conditions should obtain for propositions about well-being to be 
correct. Broadly speaking, objective theories claim that the pro-attitudes o f the agent 
towards an object are not necessary in order for that object to determine her well-being. On 
the other hand, for a theory to count as subjective the following must be true:
'Nothing can intrinsically enhance the quality o f  a person’s life unless that person has some 
positive, affirmative attitude toward that element o f  her life.'’
Arneson refers to this constraint on theories of well-being as the weak endorsement 
constraint. This requirement has been taken veiy seriously. As Arneson puts it, what lends 
plausibility to this constraint is that a purportedly happy occuirence in one’s life that leaves 
one utterly cold cannot intrinsically enhance one’s well-being.'^
Arneson, 1999, 115.
” Arneson, 1999, 139. "Note that this formulation of subjectivity is weaker than the one expressed in the 
previous quotation from Arneson. On that formulation it seemed that subjectivity entailed that a person’s 
volitions and attitudes be both necessary and sufficient. On this weaker reading of subjectivity a person’s 
volitions and attitudes are considered to be only necessary. Henceforth, we will refer to subjectivity in this 
weaker sense.
To avoid this problem some hypothetical-desire theories place a constraint that any non-instrumental, basic 
desire whose satisfaction contributes to an individual’s well-being must be actual when satisfied. That is to 
say, the hypothetical desire must be endorsed by the person and so become her desire in order for its 
satisfaction to contribute to her well-being. Griffin, 1986, 11.
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On what side of this dichotomy does the reason-to-desire account stand? The short answer 
is that it stands on the objective side: there may be reason for an agent to desire something 
even though the agent does not desire or endorse that thing. Let me justify this position 
with an example. Suppose that a third person, y, correctly concludes that there is reason for 
X to desire g. x, however, has no desire for g. There are three different cases to be 
considered, (a) x may be unaware that he has reason to desire g, as he has failed to consider 
the issue at all; (b) x may have considered the issue but arrives at the incorrect conclusion 
that there is no reason for him to desire g  (whether or not his rationality could be faulted 
for the wrongness o f his conclusion); or (c) x can see that he has reason to desire g  but that 
conclusion leaves him incapable of desiring it. I do not take it that there must be an actual 
desire for an object before the agent can enjoy this object at all. Take any o f the three cases 
(a), (b) or (c). Suppose, for example that at t, x  has no (ex ante) desire for g  and at t+\ g  
falls on x ’s lap like manna fallen from heaven (maybe secretly smuggles some g  into x ’s 
life). It might very well be that at /+i,x rightly welcomes or responds positively to g  even 
though at t he had no desire for g. The fact that x did not desire g  at f does not make any 
difference to the fact that there was reason for him to desire g  at  ^ and there is reason to 
respond positively to the enjoyment o f g  at r+i.
It might be claimed, then, that what was important is not that there is an actual desire for g  
at t, but that once g  is obtained it would actually be positively endorsed. What would this 
endorsement be? Arneson talks vaguely in terms o f a “positive, affirmative attitude” 
towards an element o f x ’s life. 1 think one might be more precise and say that the 
endorsement in question is nothing other than the idea of the ex post desire discussed 
above. Suppose once more that g  falls on x ’s lap like manna from heaven. We can now 
ask: is this attitude of endorsement o f g  necessary in order to consider g a s  a good? The 
answer is once again going to be negative. As we saw above, the endorsement in question 
is a defeasible criterion to determine whether one has reason to desire something. Suppose 
the following three cases analogous to (a), (b), and (c) in the paragraph above, (a) x might 
not be aware that g  is present in his life and caimot therefore endorse it; (b) x might be 
aware o f g  but conclude wrongly (and whether or not his rationality is faulty) that there is 
no reason to endorse it; or (c) x might see that there is reason to endorse it and yet fail to be 
emotionally engaged by it.
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In conclusion, then, our theory would not accept the “weak endorsement constraint”. Ex 
ante and ex post desires are not necessary determinants o f well-being. I f  that is true, 
however, on our theory it would be possible for an agent to attain something that 
intrinsically enhances his well-being though the agent does not have ex ante or ex post 
desires for it. It is not impossible to thinlc about such cases in practice. As I shall later 
argue, a person’s well-being can be contributed to posthumously. Suppose, then, that Mike 
was a big Liverpool fan and until the tragic incident in which he lost his life he was very 
active in promoting the interests o f his football club. After his death and despite the lack of 
a will, M ike’s relatives decide to donate on Mike’s own behalf part o f his money for a new 
project ill favour o f the club. The relatives thinlc that had Mike been aware o f their decision 
he would have been very happy with it. They thinlc that M ike’s interest is somehow best 
served in this way. Those o f us who are inclined to believe that Mike’s well-being is to at 
least some extent being contributed to, may ar gue that that is so despite the lack o f both an 
ex ante and ex post desire. It may be retorted that M ike’s dispositions (whilst alive) could 
clearly be understood as the expression o f an ex ante desire for any project o f the kind in 
question. Even if  that were true, however, I would see no argument to the effect that these 
dispositions should be seen as determ inants  o f M ike’s well-being rather than as an 
indicator o f (that on the basis o f which M ike’s relatives would imow) what Mike would 
have had reason to desire.
On our reason-to-desire theory it would also be at least logically possible for an agent to 
get something that intrinsically enliances his well-being though the agent actually hates. I 
have to admit that 1 find it hard to come up with a good example to illustrate this case. 
There is, however, a good explanation for that, in terms of our own account: though desires 
are not determinants o f well-being, they are our primitive criterion for claims about well­
being. W ithout them, it will be hard to know  anything about what is or what isn’t a 
contribution to a person’s well-being.
Note also, that the logical possibility in question is the same kind o f logical possibility that 
explains how it would be possible that I don’t believe that p  even when it is the case that p. 
The same analogous cases (a), (b), and (c) apply to the epistemological case too. 1 might 
for example not be awaie o f the evidence in favour o f p  and fail to believe that p . Or I 
might be aware of the evidence but incorrectly judge that it does not support p. Or I might 
be cognitively irrational and fail to believe that p ,  though I realise that the evidence
86
Chapter 4
supports p. We would take it to be a rather worrying sign if  a theory of well-being did not 
allow for even the logical possibility o f mistakenly hating something that, in fact, is good 
for the person.
3.2. D oes the,reason-to-desire account leave no room for individual differences?
From this discussion, we must conclude that our account is on the side of objective theories 
o f well-being, at least insofar as one agrees with Arneson’s distinction between objective 
and subjective theories. Let us make clear, however, that this type of objectivity should not 
trigger liberal fears o f paternalism. True enough, on our theory there can be only so many 
desirability features under which there can be reason for any agent to desire an object or a 
state o f affairs, and criteria o f what these features are, are provided by looking at the 
converging judgements o f authoritative judges. We have mentioned pleasure, so far, and 
believe contra Mill that that is not the only featuie that competent judges would single out 
as desirable for one. Experience and reflection, I believe, will show that knowledge, 
autonomy, deep personal relations, achievement, and virtue can also be added to pleasure. 
However, our theory does not determine a list o f particular objects and states of affairs that 
are to be desirable for each human agent. To say that there are only so many desirability 
features is to say that each particular object or state of affairs an agent has reason to desire 
is to be subsumable under a determinate categorial end, be it pleasure, Imowledge, or any 
other categorial end on which the opinion of competent judges would converge.
Categorial ends must be intelligible. I f  we observed a person eating dirt with a spoon, we 
would want to understand his action and in order to do so we would begin by trying to 
place it under any one o f the categorial ends that it is intelligible to apply to human actions. 
Does this person find eating dirt pleasant? Or is he rather trying to acquire some 
knowledge, maybe, the knowledge o f what dirt tastes like? If  he isn’t what makes his 
action desirable or valuable for him? In order to be able to understand these actions we 
would have to place them under kinds o f ends that we spontaneously find intelligible, ends 
that we as human beings can share. If  we can’t place these actions under any intelligible 
end, we cannot but deem them irrational.'®
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Saying that there is no objective list o f particular objects and states of affahs that each and 
every agent should find desirable is compatible with the claim that given some general 
facts about hiunan biology, certain general claims about the good for human beings can be 
made with a certain degree o f confidence. This claim, however, would not amount to 
claiming that, say, there is more reason for each and every human being to desire chocolate 
ice cream over vanilla ice cream, or to desire listening to jazz music over pop music. 
Whether there is reason for a certain agent to desire one over the other will depend on 
some facts about the agent in question. In this case, supposing that these two kinds o f ends 
are entirely subsumable under the idea of pleasure, what there is more reason for the agent 
to desire will depend on what option is likely to yield more pleasure. At this level, it will 
be some fimdamental fact about the agent that determines what there is reason for him to 
desire. What is more, at this level, the agent is likely to be the most authoritative judge to 
determine which o f the two options is best for him.
Notice also that on my account this sensitivity to individual differences might be 
reproduced at the more fundamental level o f the categorial ends. So far, I have only 
claimed that there are a number of intelligible categorial ends. What 1 have not specified is 
(1) whether there is a ranking of these ends in order of prudential importance applying to 
each individual; and (2) what consequences the presence o f such ranking would have on 
what there is reason for each agent to desire.
Let us begin with question (1). It might not be implausible to postulate that certain 
categorial ends ranlc higher than others. This conclusion might be more easily accepted by 
those who talce it that there may be higher and lower kinds o f pleasure. The argument then 
would use the following analogy: just as there are higher and lower pleasures, there are 
higher and lower categorial ends. Of comse, this ai'gimient is nowhere neai* to being a very 
compelling argument. For one thing, the term o f comparison on which the analogy is 
supposed to rest (that there are higher and lower pleasures) is very much in dispute. 
Supposing, however, that it was unanimously agreed that certain pleasures are higher than 
others: what would that exactly entail for each individual’s well-being? Suppose that a 
competent judge were to rank two goods, g  and g*. The judge would have to be well 
acquainted with both goods; the spontaneity o f her desires for, respectively, g  and g*
Of course, we might refrain from drawing this conclusion if the actions we found unintelligible were those
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should be genuine and not to be faulted; and finally, her judgement should converge with 
that o f the majority o f competent judges. Suppose that she correctly judged g* to be a 
superior kind o f good. Would that entail that there is reason for each and every agent to 
desire g* over g? Certainly not. Suppose, for example, that it is a fact about agent x that he 
has no access to g*. Maybe g* is very expensive or maybe x has no access to g* because he 
lacks the physical/mental capacities to appreciate g*. In either case, given these facts about 
X it would certainly be wrong to assert that there is reason for x to desire g* over g.^ ® The 
same point applies pari passu  to the case of categorial ends. Even if  they could be ranked 
in order o f prudential importance, this would not entail that each and every agent, 
irrespective o f his or her situation, would have more reason to desire the objects and states 
o f affairs subsumable under the higher categorial ends.
In conclusion, the reason-to-desire theory of well-being as specified here holds that 
judgements about well-being can be correct and incorrect and that desires or endorsements 
are not necessary determinants o f an agent’s well-being. This, however, does not entail that 
there is equal reason for each agent to desire the same particular* objects or state o f affairs. 
What an individual has reason to desire always depends on facts relative to him or her, 
though o f course human beings share many (psychological, physiological) features qua  
human beings and it is thus possible to make some generalisations with a good degree of 
confidence. We have shown that our account leaves comfortable room for differences in 
taste and for the fact that at least when it comes to taste, each individual might be the best 
judge o f what is good for him or her. Also, it should not be forgotten that on this account 
the most important epistemic criteria o f desirableness are each person’s desires and 
endorsements. In most cases, agents will not be ‘left cold’ by something that is good for 
them. I f  they do after having duly pondered the facts, they might be cognitively or 
affectively criticisable.
4. Ideal-preferencG v. reason-to-desire
of beings very unlike human beings.
Though one could say that there would be reason for her to desire it i f  some relevant facts about her and her 
circumstances were different,
89
Chapter 4
The reason-to-desire theory o f well-being might seem very close to what we could 
generally refer to as ideal-preference theories o f well-being. It will be the task o f this 
section to shed light on what I take to be the unbridgeable distinction between them. We 
shall begin by briefly presenting the development of ideal preference and reason-to-desire 
theories o f well-being as they were discussed by Sidgwick. Subsequently I will discuss 
some o f the difficulties that arise for ideal preference theories, which, as 1 shall show, do 
not arise for the reason-to-desire theory o f well-being.
4.1. Ideal preference theories
One o f the earliest discussions o f both kinds of theories in the modern debate can be found 
in Sidgwick’s Methods o f  Ethics. It is important to place Sidgwick’s discussion in its 
context. Sidgwick believed that practical judgements such as judgements about the good 
are considered by common sense to be determined by rational considerations or dictates.
He also assumed that the grammatical forms of ordinary language can tell us something 
important about the nature o f what we talk about. In his discussion about this type of 
practical judgement, Sidgwick examines the contrary opinion o f some philosophers 
according to whom such judgements are either expressions of desires or inclinations or else 
factual judgements containing information to wliich our desires lead us to react favourably 
or unfavourably.^'
Sidgwick begins by exploring and rejecting the idea that the notion ‘good’ can be 
interpreted in relation to simple desires. He argues that that will not work for two reasons: 
firstly because “what is desired at any time is, as such, merely apparent Good, which may 
not be found good when fruition comes, or at any rate not so good as it appeared. 
Secondly, he argues that prudent men would diminish the intensity o f their desires for 
things commonly considered as being good for us such as fine weather or perfect health. 
That is because these things lay outside our reach. To desire them intensely would generate 
great frustration, i.e., something not good for one. Hence, prudent men attempt to diminish 
the intensity o f their desires for these things; that, however, does not make these things any 
less good.^^ Thus, Sidgwick considers whether we should:
■ For a detailed discussion of this topic see Schneewind, 1977, 215-226. 
“ Sidgwick, 1907, 110.
Sidgwick, 1907, 110.
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identify  [the notion o f  ‘g o o d ’] no t w ith the actually  d esired , but rather w ith the 
desirable ',—meaning by ‘desirab le’ not necessarily ‘w hat ought to be desired’ but w hat 
w ould be desired, with strength proportioned to the degree o f  desirability, i f  it were judged 
atta inab le  by voluntary  action, supposing the desirer to possess a perfect forecast, 
emotional as well as intellectual, o f the state o f attainment or fruition/'*
But Sidgwick finds this definition unsatisfactory, as it limits the scope o f our judgements 
o f good to what is within our reach and it overlooks the fact that there are things that we 
desire and that we do not regret having obtained, but which destroy certain desires which 
could have brought about something better for the agent. Put simply, this definition cannot 
account for the ‘good on the whole’ o f an agent. So, on behalf o f those who want to 
maintain that practical judgements are either expressions o f desires or inclinations or else 
factual judgements containing information to which our desires lead us to react favourably 
or unfavourably, Sidgwick put forward the following thesis, wliich we will call (S):
(S) A m an’s future good on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if  all 
the consequences o f  all the different lines o f  conduct open to him  were accurately foreseen 
and adequately realised in imagination at the present point in tim e.’^
And he commented on it as follows:
The notion o f  ‘G ood’ thus attained has an ideal element: it is som ething that is not always 
actually  desired  and aim ed at by hum an beings: but the ideal elem ent is entirely  
interpretable in term s o f fact, actual or hypothetical, and does not introduce any judgem ent 
o f  value, fundam entally  d istinct from  judgem ents relating to ex istence;— still less any 
‘dictate o f  R eason’ /^
At this point, Sidgwick begins to criticise (S) though, as we shall see, his criticism is not as 
clear cut as one would expect it to be. He first tells us that though (S) is clearly not “what 
we commonly mean when we talk o f a m an’s ‘good on the whole’” it cannot be denied
-'Sidgwick, 1907, 110-111. 
Sidgwick, 1907, 111-112.
Sidgwick, 1907, 112. Of course, the “actual” in this quotation does not refer to (S) but to Sidgwick’s 
earlier discussion of definition of the good in terms of actual desires. (S) is clearly expressed in terms of 
hypothetical facts.
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“that this hypothetical object o f a resultant desire supplies an intelligible and admissible 
interpretation of the terms ‘good’ (substantive) and ‘desirable’, as giving philosophical 
precision to the vaguer meaning with which they are used in ordinary discourse.” '^* 
However, it still seems to him “more in accordance with common sense to recognise— as 
Butler does— that the calm desire for ‘my good on the w hole’ is authoritative', and 
therefore carries with it implicitly a rational dictate to aim at this end, if  in any case a 
conflicting desire urges the will in an opposite direction.”^^  As we saw, Sidgwick did not 
consider (S) to express this rational dictate/® To do just that, Sidgwick put forward what 
we shall call (S*):
(S*) ... ‘ultim ate good on the w hole for m e’ [means] what I should practically desire if  my
desires were in harmony with reason, assuming my existence alone to be considered.^**
According to Sidgwick, then, the relevant difference between (S) and (S*) is precisely that 
the latter alludes to the authoritative dictates o f reason implicit in our common judgements 
about the good, while the former doesn’t. This point should be read in conjunction with 
Sidgwick’s earlier remark to the effect that (S) expresses judgements about the good in 
terms o f judgements “related to existence”, i.e., descriptive judgements while, as we are to 
gather, (S*) does not imply that. Read in this way, then, Sidgwick seems to be saying that 
the normativity o f judgments about the good cannot be captured by descriptive claims 
about our desires even when these are formed under idealised conditions. Hence, 
Sidgwick’s remark about conflicting desires: when I judge that something is good for me, 1 
recognise that I should desire that tiring whatever else is true about my desires actual or 
hypothetical. These actual or hypothetical desires may simply fail to carry any normative 
weight. However, though at a semantic level judgements about well-being might not be 
expressed in term s o f what one would desire under idealised conditions, at an 
epistemological level, it might still be the case that the best way to find out what is good 
for one is to think about what one would desire under idealised conditions.^* Sidgwick’s 
account is not inconsistent with this last point.
Sidgwick, 1907, 112.
J® Sidgwick, 1907, 112.
Chrlstiano, 1992, also noticed Sidgwick’s dissatisfaction with (S)’s fitness to express the “rational dictate”. 
•'“ Sidgwick, 1907, 112
•’' I am not claiming, however, that Sidgwick himself endorsed this evidential view. Chrlstiano writes that 
Sidwick never talked of desires as evidential, though he thinks that Sidgwick’s view is best made sense of 
when understood in these terms. Chrlstiano, 1992,264.
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At this point two remarks ought to be made. The first one is only peripheral to our aim and 
exegetical in nature. I believe our presentation of Sidgwick’s thought to be faithful both to 
the relevant parts o f his text in particular, and to his methods and projects in general. As 
for the latter, I am particularly referring to his intuitionistic defence o f the importance o f 
ordinary language in pointing to the nature of the things we talk about. It seems clear that 
Sidgwick, though somehow attracted by (S) as a fine philosophical interpretation o f the 
notion o f the good for one, thought that (S) was not capable o f fully capturing the meaning 
o f our common notion o f tlie good. His formulation o f (S*) ought to be read precisely in 
this light, as a remedy to the shortcomings of (S).^^
Secondly, it has to be noted that the recent literatiue on the ideal preference account offers 
different versions o f such an accoimt. The common idea behind them all is that well-being 
is to be characterised by starting with a desire (or with a preference or with contentment) 
that is idealized by attaching some condition C, be it avoidance o f the influence o f  
mistaken belief and of ignorance o f material facts, etc.^^ Condition C may be spelled out in 
such a way as to produce a reduction o f the normative concept o f well-being to a non- 
normative concept, i.e., a desire or preference o f some kind. We have seen such an attempt 
with Sidgwick’s (S) above. However, condition C may also be spelled out in a way which 
Sidgwick did not consider, i.e., so as to produce an a priori equivalence between two 
normative concepts. One example would be the following:
g  is an ingredient of x ’s well-being if  and only if  g  is what x would desire if  x ’s
rationality could not be faulted and x was equipped with all relevant information.
I should at this point note that my reading is by no means shared by all of the students of Sidgwick’s 
thought. Many authors fail to have noticed the relevant difference between (S) and (S*). Brandt, 1979, 59, 
155; Darwall, 2002b, 31-38; Griffin, 1986, 39; Sobel, 1994, 792, 795, n. 23; Rawls, 1971, 416-17, 421; 
Rosati, 1995, 297-98. Shaver, 1997, 314 n. 2, also mentions Loeb, 1995, 24, n. 2; and Velleman, 1988, 353- 
54. Some authors, however, have noticed the difference in question: Parfit, 1984, 500. Schneewind, 1977, 
225; Shaver, 1997, 314-17. Finally, Crisp, 1990, 270, notices the difference between what 1 formulated as (S) 
and (S*) but claims these are not two separate alternatives but collateral definitions of the Good: (S) “spells 
out what it is that makes someone’s life go best” while (S*) “implies that seeking this is what one has most 
reason to do.” What I claim, however, is that Sidgwick noticed that what there is most reason to desire (and 
hence do) might not be what one would desire under idealised conditions. If that’s correct, Sidgwick should 
not have taken (S) to spell out what it is that makes someone’s life go best.
Griffin, 1986, chs. 1-2; Brandt, 1979, chs. 6-7; Rawls, 1971, 417 ff. Brandt for example defines as rational 
the intrinsic desires that would survive the idealised scrutiny that he describes under the notion of ‘cognitive 
psychotherapy’: an intrinsic desire is rational if a person would still have it after repeated representation of all 
relevant scientifically available information, in an ideally vivid way, at appropriate times.
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Even this formulation, however, would preserve the difference between ideal preference 
theories and the reason-to-desire theory. On our account, though these idealised desires 
play a very important role at the epistemic level, we shall say (in Sidgwickian spirit) that 
they can never afford a characterisation of well-being at the semantic level. This would of 
course be precisely denied by the defenders of ideal preference theories o f well-being. Let 
me dwell on this point a little fm-ther.
The reason-to-desire relation is a relation that obtains when for example the fact that p  
gives X reason (of degree d  at time f) to desire (j). Suppose that the fact that smoking gives 
me pleasure is a reason for me to desire to smoke. That there is reason for me to desire to 
smoke is true in virtue o f the fact that there is reason to desire pleasure, and some facts 
about me, namely, that I am such that smoking would give me pleasure. The spelling out of 
the relata indicates the normative statement that smoking is desirable for me. In the 
sections above, we described the epistemology o f these purely normative statements: a 
spontaneous judgement about reasons stemming from the feelings must be rationally 
validated in order to become a warranted normative judgement. The process described 
above occurring from our spontaneous feelings through to their validation as warranted 
normative judgements did not offer a definition (strict analysis) or a characterisation (a 
priori equivalence) o f what there is reason to desire in terms o f a counterfactual. It is 
precisely on this point that the reason-to-desire account and the ideal-preference account 
differ most clearly.
4.2. Problems for ideal preference theories
Robert Shope formulates a serious objection against definitions o f rational desires 
expressed in terms o f subjunctive conditionals like the ideal preferences we have been 
discussing so far. '^* His point is best illustrated through the following example. Suppose 
that I strongly desire to learn ethical theory but if  I were fully informed about all the 
relevant matters concerning the reasonableness of my choice, I would already Imow ethical 
theory and hence would have no desire to acquire further understanding of it. Learning 
about ethical theory, then, would not be part o f my well-being as I would not form such
''' Shope, 1978a; 1978b.
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desires under ideal conditions, and this is indeed a counterintuitive way to show that 
something is not in my interest. Even if  learning about ethical theory were not part of my 
well-being it is surely not so for the reason ideal preference theories seem to suggest.
Donald Hubin makes a similar remark concerning counterfactual accounts.^^ Ideal 
preference accounts, or as he would call them, hypothetical motivation accounts o f well­
being, claim that we have reason to desire to do that which we would be moved to desire to 
do under certain conditions. Our reasons to choose, desire, prefer, be content with etc., an 
object or a state of affairs is a disposition to choose, desire, prefer, be content with etc. that 
object or state o f affairs under certain conditions. It is this disposition that the subjunctive 
conditional defining the ideal or hypothetical preference is supposed to capture. But, then, 
the following problem arises:
Let us suppose that the idealizing conditions the theory proposes are these: removal of false 
beliefs, introduction of all relevant true beliefs, and vivid appreciation of all relevant 
factors. Now, we are to ask what a real flesh-and-blood agent would be motivated to do 
[i.e., choose, desire, prefer etc., to do] were he to be free of false beliefs, vividly aware, ... 
etc. But what a human being would be motivated to do under non-actual circumstances ... 
is in part dependent on brute physiological features of the agent. This particular agent, even 
when idealized in the ways we are imagining, may become motivated to put pebbles in his 
navel when he becomes vividly aware of some complex of facts about number theory. The 
awareness of the set of facts may produce physiological effects on the agent—effects that 
have nothing to do with the content of the facts—and these effects may produce other 
psychological states: desires, or some other psychological states taken to be motivating.^“
In this case, the hypothetical account would suggest that the agent has a reason to desire to 
do something that there is no reason to desire to do. Hubin considers and rejects various 
ways in which the defenders o f the hypothetical account could reply. For one, the 
idealizing conditions might not have been the right ones. Hubin convincingly shows, 
however, that his example applies across the board to different types o f idealisations.^^ 
Alternatively, it might be replied that those counterfactuals based on purely physiological
Hubin, 1996. In what follows I will not strictly reproduce the terminology used by Hubin’s, as it is 
different from ours. His points can be expressed in our own terminology with no loss of meaning.
Hubin, 1996, 36-37. 
See Hubin, 1996, 37.
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causal links as that in the example above should be excluded. Hubin then goes on to 
consider the case in wliich the hypothetical circumstances focus only on the psychological 
(rather than physiological) connections based on the contents o f mental states. He 
concludes that even when considering nondeviant (normal) psychologies, people might be 
such that vivid awareness of certain facts would trigger a desire (choice, preference, etc.) 
to do something that they clearly have no reason to desire. Vivid awareness of the horrors 
o f the Holocaust, for example, would kill some people’s desire for food. Hubin thus 
concludes:
motivation [or preference, choice, desire, etc.] might withstand (or be extinguished by) the 
idealization for the wrong reasons; the idealizing conditions may even create inappropriate 
motivation.'^^
The reason-to-desire account does not fall into this kind of problem because what there is 
reason to desire is not defined  (nor is it an a priori equivalence) in terms o f what the agent 
would  desire under certain conditions. Ideal preference theorists might reply to Hubin’s 
charges by laying more stress on the agent’s rationality under the idealised conditions so 
that it could not be possible for the agent to have an ideal preference for anything other 
than that which he has reason to desire. It may for example be argued that the agent is 
rational only when he recognises all the truths about tire reason-to-desire relation. But this 
would make the ideal preference account redundant. It would be simpler to appeal directly 
to the reason-to-desire relation.
Hubin, 1996, 44. Before Hubin, Gibbard makes a similar point when he writes: “Perhaps with a more vivid 
realization of what peoples’ innards are like, I would want to stay away from dinner parties and do all my 
eating alone—although then I would feel lonely and isolated.” Gibbard, 1990, 20. Gibbard concludes that 
full-information theory of rationality would define as rational the desire to eat alone, and yet this is not what 
would be advisable for one to do. As a consequence, rationality would lose its advisability or recommending 
force. This last point links Gibbard’s discussion to Sidgwick’s claim to the effect that (S) cannot fully capture 
the ‘Rational dictate’ implicit in the notion o f ‘the good on the whole’ for a person.
In order to avoid this problem Peter Railton suggests the following formulation: “an individual’s 
good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to pursue, were he to contemplate his present 
situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free 
of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality.” Railton, 1986, 16. This account is also known as the 
ideal advisor account of the good. I believe Railton’s account cannot successfully deal with the Gibbard- 
Hubin point. Suppose that I am motivated to put pebbles in my navel when 1 consider under idealised 
conditions whether it would be good for me to write a Ph.D. in ethical theory. My ideal advisor would know 
this fact about me and discount it. But on the basis of what can he discount it? Not on the basis of the 
idealised conditions as those conditions are precisely what yield the fact to be discounted.
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5. C on clu sion
In conclusion, on the reason-to-desire theory, what measure o f well-being each agent 
attains depends on the extent to which his life contains what he has reason to desire. The 
measure o f well-being I enjoy increases the greater the measure o f pleasure, achievement, 
knowledge, deep personal relations, autonomy I enjoy. The distribution o f these goods that 
will produce the greatest measure o f well-being will vaiy for each agent according to facts 
about his or her person and his or her particular circumstances. Judgements about what 
there is reason to desire can be authoritative: ex ante and ex post desires are the primitive 
criteria for these judgements. These criteria are typically accompanied by a normative 
impulse: we take ourselves to have reason to desire the objects o f our desires. Reflection, 
experience and the converging opinion o f competent judges confer authoritativeness on our 
initial judgem ent. This account need not mention the satisfaction o f desires, and 
preferences, whether ideal or not. In the next three chapters, the plausibility o f our theory 
of well-being will be put to the test.
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Chapter 5 The Scope Problem and the Limits of 
Well-Being
1. Introduction
In this chapter I examine issues concerning the limits of the concept o f well-being. I begin 
by looking at Stephen Darwall’s rational caie account of well-being. According to Darwall 
an account of well-being is too wide when it includes as contributions to a person’s well­
being instances o f rational self-sacrifice. I f  it does, Darwall claims there is a “scope 
problem” : we must find an account on which well-being has narrower limits. Though I 
agree with DarwalTs aim, I disagree with his strategy at least when it consists in claiming 
that well-being is not a normative concept and that the notion o f care is what lends 
normativity to well-being (§2). Next, I illustrate how our reason-to-desire account deals 
with the scope problem (§3). This discussion will yield the conclusion that a person’s well­
being can be contributed to by things as diverse as the well-being of other persons, all sorts 
of projects the outcomes o f which (in one sense) do not involve one’s self, and even post­
mortem events and states o f affairs. It might be wondered, then, whether we could still call 
‘well-being’ something as wide in scope as this concept (§4). Finally, I will deal with a 
difficulty raised by our claim that a person’s well-being can be contributed to by post­
mortem states and events (§5).
2. Darwall, the scope problem, and the normativity of well-being
2.1. The scop e problem
Darwall’s particular view of well-being seems to be motivated by a worry which I share. 
Darwall wants to find a theory o f well-being capable o f accommodating the possibility o f 
rational self-sacrifice. The idea intuitively at work in his account is the following: when a 
person makes a rational self-sacrifice he camiot at the same time be doing what is best in 
terras o f his well-being and vice versa. As I would put it, the ideas of rational self-sacrifice
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and well-being are essentially connected: an action cannot rationally be conceived o f as 
both what’s best for x in terms o f his well-being and a rational self-sacrifice for x.'
According to Darwall, we must distinguish between on the one hand a theory o f rational 
choice and, on the other, a theory o f well-being. Failing to do this opens up the door to 
what Darwall calls the scope problem: if  rational choice theories are conflated with rational 
self-interest theories the scope o f the concept o f well-being would be so wide as not to 
allow the possibility o f rational self-sacrifice. Darwall thinlcs that informed desire accounts 
of the good might very well work as wider accoimts of rational choice. The fact, however, 
that on this type of account it might be rational for an agent to sacrifice his well-being on 
one occasion, shows that they cannot be considered as accounts of individual well-being. 
We must draw a distinction between rational choice and rational self-interest the dividing 
line being the notion o f rational self-sacrifice.
Even though I am in agreement with Darwall’s aim, i.e., giving an account o f well-being 
narrow enough in scope so as to exclude that instances o f rational self-sacrifice may count 
as part o f one’s well-being, I am opposed to the way in which he argues for it. Darwall’s 
strategy can be inferred flom the following passage:
But what is a person’s good, welfare, or interest? And what claims does our own good 
make on us? These questions are interrelated. So long as the concept of a person’s welfare 
is seen as having a normativity that is intrinsically agent-relative, as entailing normative 
reasons distinctively for the agent's own desires and actions, it will seem inevitable that 
welfare consists in whatever it makes sense for a person to want and, therefore, to realize.
To a first approximation, what is in a person’s interest will seem to consist in whatever an 
agent (rationally) takes an interest in. This, however, make self-sacrificial acts... 
impossible."
Darwall’s strategy, then, consists in showing that the concept o f well-being is not in itself 
an agent-relative normative concept. I f  well-being can be shown not to be intrinsically 
normative, then saying that something is good for a person does not aniotmt to saying that
’ We shall discuss the notion of self-sacrifice in greater detail in Chapter 7.
 ^ Darwall, 2002b, 23-4. Note that Darwall seems to believe that if it makes sense to desire something, it make 
sense to realise the object of one’s desire. Though I agree with this thesis, I do not take it to imply that if it
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he or she has reason to desire and puisne it or “take an interest in it”. As we shall soon see, 
Darwall wants to show that the notion o f care is what confers on well-being its 
normativity.
2.2. Presenting Darwall’s  challenge: care and the normativity of well-being 
Darwall writes:
. . . i t  is believed that if  som ething is for my own good, then it follows that I ought, or have 
reason, to w ant or pursue it. It is assum ed, that is, that w elfare has an agent-relalive 
norm ativity , that a person’s w elfare is necessarily  norm ative for his own desires and 
actions.^
Let us express his thought as the following thesis:
(W) (y) (If something is for jp’s good or well-being, then y  has reason to want it and
pursue it)
Darwall intends to deny that (W) is a conceptual truth. The bulk o f his argument is 
expressed in the following two passages:
...som eone may not value his ow n w elfare because, in a depression, he sees h im self as 
unworthy o f  care or even, perhaps, because he loathes himself. D epression or self-loathing 
doesn’t entirely extinguish values and preferences, however. The depressive may prefer 
isolation and sleep, even though he knows that he might enjoy and benefit more from going 
out with friends: “ Sure, that would be better for m e,” he m ight say “ but why does that 
matter? Why think I am worth caring for?” And the self-Ioather m ight take the fact that he
makes sense to realise something, it makes sense to desire that thing. This point should be kept firmly in 
mind for the rest of this discussion.
’ Darwall, 2002b, 4. Two connected remarks concerning this quotation and its formalisation are in order. 
Firstly, note that according to Darwall it is believed that (a) if something is good for someone than he has 
reason to want or pursue it and (b) a person’s welfare is necessarily normative for his own desires and 
actions. It is clear from the discussion following this quotation that Darwall takes it that we have reason to 
pursue something when we have reason to desire it and vice versa. Of course, and this is my second remark, 
this is not what I have claimed: though we have reason to pursue or realise the things we have reason to 
desire, it is not the case that we have reason to desire to do all the things we have reason to do.
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w ould benefit from an activity as a reason not to engage in it. To both, the thesis that one’s 
own good or welfare entails reasons for acting will mock the truth.'*
M ost would agree, o f  course, that the depressive and the self-Ioather are m istaken in 
th inking that considerations o f  their own w elfare give them no reasons. But w hat these 
characters think isn’t s e l f  contradictory or conceptually incoherent. A nd because it isn ’t, 
the norm ativity o f  welfare cannot consist in entailing agent-relative reasons for the person’s 
own desires and actions. The notion that, as one is unworthy, one’s good gives one no 
reasons, is not the incoherent thought that w hat is (as one thinks) valuable, gives one no 
reasons. It is conceptually  possible that considerations o f  one’s own good provide no 
norm ative reasons for acting w hatsoever or even, as the self-Ioather believes, that they 
provide “counter” reasons. To claim otherwise, as I assume we would, is to put forward a 
substantive normative thesis, not an analytic or conceptual truth.^
Darwall thiiilcs that (W) is not a conceptual truth, but wants to assert that another thesis is 
conceptually true:
To understand the norm ativity o f welfare, I shall argue, we m ust see it in relation to care. 
W hat the depressive is right about is that z /h e  w eren’t worth caring for, considerations o f  
his own good would not be reasons. I t’s ju st that he is wrong in thinking he is unworthy o f  
care. The deep truth that underlies the depressive’s claim is that it is a person’s being 
w orthy o f  concern (as he will seem to som eone who actually cares for him) that makes 
considerations o f  his w elfare into reasons. W hat is a conceptual truth is that to care for 
som eone is to be in a relation to him such that considerations o f  that person’s welfare are 
norm ative for one’s desires and actions with respect to him. What is fo r  someone's good or 
welfare is what one ought to desire and promote insofar as one cares fo r  him f’
Exactly what thesis is Darwall asserting to be conceptually true? The last quotation reports 
a paragraph from beginning to end. At the beginning o f the paragraph, and in light o f the 
preceding discussion, Darwall is clearly in the process of characterising the normativity o f  
well-being: we can understand the normativity o f well-being only when we “see it in 
relation to care”. Daiwall proceeds by specifying the relation between care on the one side
Darwall, 2002b, 5-6.
 ^Darwall, 2002b, 6.
Darwall, 2002b, 6-7.
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and the normativity o f well-being on the other. The penultimate sentence o f the paragraph 
tells us that what is a conceptual truth is that:
(d) “to care for someone is to be in a relation to him such that considerations o f that
person’s welfare are normative for one’s desires and actions with respect to him.”
The very last sentence o f the paragraph, however, witnesses an umnentioned shift in the 
object being characterised: what is at issue now is not the normativity o f well-being but 
rather well-being itself: '"What is fo r  som eone’s good or welfare i s . . . f  Something Darwall 
writes later on may be taken to clarify tliis sliift:
So far we have it that the norm ativity o f  w elfare must be understood in relation to a 
concern for som eone for that person’s sake. 1 will be claiming, in addition, that a stronger 
relation exists between welfare and care, namely, that what it is for som ething to be good 
for som eone Just is for it to be som ething that one should desire for him for his sake, that is 
insofar as one cares for him. ... We m ight equivalently say that what it is for som ething to 
be good for som eone is for it to be som ething that is rational (makes sense, is warranted or 
justified) to desire for him insofar as one cares about him. This is a rational care theory o f  
welfare. It says that being (part of) som eone’s welfare is being som ething that it would be 
rational to want for him for his sake.^
It seems as if  Darwall wants to defend two theses: the first is (d) and is concerned with the 
normativity o f well-being and its relation to care; the second is meant to provide a 
characterisation of well-being itself. Let us state the latter thesis as follows:
(d*) “Being (part of) someone’s welfare is being something that it would be rational to 
want for liim for his sake.”
In conclusion, Darwall makes at least three claims: (1) (W) is not conceptually true; (2) (d) 
is conceptually true; (3) (d*) is (conceptually) true. In §2 .3 ,1 take a closer look at (d) and 
attempt to specify precisely which thesis Darwall is putting forward as a substitute for (W).
I conclude that, at least on some interpretation o f it, (d) yields some unintuitive results and
 ^ Darwall, 2002b, 8-9. To fully understand this passage we must mention that according to Darwall “When 
we care about someone, we desire things for her for her sake.” Darwall, 2002b, 47.
102
Chapter 5
wonder whether such a thesis can really be considered to be conceptually true. In §2.4, I 
will put forward reasons to believe that (d*) is uninformative. Finally, in §2.5, contra  
Darwall, I argue that the best explanation of the depressive and the self-Ioather’s case does 
not yield the conceptual possibility that well-being entails no reasons.
2.3. The normativity of well-being: which thesis?
Consider (d):
(d) "to care for someone is to be in a relation to him such that considerations o f that 
person’s welfare are normative for one’s desires and actions with respect to him.”
The purpose o f (d) is to show that the notion o f care is what confers normativity to 
considerations o f well-being. According to Darwall, well-being does not entail reasons 
unless we see it in relation to caie. It is because x cares about y  that the fact that something 
is good for y  entails a reason for x to desire it fory. We could formulate (d) as follows:
(D) (x), (y) (If something is fo ry ’s good then, if  x cares fory, x has reason to desire and
promote it)^
If I care about m yself I will find that considerations of my well-being entail reasons for 
me. It is hard to argue against this train o f thought except on grounds o f circularity. We 
will pursue that line of argiunent in the next subsection. First, however, we must bring the 
reader’s attention to another feature o f Dai wall’s account.
Darwall might argue that (D) is not really the thesis he was trying to defend. In a passage 
quoted above, Darwall writes that “What the depressed is right about is that //h e  weren’t
 ^Throughout this section I will take ,v and y  to range over persons, i.e., agents with a capacity to think and act 
on reasons; x and y  can be identical. It might be helpful to identify the logical form of (D). There are three 
atomic sentences “P”, “Q”, “R”: respectively, “Something is fory’s good or interest”, “x has reason to desire 
and promote it”, and “x cares about y”. The logical form of (D) must be: “P ❖ (R ♦ Q)”. Notice that this 
formulation is equivalent to “R & ( P 4  Q)”, i.e., if x cares about y  then, if something is good fory, x has 
reason to desire and promote it. This formulation may seem even closer to Darwall’s claim that “to care for 
someone is to be in a relation to him such that considerations of that person’s welfare are normative for one’s 
desires and actions with respect to him.”
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worth caring for, consideration o f his own good would not be reasons. It’s just that he is 
wrong in thinking he is unworthy o f  care. ...[I]t is a person’s being worthy o f 
concern... that makes considerations o f his welfare into reasons.” This quote highlights an 
important shift in Darwall’s conception o f the normativity o f well-being. On this new 
reading Darwall is not concerned with care as a crude (unevaluated) feeling: rather, what 
would make considerations o f well-being normative is a person’s being worthy o f  care. 
Then, rather than (D), the thesis at hand would have to be (D'):
(D') (x), (y) (If something is fo ry ’s good then, if  y  is worthy o f care, x has reason to
desire and promote it)
This is a very important change, as caring about y  might have nothing to do with y ’s being 
worthy of care. Suppose that Jack the Ripper is someone completely unworthy o f care: he 
is a serial killer, with no exculpating elements in his psychological profile. This fact does 
not exclude that someone (including himself) could care about him. But now let us look at 
the truth o f (D'). Darwall would have to claim that it is a conceptual truth that the agent- 
neutral reason giving force o f a person’s well-being is conditional on considerations o f 
worthiness o f caie. Suppose now that the building of a gigantic marble statue representing 
my person would immensely contribute to my good and, despite my eccentricities, I am 
someone who is worthy o f care. Is this fact (my being worthy o f care) really sufficient to 
make it the case that everyone has a reason to desire and promote the building o f my 
statue. Rather than being conceptually true (D') seems substantively false.
2.4. The definition of well-being in terms of care 
Remember Darwall’s definition o f well-being:
(d*) “Being (part of) someone’s welfare is being something that it would be rational to 
want for him for his salce”
Darwall thinlcs that tliis formulation is equivalent to another one: “what it is for something 
to be good for someone is for it to be something that is rational (makes sense, is warranted 
or justified) to desire for him insofar as one cares about him.” That is because “When we
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care about someone, we desire things for her for her sake.”  ^ Let us formulate (d*) as 
follows:
(D*) (%)(y)(g) (g is good fo ry  iff, if  x cares about y  then it would be rational for x to
desire g  for y ’s sake)
For example, suppose that Jack is identical to x and y, and g  is the eating of an apple by 
Jack. Eating the apple is good for Jack, if  and only if, if  Jack cared about himself it would 
be rational for him to desire that he ate the apple. Note that, unlike the discussion 
concerning the normativity o f well-being, tire discussion concerning the definition o f well­
being is conducted by Darwall in terms o f care rather than worthiness o f care. In what 
follows, then, we shall ignore concerns arising from definitions of well-being in terms of 
worthiness o f care. According to Darwall, we camiot define well-being simply in terms of 
what it would be rational to desire because the scope o f ‘desire’ is too wide.*** Care too is a 
form o f desiring but with a very important qualification: when we care about someone we 
desire something for this person fo r  his sake. As Darwall wiites:
To appreciate what these last three words [for his sake] add consider that it seems possible 
for an intrinsic desire for someone to arise through the sort o f  associative process by which 
Mill explains the genesis o f an intrinsic desire for wealth, or even, perhaps, through whim 
or fancy, w ithout involving any concern for the person himself. ... One might simply desire 
intrinsically that another’s good be realized without desiring this for his sake."
We might for example meet a stranger on a train and form an intrinsic desire that certain 
states concerning this stranger’s good obtain without desiring it for his sake. On the other 
hand:
The object o f care is the person herself, not some state or property involving her. In caring 
for her, we, o f  course, want certain states and properties involving her to be realized. When 
they derive from care, however, such desires have an “indirect object” in addition to these 
direct objects. In caring for her, w e want these things fo r  her. This does not mean ju st that
 ^Darwall, 2002b, 47.
According to Darwall it may for example be rational for someone to desire to self-sacrifice. See our
discussion in §3 below. 
" Darwall, 2002b, 2.
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we want the properties and states to involve her, as opposed to someone else—or even that 
the desires are to be understood de re rather than de dicto. We want them for her yb/' her 
sake}^
I take it that an intrinsic desire for something is a desire for that thing for its sake and not 
for the sake of something else. Suppose now that the only thing that would contribute to 
y ’s well-being is that y  eats an apple. Suppose x cares about y  and suppose z has an 
intrinsic desire that y ’s good be realised. Surely, x and z would both want that y  eats the 
apple. Darwall, however, thinks that, in addition to this direct object, caring involves an 
“ indirect object”. But what x would be wanting for y  in addition to what x and z already 
both want I fail to see. This point applies to the stranger in the train case. If  z forms a 
genuine desire (rather than a simple whim or fancy) that the stranger’s good obtains, then I 
cannot see what x (i.e., someone who actually cares for y) would be wanting for y  in 
addition to what z already wants fory.
The most problematic point for Darwall’s account, however, is his definition o f caring for 
y  as wanting something fo ry  fo ry ’s salce. The expression “for a person’s sake” seems to be 
a synonym of well-being or interest. If  I act for a person’s sake, I do something with an eye 
to his or her interest. An expression such as: “Do it for my sake!” would also confirm it. It 
conveys that if  the action were not done, the person imploring that the action be done 
would thereby be made worse off. If  this is so, Darwall cannot, at the risk o f rendering 
(D*) uninform ative, appeal to the notion o f care on the right hand side o f the 
biconditional.'^ That is, if  (D*) is meant to give a characterisation o f well-being in terms of 
something other than itself then the “for one’s salce” clause cannot appear on the right hand 
side of the biconditional.
2.5. Of depressives. self-loathers. and conceptual incoherence.
Darwall argues in favour of the claim that (W) camiot be conceptually true by claiming 
that when a depressive or a self-Ioather takes him self not to have reason to desire
Darwall, 2002b, 47.
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something that he takes to be good for him, he does not show conceptual incoherence. At 
most this person would be substantively confused or, as Darwall wants to say, he would 
wrongly believe him self to be unworthy o f care. Our reply to Darwall takes its starting 
point from another thesis he endorses, namely, the “internalist requirement” :
unless a consideration is one by w hich an agent would be m otivated were she to take 
account o f  it rationally , it can give her no reason to act. To be a reason for her, a 
consideration must be something on which she could (autonomously) ac t.’'*
I take Darwall’s internalism to express a requirement for normative reasons of this form:
“R is a normative reason for S to 0 only if, had S taken account of R rationally, R would 
motivate S to 0 .” If, after taking account o f a consideration, I believe that this 
consideration is a reason for me to act, then I am motivated to act. Wliat we are interested 
in is not so much the motivational side o f this requirement but the “taking rational 
account” side of it. Take the case o f the depressed agent: he takes rational account o f the 
consideration that something is good for him and doesn’t thinlc it is a reason for him to 
desire and do anything. Starting from this view, I will make four remarks. Together, these 
remarks should show that the best explanation why the depressive and the self-Ioather do 
not see that they have reason to desire their good, does not yield the conceptual possibility 
that well-being entails no reasons. This explanation would point rather to the conclusion 
that these agents are rationally defective either in their thinking about their good or, 
alternatively, that they are subject to a form of practical irrationality.
1. In certain cases depression is a serious mental illness; failure to treat manic depression 
appropriately, for example, may ensue in suicidal behaviour on behalf of the depressive. It 
is not clear how serious a mental condition affects Darwall’s ‘depressive’. We know that to 
him, “the thesis that one’s own good or welfare entails reasons for acting will mock the
" Given that it is rational care that is supposed to be the independent variable, i.e., the variable explicating 
well-being. See Darwall, 2002b, 9.
Darwall, 2002b, 40. A quick comment on Darwall’s formulation of internalism is in order. It is made up by 
two sentences. Someone who disagrees with the first sentence does not have to disagree with the second and 
someone who agrees with the second sentence does not have to endorse the first. Those who defend the claim 
that an agent can see reason to act in a way and at the same time fail to be motivated to act accordingly can 
still accept that “To be a reason for her, a consideration must be something on which she could 
(autonomously) act.” They could consistently do so if they thought that having the capacity to autonomously 
choosing an act does not always amount to being motivated to choose that act. On this view autonomy would 
be a dispositional capacity.
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truth.” But if  the depressive’s condition was serious enough, how much authority should 
we give to the claims he takes to be mocking the truth? Should we, as Darwall does, take 
them as important indicators of what conceptual truths there are? The internalism endorsed 
by Darwall requires that the agent “takes rational account” o f considerations o f his good. 
But it is precisely part o f the condition o f being depressed that one is not able to think 
rationally about one’s own good. The depressive’s rationality is defective precisely in one 
crucial respect, i.e., that wliich would let him see that he has reason to desire what is good 
for him. That is why we should not consider his conclusions regarding the normativity of 
his well-being as authoritative.
2. Suppose, for the sake o f the argument, that we can trust the result o f a depressive’s 
“taking rational account” o f his good. He concludes that liis good gives him no reason to 
desire anything. According to Darwall the depressive is not conceptually confused but 
(consciously or unconsciously?) he wrongly thinks that he is unworthy o f care. The 
following example should show the falsity o f this point and the truth of the claim that an 
agent’s good is normative with respect to his desires. Suppose that Jack is depressed and 
does not take considerations o f his well-being to give him any reasons. You are a good 
friend o f his and want to persuade him to reconsider his judgement. What kind o f facts are 
you going to point out to him in order to convince him? Rather than showing him that he is 
worthy o f care (whatever that would mean), I think you would begin to list all the various 
ways in which he stands to be benefited if  he stopped staying in bed all day, being 
depressed. If  he came out with you, you would say, you could visit an art museum where a 
new exhibition of his favourite painter has just opened. Alternatively you may both go for 
a picnic at the seaside or maybe play football; your team-mates, you go on to say, miss 
Jack badly both, on the field and outside it. Wliat you are doing is to show that Jack does 
have reason to desire the various things that are good for him simply in virtue o f these 
things’ being good for him. You are trying to make him see that he has reason to desire 
these things, by making vivid to his mind the way in which they are good for him (by 
being enjoyable, for example). Considerations o f worthiness o f care would be irrelevant.
3. There are two ways in which Jack could respond to your solicitations: (a) he can see he 
has reason to desire taking part in these activities and be motivated to do so; (b) he can see 
that these activities are good for him, take himself to have reason to desire them, but fails 
to desire them and to be motivated to act on them. Maybe his depression is too serious; he
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might need therapy rather than friendly solicitations. What is important here, however, is 
that the depressive is not conceptually confused, hence, we need not postulate the 
possibility that he sees something to be good without taking it to be a reason for him. 
Rather, the agent is simply irrational about his desires and actions.*^ That would not be a 
surprising result given his psychological condition.'^
Darwall wants us to envisage the self-Ioather as someone who takes the fact that a certain 
state could be described as one in which he stands to be benefited to be a reason not to 
desire it and not to pursue it. I thinlc, however, that there is a more accurate description o f 
this situation, one that is compatible with the view that (W) is a conceptual tiTith. When we 
loathe ourselves, if  we are at all to be considered as rational, we take ourselves to do so for 
some reason or other; we do not simply start conceiving o f the things that are good for us 
as undesirable. We might for example hate oiu'selves for something we have done and 
decide to punish ourselves, maybe, so as to redress the situation. At this stage this view 
offers two alternatives: the fact that I stand to be benefited by something counts as a reason 
to desire and pursue that thing though this reason is overridden by the stronger reason to 
punish oneself. Alternatively, the reason giving force of considerations o f one’s well-being 
is silenced by the reason to punish oneself. These descriptions o f the self-Ioather, however, 
make him a perfectly rational figure who is neither conceptually nor practically confused, 
at least insofar as he is justified in tliinking that the overriding or silencing reason he takes 
himself to have really is overriding or silencing. The self-Ioather, however, may also be a 
rationally defective figuie. He would be so when, in the absence o f opposite (overriding or 
silencing) reasons, he took the fact that something is good for him to be a reason against 
the pursuit o f that tiling. This agent would fail to be affected by a reason giving fact in one 
o f the relevant practical ways.
4. In conjunction with (b), another important type o f case, call it (c), can explain away 
Darwall’s conceptual possibility. According to (c), the (depressed) agent in fact sees as
The idea of irrationality appealed to here is rather narrow: An agent is irrational if, and only if, he takes 
himself to have (sufficient) reason to (j) (where (j)-ing is any type of act) and yet fails to be motivated to $. As 
Scanlon puts it: “Irrationality in this sense occurs when a person recognizes something as a reason but fails to 
be affected by it in one of the relevant ways.” Scanlon, 1998, 25.
It should be pointed out that Darwall’s internalist requirement would not allow (b). If the agent could see 
he had reason to desire and do something, he would be motivated to do it. But isn’t the case described by (b) 
an ordinary case of an agent’s acting against his better judgement? Jack can see that he has reason to do a 
certain action but fails to be motivated to do it. Can Darwall’s internalist requirement allow for these cases?
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good for him the things that those who can think rationally Imow not to be good for him. In 
onr example, Jack may be substantively wi'ong about what things are good for him. If  the 
depression is serious enough Jack may be left utterly cold by his friend’s listing of all the 
good things he could take part in. In fact. Jack cannot even conceive leaving his bed as 
anything other than a very unpleasant option. Maybe he can still remember how much he 
enjoyed these activities back when things were different. Now, however, it would not be 
the same; he thinlcs he knows he couldn’t enjoy his time with his friends. He just wants to 
be left alone: that is what he thinks is best for him now.
We can sum up our argument as follows. Firstly, we should be wary of any project that 
takes as evidence for the normativity o f the concept o f well-being the thinking o f agents 
who might very well be impaired in their capacity to thinlc rationally about their good. Our 
reply to Darwall takes its start from the way people who are not impaired in this way 
would conceive o f well-being. Also, when someone not impaired in this way tries to 
motivate an agent to desire his good, he will not appeal to considerations o f worthiness but 
to the way in which various things and activities could be good for the agent. Finally, 
depressives and self-loathers are best understood as practically irrational agents. Thus, the 
best explanation o f the case o f the depressed and the self-Ioather does not yield the 
conceptual possibility that well-being entails no reasons. This is as much evidence as one 
could ask to claim that (W) is after all a conceptual truth.
If  our considerations are correct, in sections 2.3-2.5 we have reached the following 
conclusions. Darwall’s claim that the normativity of well-being must be seen in relation to 
worthiness of care as in (D') can hardly be considered as a conceptual truth. Also, the 
notion o f care presupposes that o f well-being: for this reason the former cannot be used to 
define the latter nor can it be used to explain its normativity. Darwall used the case of the 
depressive and the self-Ioather to show that it is conceptually possible to think that 
something is good for an agent and yet think that the agent has no reason to desire it. The 
truth o f this claim would show that (W) is not conceptually true. Our reply to Darwall is 
that the best explanation of these cases should not postulate this conceptual possibility.
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3. The reason -to -d esire  theory and the s c o p e  problem
3.1. Rational self-sacrifice and well-being
To this point, we have gone along with Darwall in assuming that rational self-sacrifice and 
well-being are essentially connected. In the remaining part of this chapter we shall keep 
doing so though it must be noted here that philosophers such as Joseph Raz and Scanlon do 
not seem to share this assumption. We shall have an opportimity to discuss their views in 
Chapter 7. How can the reason-to-desire account deal with the scope problem? Darwall has 
already pointed out what I take to be the most serious challenge facing our account. 
According to him, it is possible for an agent to form an intrinsic desire for something the 
obtaining of which would not contribute to his or her well-being. At this stage, Darwall 
mentions the sort o f associative process Mill appeals to in order to explain the genesis of 
intrinsic desires for things such as wealth. The scope of desire would simply be too wide to 
individuate all and only the things that contribute to a person’s well-being.
I would agree with Darwall insofar as we do at times form intrinsic desires for things that 
are not good for us. The question is, however, whether we have reason to desire these 
things. How are we to show that what there is reason for an agent to desire is by definition 
something the obtaining of which will contribute to his well-being? I have already offered 
an argument to this effect in our discussion o f desires in Chapters 3 and 4. In Millian 
fashion, we would say that desiring something involves the tendency to see that thing as 
good for one to have. O f course, not all things we desire are good for us, and that is why 
our well-being claims can be considered authoritative only after the epistemic process we 
sketched in Chapter 4. Next we need to show how the reason-to-desire account side-steps 
the scope problem. Once again we would appeal to Mill and his distinction between 
desiring and willing. Wlienever we have reason to act on the basis o f what we have reason 
to desire, our actions can be expected to conhibute to om* well-being. Not all our rational 
actions, however, proceed from our rational desires in this way. At times we may have 
reason to will an action without having reason to desire to do it. This is precisely what 
draws the boimdary between rational pursuits that are not in the agent’s interest or good 
and rational pursuits that most contribute to the agent’s well-being.
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Darwall may insist: surely there are things one would desire and continue to desire even 
after reflection, the obtaining of which would not contribute to one’s well-being. Here is 
one example offered by Darwall:
... although concern for a person gives rise to a desire for her welfare, it is not sim ilarly 
related to a desire for outcom es that she desires, even rationally. Suppose your friend 
Sheila is in the following situation. By donating all her disposable wealth she can realize an 
outcom e she cares very m uch about, say, the rebuilding o f  a city ravaged by w ar to a 
certain degree, D. But there is a catch. Sheila also has a degenerative disease, which, if  it is 
not checked, will create m em ory loss and confusion severe enough so that she will be 
unsure where her money has gone, unable even to hold stable beliefs about the state o f 
rebuilding in the war-ravaged city. Happily, there is a relatively inexpensive drug that can 
arrest the symptoms o f  Sheila’s disease w ithout side effects. However, the drug is not free, 
Sheila will not accept donations, and she cares so much about rebuilding the city that even 
though the difference the cost o f  the drug would make in the rebuilding effort is quite small 
(call it d), she nonetheless wants (and w ould continue to want on reflection) to forgo the 
drug and donate all she has.’’
Sheila can choose between two outcomes. One in which the city is rebuilt to degree D  
together with her advanced disease, memory loss, and uncertainty about the city actual 
state. And another involving the reconstruction o f the city to degree D mimis cl, her 
knowledge o f her role in the reconstruction, and a generally improved mental state. 
Darwall tells us that Sheila ranlcs the first outcome higher than the second one and insists 
that her ranking would survive reflection by Sheila. Importantly, Darwall thinks that 
Sheila’s interest would be best served by the second option. Hence, we may have a rational 
desire (a desire that survives reflection) for something that is clearly against our well­
being. I would like to make two objections.
Firstly, I would like to question whether Sheila’s ranking really is something that would 
survive reflection. The point is that Sheila’s desire to put every last penny to the rebuilding 
o f the city, even when that could have little effect on the city and a great effect on her 
health, is mireasonable. Another feature makes the example as a whole even less credible.
I f  the reconstruction o f the city were what most matters to Sheila and by accepting
Darwall, 2002b, 43.
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donations she might achieve an even higher degree of reconstruction, would it not be 
rational for her to accept donations?
Our second objection is more important and takes its root from the claim that Sheila’s 
interest would be best served by the second option. Suppose that Sheila has in fact most 
reason to desire the first outcome. Why assume that that outcome is clearly not the best 
outcome in terms o f her well-being? Darwall must take it that this example captures a 
consensus o f intuitions, that we would all agree that Sheila’s well-being is clearly not 
served by the first outcome. I would argue that that is not as intuitive as Darwall thinlcs. To 
show this we need to introduce anotlier piece of ai'gumentation.
3.2. The expansion of the self
When we form an intrinsic desire for another person’s well-being we would conceive of 
that person’s well-being as part of ours. To say that another person’s well-being is part of 
mine means that how well my life goes for me depends on how well this person’s life goes 
for him. This thought dates back to at least Aristotle who claimed that we can justify 
concern for one’s friend and family members as cases of, or on the model of, self-love. The 
excellent person, Aristotle thinlcs, is related to his friend in the same way as he is related to 
himself, since a friend is another self; therefore, just as his own well-being is choiceworthy 
for him, his friend’s well-being is choiceworthy for him.**
Now, thinlcing back to Sheila’s case we can say the following: just as we may identify our 
good with other people’s good, we may identify our good with rational ends such as the 
reconstruction o f the war-ravaged city. John Skorupski notes a problem with this kind o f 
picture:
...w hen the good o f  others -  or outcomes which (in one sense) do not involve me, such as 
the long-term regeneration o f  the Caledonian forest -  become ‘a part o f  my good’, is this 
not a dilution o f  the notion o f  personal good, a fading o f  its boundaries, in that the notion o f  
se lf  fades from the content o f  the desire?***
See Aristotle, 1984, II70b 6-9. 
Skorupski, 2000,319.
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However, he offers the following suggestion:
Can it be plausible to see it instead as an expansion o f  the notion o f  the self, an 
enlargement o f  its objectification in the world through self-identification with others, or 
with outcomes beyond my stream o f  experience? It seems to me that... [one] could 
plausibly argue that there is both dilution and expansion: the psychological process 
involved is the fading o f  a lower, because narrower, conception o f  the limits o f  one’s se lf  
(or more accurately one’s good) in favour o f a more expansive one,’*
Skorupski’s suggestion seems to apply well to Sheila’s case. It is conceivable that Sheila 
identifies her good with the reconstruction of the city. A little reflection shows that many 
of us are familiar with the phenomenon o f the expansion of the self, though, maybe, not in 
these philosophical terms. We all, to some extent, identify our lot with that of our beloved 
ones, our friends, our football team, our comitry, and our projects. What happens to them 
has direct repercussions on how well o ff we are. I f  we commonly identify our well-being 
with such entities why deny that Sheila could identify her well-being with the 
reconstruction project? I believe that rather than excluding it as extraneous, any theory of 
well-being must either accomit for this phenomenon or, at worst, explain it away as an 
error.
Darwall may accept that, considered on its own, success in her rational project would 
contribute to Sheila’s well-being. But the outcome that Sheila prefers includes a 
diminution in her health so great that the loss in well-being would be greater than the 
contribution afforded by her success in the project. Surely, however, we reasonably 
identify with our well-being states in which our health is seriously diminished. Think about 
the case o f a mother who agrees to donate her kidney to save her daughter’s life. The 
mother’s health will be impoverished by the loss of her kidney. But the contribution to her 
daughter’s well-being, with which her well-being is identified, is so great that her own 
well-being would be greater were she to donate her kidney rather than let her daughter 
die.^'
Skorupski, 2000,319.
Though I believe the mother to have sacrificed something for her daughter I do not take her action to be an 
instance of 5e//sacrifice. I will explain the difference between sacrifice and self-sacrifice in Chapter 7, §4.3.
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The structure of Sheila’s example is not different from this one. If, however, we are still 
inclined to say that the loss o f well-being is greater in the first outcome, then I believe we 
should say there is no reason for Sheila to desire that outcome. On our account, however, 
saying that does not yet amount to saying that she has no reason to will that outcome. 
Maybe, say, the belief that the reconstruction o f the city would substantially enhance the 
well-being o f thousands of people might motivate her to will the first outcome. Her willing 
might arise without any intrinsic desire to benefit these people (and with an intrinsic desire 
to preserve her health). Re-described in this manner, the example clearly captures a case of 
rational self-sacrifice.
4. Well-being or personal good?
Some may retort that the notion o f well-being I have been sketching is simply too broad. 
Sumner reminds us the concept o f well-being (or welfare) must fit a certain description. 
There is, according to him, a pre-analytic agreement about what areas the concept o f well­
being can cover. Sumner also reminds us that though this agreement may be unquestioned 
for a set of core meanings of the concept, it may grow thin at the margins.^^ Darwall makes 
a remark similar in spirit when he writes:
O f course, we might, as a semantic matter, simply use ‘welfare’ to refer to whatever is 
useful in promoting the agent’s current desires, her rational desires, or some subset o f  
these. But if  we do, we w ill lose the conceptual connection between welfare and 
benefit.. 23
As we saw above, Darwall was concerned with separating the concept o f ‘rational choice’ 
from that o f ‘rational self-interest’. Railton shared the same concern and attempted to solve 
it by drawing a distinction between the notion o f an ‘individual’s good’ and that o f an 
‘ individual ’ s welfare ’ :
See Sumner, 1996, Chapter 1. 
Darwall, 2002b, 35.
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This notion [that o f  an individual’s good] is not the same as that o f  an individual’s welfare, 
for it may turn out that an ideally informed and rational individual would want to seek as 
an end in itself (were he to step into the place o f  his present self) the well-being o f  others as 
well as himself.’'*
Unfortunately, though, that an individual would have a rational desire for another’s well­
being does not in and o f itself show that the satisfaction of his want would not be part of 
his well-being. The other person’s well-being might be considered to be a part o f his well­
being, and in that case it would be desired and aimed at as an end in itself. Yet, there is a 
more important problem for Railton’s strategy. In a similar vein to DarwalTs, I would want 
to say that his move tlireatens to sever any conceptual linlc between a person’s good and a 
person’s welfare or well-being. It seems hard, at least at a pre-analytic level, to accept that 
the realisation o f the same end may have at the same time opposite effects on a person’s 
good and on a person’s well-being. And yet accepting Railton’s proposal would entail 
exactly this consequence. Suppose that x ’s choice to promote y ’s well-being involved a 
considerable loss in x ’s welfare, and yet that choice was determined by x ’j  ideally 
informed desire. On Railton’s account the realisation of x ’s end would contribute to x ’s 
good but would diminish the measure of x ’s well-being. That seems counterintuitive. It is 
hard to conceive how an individual’s good may be positively affected while, at the same 
time, his well-being is negatively affected. A semantic decision such as this one should not 
be allowed as it clashes too strongly with our ordinary intuitions.
What are the limits o f the concept o f well-being, then? And does the notion o f well-being 
we are defending here outstretch them? It might be very hard to give a definitive reply to 
this question. Philosophers’ intuitions about what things are covered and what things are 
not covered by the concept o f well-being (and concepts akin to it, i.e., happiness, interest, 
good, etc.) have been clearly divided, at least at the margins, since Aristotle and even 
before. However, to find a pragmatic solution to our problem it might be helpful to look at 
Shelly Kagan’s discussion o f this question.^^ Towards the end of his essay, Kagan makes 
the following point:
Railton, 1986, 30 n. 9. 
See Kagan, 1992.
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Increasing well-being is providing an intrinsic, ultimate benefit to the person; thus it would 
have to involve altering the person’s intrinsic properties. Since a person just is a body and a 
mind, changes in well-being would have to involve changes in the person’s body or mind.
... If something is to be o f  genuine (ultimate) benefit to a person, then it must affect the 
person; it must make a difference in the person. That is it must affect the person’s intrinsic 
properties. Changes in merely relational properties cannot be what is o f  ultimate value/b?- 
the person. 1 certainly have no argument for this claim. It is sim ply that I find it 
overwhelmingly plausible.’*
Yet, only a little later, Kagan notices that many people will find it overwhelmingly 
plausible to say that a person who has been deceived into thinldng that she is loved and 
successful, is not as well off as she would have been had she heen genuinely loved and 
successfi.il. On Kagan’s model, tliis would then be an example o f a change extrinsic to the 
person capable o f affecting the person’s well-being. On our theory a person’s well-being 
would include what Kagan calls ‘external goods’, i.e., goods that do not affect a person’s 
(body and mind) intrinsic properties. An agent may very well have reason to desire to have 
genuine friends. The fact that, imbelaiownst to him, what he believes to be his friends are 
not genuine can have a negative effect on his well-being. On Kagan’s account, goods such 
as this one would not be part o f a person’s well-being. Yet, Kagan adds:
... even if  this is so, this does not at all show that the various external goods are not 
genuine goods. Indeed, they may well be more significant than well-being itself. We will 
still care deeply about the presence o f  these external, relational goods. And nothing 
suggests that we are mistaken to do so. Even if  they are external to well-being, there will 
remain an important sense in which these goods are personal, in that their value lies in their 
relation to the given person.”
If one were to grant Kagan his appeal, then the term personal good  would be most 
appropriate in capturing all o f the things that there is reason for an agent to desire. In that 
case, then, the goods making up one’s personal good would be both those ‘internal’ goods 
contributing to the restricted notion of well-being plus other external goods. Notice, 
however, that this semantic decision would fall prey to the same objection we raised 
against Railton’s distinction between ‘individual’s good’ and ‘individual welfaie’. Suppose
Kagan, 1992, 186.
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that suddenly and behind my back, my good friends became false friends and, at the same 
time, resolved to deceive me about their genuineness by pretending to be even nicer friends 
than they used to be when they were genuine friends. My personal good would be 
decreased by my loss of genuine friends though my well-being would be likely to increase 
through the extra niceness of my (newly false) friends. If the loss in external good is large 
enough, my personal good would decrease overall though my well-being would increase, 
.lust as for Railton, this solution seems unnatmal.
I do not think that we should worry too much about Kagan’s distinction between internal 
and external goods and the way both kinds of goods relate to ‘well-being’. That is because 
Kagan has not convincingly shown that the meaning of well-being has to be restricted to 
what he calls internal goods. His case was argued for through an appeal to an intuition. 
There is nothing wrong with appealing to intuitions, were it not the case as it is here, that 
opposing intuitions are just as strong. In what follows, then, I will take it to be semantically 
permissible to use ‘well-being’ in the way we have so far used it. In fact, I think we would 
even be allowed to use the expression ‘personal good’ as a synonym for it.
5. Posthumous well-being
A discussion about the scope of ‘well-being’ would be incomplete without at least some 
remarks concerning its most paradigmatic case: can posthumous states affect one’s well­
being? Post-mortem states motivate us to act, whilst alive. Their content might be clearly 
connected to what an agent takes to be his good. Posthumous fame is a typical example. 
Many people desire to be remembered in history. That one’s offspring prospérais another 
much more common example. Are these irrational desires to have? Or is it wrong to 
conceive o f them as desires mider the idea of one’s good?^* I thinlc on our account an agent 
might very well have reason to desire things that will only obtain after her death. We 
would have to defend, then, the view that post-mortem states can contribute to a person’s 
well-being.
”  Kagan, 1992, 188-189.
Sldgwick, for example, noticed that people desire things such as posthumous fame though he thought this 
desire to be irrational. Sidgwick 1907, 113-114, 128-129, 398-402.
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Suppose that ensuring a prosperous future for his children is an important part o f Henry’s 
well-being and one of his main aims in life. Had he not had such an end, he would have 
taken up a less stressful but less remunerative job, retired earlier, spent much more money 
on him self and much less on his children’s education. Yet, being a rather late parent, he is 
perfectly aware that his chances to be around when his children will be able to harvest the 
fruit o f his labour are very small. And so it happens. Good old Henry passes away and only 
a good few years later do his children fully enjoy and appreciate what he had done for 
them. However, for the sake o f the ensuing discussion, consider an alternative scenario: 
Henry passes away and a few days later, his children are killed in a tragic car accident.
I hope many will join me in thinldng that Henry’s well-being is affected in both scenarios 
though, o f course, in contrasting ways. If  one does accept this as a possibility then one 
must think that the following view is true:
(PM) Something can determine the level o f an individual’s well-being even after
the individual’s biological death.
(PM), however, seems to clash with another view, which, I believe, also enjoys our 
intuitive approval. Let us call this view the “Existence Requirement”:
(ER) Something can affect an individual’s well-being at t only if  the individual
concerned exists at t.
One easy way to dismiss (PM) is to argue that in order for something to affect an 
individual’s well-being, the individual must experience/be aware of that thing and, we will 
assume, if  one is not alive one does not have the capacity to experience or be aware o f 
anything. But this criterion seems too strict as it does not allow cases such as the deceiving 
friends we mentioned in the last section, to have an effect on an individual’s well-being. 
As that example showed, changes in our circumstances may affect our well-being even 
though we are not aware o f them. But there is another step to be taken to allow that 
changes we cannot be aware o f because we are dead can affect our well-being. In the 
example o f the deceiving friends there is someone whose well-being is being affected. In
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$the post-mortem case, the subject whose well-being is allegedly being affected no longer 
exists or, more precisely, is no longer alive. That is precisely the intuition behind (ER).
One solution to preserve the spirit o f both (PM) and (ER) is to say that posthumous events 
can impact retrospectively on a subject’s life, affecting its success or failure. George 
Pitcher writes:
[T]he sense in which an ante-mortem person is harmed by an unfortunate event after his 
death is this: the occurrence o f  the event makes it true that during the time before the 
person’s death, he was harmed— harmed in that the unfortunate event was going to happen.
If the event should not occur, the ante-mortem person would not have been so harmed. So 
the occurrence o f  the post-mortem event is responsible for the ante-mortem harm.”
Applying this thought to H enry’s example, we get that whatever happens to H enry’s 
children after his death, i.e., whether they die in the car accident or whether they live to 
prosper, will affect Henry’s well-being before his death. This solution, however, is 
incompatible with our account. That is because, on our account, a person’s well-being is 
nothing over and above the attaining o f (a particular arrangement of) the various 
constituents o f his well-being. Now, Henry has reason to desire while alive at ti that a 
certain state obtains at time t2 after his death. If  that state is realised at ti Henry’s well­
being will be contributed to at t2 (if at all) and not at ti. At ti there is a lack o f the most 
essential thing: the good the attaining of which would contribute to Hem y’s well-being.
The solution I am rather more inclined to endorse to preserve the spirit o f both (PM) and 
(ER), has been offered by David Ruben. In a footnote he writes:
If one regards x ’s being harmed by y as a real change in x, the relatum which is harmed, 
then it will follow that one cannot harm the dead. On the other hand, if  x ’s being harmed by 
y is a Cambridge change in x, then there is no reason in principle why one cannot 
sometimes do things which do harm the dead.’*
Pitcher, 1984, 187-188
Ruben, 1989, 232-233 n. 20. The following examples illustrate the difference between real changes and 
Cambridge changes: “A real change is a change as ordinarily understood: The change in a schoolboy if he 
comes to admire someone he did not admire before, the change in a woman when she gives birth to a sixth 
child, the change in an object when its color changes. Cambridge changes are phoney qua changes: The 
change in Socrates when a schoolboy comes to admire him, the change in the number six each time it ceases
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If we bring the results o f this view to bear on (PM) and (ER) we get the following. 
Something can be a real change in an individual’s well-being at t only if  the individual 
concerned exists at t. However, something can be a Cambridge change in an individual’s 
well-being even after the individual’s biological death. Note, however, that on this account 
it is also possible that whilst alive, our well-being can be Cambridge affected. Thinlc back 
to the “deceiving friends” example. Suddenly and unbeknownst to me, my friends cease to 
be genuine and become deceivers. My well-being is thereby diminished.
If  we accept that Cambridge changes may affect a living individual’s well-being then we 
should ask in what way the fact that the existence requirement is fulfilled in this kind o f 
example is relevant in determining that the agent’s well-being is being affected. It seems 
that it is only relevant as a pre-condition: without a person there is no one’s well-being to 
be affected. Note however, that we can no longer say “without a living person there is no 
one’s well-being to be affected.” To say that would entail that Cambridge changes (of any 
kind, not only the one’s affecting one’s well-being) require that what is being changed is 
alive at the moment at which the change occurs, and that is surely false. We can then 
reformulate (ER) and endorse it as follows:
(ER’) Something can be a real change in an individual’s well-being at t only if the 
individual concerned is alive at t. Something can be a Cambridge change in an 
individual’s well-being at t only if  the agent is alive at t or was alive at a time 
before t.
6. Conclusion
Taken together, many of the issues discussed in this chapter lead to one crucial conclusion: 
a person’s well-being can be contributed to by things as diverse as the well-being o f other 
persons, all sorts of projects the outcomes o f which (in one sense) do not involve the
to be the number of someone’s children, the change in Adam and Eve each time they acquire a new 
descendant.” Ruben, 1989, 223. Ruben emphasises the point that though Cambridge changes are always 
relational, not all relational changes are Cambridge changes.
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person, and even states of affahs that obtain after the death o f the person whose well-being 
they contribute to. These are all things that agents may have reason to desire. This 
conclusion was reached by talcing on boai'd an expansionist view of one’s good, a view that
(a) is in accordance with the phenomenology of our ethical life, and that (b) is able to avoid 
falling prey to the scope problem. The upshot is that tlie concept o f well-being we have so 
far described can be very wide in scope, so wide that in fact it may legitimately be asked 
w hether we can still call this concept ‘well-being’. I have argued that we can or, 
alternatively, we can use ‘personal good’ as a synonym. Given that the limits o f the 
concept are so wide it would come as no surprise to see, as we shall soon do, that many 
different types of substantive goods can contribute to a person’s well-being.
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Chapter 6 The Parts of Well-Being; Some Remarks
1. Introduction
Given certain facts about the nature o f human beings in general, I will put forward a list o f 
goods that there is reason for a human being to desire under the idea o f his or her well­
being (§2). It is not an aim o f this chapter to argue extensively in favour o f each of the 
candidate goods appearing in the list. Rather, I will assume the plausibility o f each of the 
elements and discuss at greater length what I consider to be particularly tricky issues 
concerning some o f them. It will become clear from our discussion that for any human 
agent, the range of goods captured under the idea o f Iris or her well-being might be a rather 
extensive one. After a few brief remarks concerning the list o f goods in general (§2) and 
some o f the goods in particular (deep personal relations, virtue, knowledge, and 
achievement) (§3), I will dedicate one section each to specific issues concerning 
respectively pleasiue and its relation to happiness (§4) and autonomy (§5).
2. The list
I would think that the list o f goods that there is reason for human beings to desire would 
include the following ends: pleasure, achievement, autonomy, deep personal relations, 
knowledge and understanding, and virtue.* The question will of course arise: how can we 
devise such a list? First, it would be a good idea to demarcate the realm of knowledge 
within which tlie devising o f the list would take place. The investigation would be one in 
philosophical anthropology. The investigator would have to look at the relevant empirical 
facts concerning human beings in general and thence come up with some generalisations. 
What would be the best evidence for the claim that something is desirable for a human 
being? Take what human beings generally desire as a primitive criterion and move from
' For a more in-depth discussion of some or even all the items on the list see Finnis, 1980, esp. Chapters 3-4; 
Griffin, 1986, Chapters 1-5; A. Moore, 1991; G.E. Moore, 1903; Skorupski, 1989, Chapter 9.
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there usmg the epistemological process for normative claims we discussed in Chapter 4. O f 
course, in everyday life situations human beings will not generally desire pleasure, 
autonomy or achievement, etc., so much as the various particular objects that bring them 
about. It is the work of the philosopher to be able to abstract from a number o f reasonable 
desires for particular objects or states o f affairs, and conclude that, for example, they all 
share the feature o f being desired under the idea o f respectively pleasure, knowledge, 
autonomy, etc.^
It is also important to imderstand the natur e o f the list. The list is objective in the sense that 
given any human being it would be intelligible for him to desire any or all o f the items in 
the list as part o f his or her well-being. This claim, however, has to be accompanied by one 
remark. As discussed in Chapter 4, though it would be intelligible to desire all o f the items 
on the list, it might not be best for any particular agent to do so on one occasion or, if  his 
circumstances are peculiar enough, to ever do so. That will depend on the circumstances of 
the agents and on certain facts about him or her.
3. Deep personal relations, virtue, knowledge, and achievement
3.1. Deep personal relations
Under the idea o f deep personal relations, I intend to group relationships as diverse as 
friendship, parental love, as well as romantic or passionate love. An in-depth examination 
o f each kind o f deep personal relation and the precise way in which they can be pursued 
under the idea of one’s well-being would take a book-length essay and cannot be taken up 
here. As explained above, such an investigation would belong to the realm o f philosophical 
antlii'opology. Most abstractly, however, we shall say that all of these types o f relations
" Important substantive questions would be raised if the best philosophical-anthropological investigation 
would for example exclude some of our entries and include others. It is not the task of this thesis to carry out 
such an investigation. The list I put forward can be considered as a plausible list on the basis of some of the 
relevant literature. I will leave it an open question, and a very interesting one at that, whether the list I have 
offered is indeed the best account given our present knowledge. One particularly interesting issue, for 
example, is whether dignity should also appear in the list as an independent entiy.
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involve a special attachment o f a being to another/ Most importantly, this attachment 
involves the kind o f identification o f a being’s well-being with that o f another, the kind of 
extension of the self we discussed in Chapter 5.
3.2. Virtue
Recall the difference we introduced in Chapter 3 between the virtuous agent on the one 
hand and the conscientious agent on the other. The former would desire to act virtuously; 
the latter would do so but out o f a sense o f duty, and not out of an intrinsic desire. Let us 
also remember that these are ideal-type figures; the very same agent may combine the two 
types. One may, for example, act out of a sense of duty on some occasions but find that he 
has reason to desire to act virtuously on other occasions. Now, I would claim that the 
virtuous agent is a lover o f virtue in a way that is different from that in which the 
conscientious agent is a lover o f virtue. Wlien we say that tlie virtuous agent loves acting 
virtuously, we say that she has an intrinsic desire for it. In this respect, acting virtuously 
involves her affectively and first-personally. Not being able to act on her desire would 
translate into a genuine loss of well-being for her. In this sense, her action would not be 
selfless. That, however, should not be understood as meaning that her action would be 
egoistic or selfish. The process is once more that of the expansion o f the self. Her well­
being is to some extent identified with that o f the being she is concerned with or with the 
virtuous action or activity itself. The frustration of her desire to act virtuously would be 
perceived as a personal loss. This, I think, should be a familiar enough phenomenon o f our 
ethical life though probably not as recurring as the expansion o f our well-being towards 
our loved ones."* Things are different for the conscientious lover of virtue. He will act 
virtuously entkely out of liis sense o f duty.
 ^ Though necessary, this condition might not be sufficient to capture, for example, a relation such as 
friendship. Two people can’t be said to be genuine friends unless the special attachment in question is 
reciprocal (can we be friends if you despise/hate me?). But, then again, friendship is most typically a social 
form. What particular practices are involved by it will depend to some extent on the particular society in 
which it is instantiated.
Note the difference between my account of the virtuous agent and Mill’s. On my account, acting virtuously 
is not to be understood under the idea of pleasure as it was for Mill (though it does not exclude that it might 
on occasions be so understood). Rather, acting virtuously is an independent categorial end under the (non- 
substantial) idea of one’s well-being.
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3.3. Knowledge
111 what way can laiowledge or understanding o f one’s situation be taken to be part o f a 
person’s well-being? Take the case of the mother whose son has long gone missing in a 
military campaign. She wants to know his fate. She does not desire to laiow because she is 
miserable not knowing; she is miserable not knowing because she desires to know.^ 
Knowledge o f one’s situation is an end that people do desire and, it seems to me, they do 
so with good reason. Importantly, as this example shows, they can desire it as a component 
of their own good and not for the good o f others or in pursuit o f an ethical ideal. An 
illustration o f anotlier feature o f how laiowledge could be good for a person is given by the 
following example from Robert Nozick:
We would not wish for our children a life o f  great satisfactions that all depended upon 
deceptions they would never detect: although they take pride in artistic accomplishments, 
their critics and their friends too are just pretending to admire their work yet snicker behind 
their backs; the apparently faithful mate carries on secret love affairs; their apparent loving 
children really detest them; and so on.^
It would be hard to judge as good for them the life of people not knowing the grim truth 
about their situation. Many, and I am inclined to join them, would agree that these people 
have reason to desire to know the truth about their situation, to stand in the correct 
epistemic relation to the facts. Needless to say, knowledge has great instrumental value. 
But standing in the correct epistemic relation to the facts can in itself be good for one. We 
desire to have genuine friends and not simply ones that seem so; we desire to accomplish 
great artistic feats, not merely to have the false experience o f having done so. More 
generally, we want om* beliefs to be based on what is actually the case. Take away this 
feature from our beliefs about our experiences and many o f us might have good reason to 
stop desiring having these experiences altogether. This, however, should not be taken to 
imply that knowledge and understanding are desirable only as a part o f a Moorean organic 
unity. I do not agree with G. E. Moore when he writes that:
 ^ 1 borrow this example from Skorupski, 1989, 300. 
Nozick, 1989, 105-106.
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Knowledge, though having little or no value by itself, is an absolutely essential constituent 
in the highest goods, and contributes immensely to their value/
Take the case of the mother once again; the experience of coming to laiow the fate o f her 
son might be very painful and certainly undesirable in that respect. Yet, she desires to 
laiow. Would knowing about her son be significantly valuable for her only when 
contributing to a greater unity? I don’t think so. Take also the nature o f scientific 
discovery. Many human beings display a primitive cmiosity about the natmal and social 
world around them and their place in it. They seek this laiowledge for its own sake. They 
do not seek it only to receive the pleasure ensuing from the satisfaction o f their curiosity. 
Nor do they seek it because the discovery process is overall a pleasurable one or because 
coming to know is pleasiuable. Many, I suppose, would want to satisfy their curiosity 
irrespective o f any pleasurable state that might be involved in or ensue from the process.
3.4. Achievem ent or accomplishment
Some authors want to distinguish between achievement and accomplishment. Andrew 
Moore, for example, takes it that:
one accomplishes something, in the prudentially important sense, if  and only if  one makes 
a substantial contribution to a project or end which is itself o f  major value,^
Many activities and projects lack the value necessaiy for accomplishment. The cracking o f  
30 walnuts in 57 seconds between one’s buttocks, for example, is some achievement, but 
no accomplishment.^
Moore’s terminological choice seems to be stipulative. I do not mean to imply that there is 
something wrong with it; I only mean that we might have inverted the terms without 
offending against our pre-analytic intuitions about their usage. The substantive underlying 
issue, however, is more important. There are doings that contribute to an agent’s well-
’ Moore, 1903, 199. Note that what my exposition is neutral on the question concerning the plausibility of 
organic unities, i.e., unities the values of which might be much greater than the value of each of its 
components taken together. Recently, Zinimermann has argued against its plausibility. See Zimmerman, 
2001, Chapter 5.
 ^Moore, 1991,212-213.
 ^Moore, 1991,216.
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being that are “o f major value” and doings that are not “of major value” . I think there are 
two interesting issues to be addressed: (1) whether the second kind o f doings can be good 
for the agent at all, and (2) whether accomplishing and acliieving have some core meaning 
in common. Let us start with the latter point.
Both kinds o f doings  seem to share a central feature, which we may call agency 
authorship. Let me illustrate what I mean by that. Sophie might rightly think it very 
important that the tr uth about the origin of the human species be discovered. However, she 
does not care about being herself engaged in any of the scientific projects conducted to that 
purpose. In fact, she knows herself well enough to realise that she does not have the right 
kind o f disposition to become a professional researcher in bio-archaeology. Researching 
the truth about the origin o f the human species is not an authorship-centred aim of Sophie. 
However, one o f Sophie’s most important aims is that o f climbing the ten highest 
mountains in the world. She does not care about other people having already done so. Nor 
does she care about having the mere experience o f climbing the ten mountains by being 
plugged into a powerful simulating machine. She desires to do it and she desires that she 
does it. Whatever one’s intuitions about the value or worth of these or any other doings, I 
believe accomplishment and achievement have agency authorship as their common kernel 
in the way just illustrated.
The point we are left to examine, now, is whether an autliorship-centred doing o f no 
“major value” may ever be good for the individual engaged in it. Take Rawls’s famous 
grass counter example. On our account, any end an individual desires and pursues as a part 
of his well-being must be subsumable under an intelligible categorial end. Now, we do not 
find it intelligible to say that counting blades o f grass can be desirable for an individual as 
an end in itself, let alone as an authorship-centred end. I f  we cannot see something as an 
intelligible end it is simply hard to see how it could be contributing to a person’s well­
being. However, if, say, counting blades of grass were a way to find peace of mind then we 
would be able to place it under the idea o f pleasure and it does make sense to say that 
pleasure contributes to a person’s well-being. *** But, then, enjoyment or pleasure would
Note that though the activity of counting blades of grass is now placed under the categorial end of pleasure 
it would still also be an authorship-centred doing. Though counting the grass is constitutive of pleasure, it 
also matters to the agent that he counts grass blades, not that grass blades be counted. Nor would the agent be 
satisfied with the mere experience of counting grass blades. It is part of his aim that he actually does the 
counting.
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become the categorial end, and coimting blades o f grass would only be a source and not a 
part of well-being.
But the question could be pushed further, as, after all, we do not think that all sources of 
well-being ar e of equal “value.” The question would then be whether an authorship-centred 
doing of no “major value” may ever be a source o f well-being. Take Rawls’s grass counter 
again. We have reason to desire enjoyment, but do we have reason to desire enjoyment 
through the activity of grass coimting? Though most o f us would find this activity unusual 
as a source o f enjoyment, it is not inconceivable that someone may find grass counting 
enjoyable in some way. Our intuitions would differ if someone found cutting him self up 
with razor blades enjoyable. That is because most o f us would find that activity particularly 
painful and what is painful is not pleasurable.
How about Moore’s curious nutcracker-man? Suppose that we are agreed that achievement 
and accomplisluiient are a component o f agents’ well-being insofar as it is intelligible to 
want to achieve or accomplish certain things under the idea o f one’s well-being. Our 
question, then, is to understand whether the activity o f cracking the most nuts in the least 
time can be considered as an authorship-centred achievement or accomplishment. If  it can 
then it can be considered as a source of a person’s well-being. We find it easy to say that 
competitive athletics or finding the cure to AIDS are accomplishments or achievements. 
We find these activities valuable (here ‘valuable’ is not to be understood prudentially) and 
we find it intuitive to say that an agent may have reason to desire to achieve or accomplish 
something valuable. It is harder to find competitive buttock-nut-cracking a valuable 
achievement or accomplishment, and if  it caimot be considered as such an agent cannot 
have reason to desire it as a source o f well-being, not simply because it does not seem as a 
valuable end but, more radically, because it does not seem to be an intelligible activity.
Someone, however, might press us: what is so different between aiming at being the 
world’s 100 metres champion and aiming at being the world fastest nutcracker? Can we 
exclude the possibility of a society in which competitive buttock-nut-cracking is a highly 
recognised accomplishment or achievement? It might be thought that what kinds of 
pursuits we can find intelligibly valuable (and ‘valuable’ here is not to be understood only 
in terms o f well-being) depend on our social forms and that we do not find buttock-nut- 
cracking valuable because it is not a recognised social form. Joseph Raz talces social forms
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“to consist o f shared beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively shared metaphors and 
imagination, and so on.”** He then goes on to claim that:
A person’s well-being depends to a large extent on success in socially defined and 
determined pursuits and activities, ... What are the reasons for [this] thesis? It is not a 
conventionalist thesis. It does not claim that whatever is practised with social approval is 
for that reason valuable. It says that the comprehensive goals a person finds valuable are 
based on social forms, whether or not these are socially approved social forms. In other 
words the thesis merely sets a limit to what comprehensive [goals] can be valuable for any 
person. They can be valuable only if  they can be his goals and they can be his goals only if  
they are founded in social forms.*“
I agree with Raz’s objection to conventionalism. However, we have to understand what 
exactly Raz means by his last claim. Raz may be taken to say that the goodness o f a goal is 
dependent on its being instantiated in a social form. I disagree with this claim if  we 
understand it to mean that what warrants om* judgement that sometliing is good is the fact 
that it exists in a social form. As we claimed when presenting the buck-passing account of 
value in Chapter 3, different things are valuable in very different ways. To judge that 
running the 100 metres in the least time is an acliievement or accomplisluiient is to say that 
this activity has a feature that provides agents with a reason to admire it. We could of 
coiu'se wonder why we find this activity admirable but not buttock-nut-cracking. I would 
say that it is a primitive fact about human beings that we spontaneously find some things 
admirable and not others.*^ O f com’se that alone is not sufficient to wai'rant our judgement 
that something is admirable. The consensus o f competent judges would have to be 
appealed to as an indicator that our primitive normative impulse is indeed authoritative. 
Going back to Raz, we should understand the dependence of valuable activities on social 
forms as follows: the existence of the latter would provide an opportiuiity to instantiate the
" Raz, 1986,311.
'■ Raz, 1986, 309-10. Note that in the second square bracket, 1 took the liberty of inserting the word “goals”. 
In the original Raz writes “forms” in its stead. There are two reasons to believe that that was an oversight. 
Firstly, in the sentence before the one containing the alleged oversight, as well as in the preceding discussion 
Raz keeps referring to “comprehensive goals” and not “comprehensive forms”. Secondly, in the sentence 
following the one in question, the subject “they” can only refer to a person’s “comprehensive goals”. If we 
took it to refer to “comprehensive forms” the second part of the sentence would read as follows: “the 
comprehensive forms can be his goals only if the comprehensive forms are founded in social forms.” That 
would not make much sense.
This could be compatible with a genealogical explanation of why running fast and physical strength in 
general might originally have been found useRil and consequently admirable. The same story could hardly be 
told about buttock-nut-cracking.
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former, though the former would be valuable whether or not there existed a social form to 
instantiate it.
4. Pleasure and happiness.
The main aim of this section is to understand the relation between pleasure and happiness, 
and their importance as constituents of well-being. The term ‘happiness’ has so far been 
largely absent from our account o f well-being and that may seem odd for a book-length 
account o f well-being such as this. The term ‘happiness’ has different meanings in 
philosophical discussion and outside it. This fact, I believe, is the source o f some 
confusion, at least in moral theory. In what follows I bring to the fore three important ways 
in which tlie term has been used in the philosophical debate. On the one hand. Classical 
Utilitarianism typically referred to happiness as to pleasur e and the avoidance of pain. On 
the other hand, as in the case illustrated by our discussion o f Sumner in Chapter 4, 
happiness is appealed to as the positive cognitive and affective endorsement of one’s 
situation and/or life. More recently, however, happiness has entered ethical discussion as a 
mood or feeling of joyfulness or high-spiritedness.
4.1. The m eanings of happiness
Mill famously thought that;
By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence o f pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the 
privation o f  pleasure.
Mill also thought that happiness, and thus pleasiue and the avoidance of pain, is the only 
thing desirable as an end. It would not be wrong to say that Bentham and Sidgwick, each 
with their own account o f pleasure, would concur with Mill in thinldng that happiness is 
pleasure and the avoidance o f pain and is what is ultimately desirable. There are.
‘‘‘ Mill, 1998, 55,112.
Though Sidgwick would be more careful in dealing with the question of whose happiness (an individual’s 
own or that of all individuals) is the ultimately desirable end.
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however, two otlier important senses in which the term ‘happiness’ has been used in 
philosophy. James Griffin, for example, writes that:
In a very common use now, to be ‘happy’ is to be satisfied with or contented with having a 
good measure o f what one regards as important in life. In this use o f  the word, ‘happy’ has 
to do with one’s situation; one is fortunate. It also has to do with one’s state o f  mind; one is 
glad or cheerful. It typically has to do with both situation and state o f  mind (one has the 
latter because o f  the former), but the two elements can appear in very different proportions 
in different cases. At one extreme, a martyr can go happy to the stake, merely secure in the 
conviction o f  right. At another extreme, a person can be happy (cheerful) for a few  
moments before realizing how unfavourable the situation actually is.'*’
According to Griffin, one kind o f happiness ascription refers to a situation in which one is 
satisfied or contented with what one regards to be important in one’s life. This for example 
is the way Simmer uses the term. One is happy if  one believes tliat one has a good measure 
of the things that one wants fi'om life. The other kind of ascription refers to certain types of 
feelings. In this case, one is happy if  one feels cheerful, glad, or joyflil. Now, the practice 
o f these two kinds of ascription may come apart, as one may be contented with his 
situation without feeling happy and, vice versa, one may feel happy without believing that 
one has a good measure o f the things one wants from life. For the sake of clarity, let us 
refer to being satisfied with one’s lot as situational happiness and to feeling happy as mood 
happiness. Typically, the former kind o f ascription focuses on longer stretches o f time, 
while the latter sense focuses on shorter ones.
In what follows, I shall not discuss situational happiness and the Idnd o f prudential good it 
could be.*^ We shall rather look at the way in which mood happiness is related to the 
classical utilitarian notion o f happiness as pleasure (or enjoyment or pleasurable 
consciousness). This comparison will be important in order to understand the value of 
mood happiness as part of om well-being.
Griffin, 1988,226.
The affective state (the feeling of satisfaction or fulfilment) that principally constitutes this type of 
happiness does not seem to be a good worth pursuing for itself. Rather, in normal circumstances, this feeling 
would arise as a consequence of an agent’s realisation that he has attained goods such as enjoyments or 
pleasures that are intrinsically worthy.
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4.2. Mood happiness and pleasure happiness
We can start by saying that Classical Utilitarians such as Bentham, J. S. Mill, and 
Sidgwick did not concentrate on the difference between feelings such as cheerfulness, 
gladness, joyfulness, high-spiritedness, etc. on the one hand, and enjoyment and pleasure 
on the other. Both moods on the one side and pleasure on the other are essentially 
phenomenal states. They all involve a feeling, something that it is like to be in that 
particular mood or something that it is like to enjoy or feel that pleasure. However, moods 
differ from pleasui'e or enjoyment insofar as the latter are object-directed and the former 
are not. I normally enjoy something, but I do not necessaiily have to feel cheerful about 
something. I may feel cheerful full stop. The question we would like to ask now is the 
following: Did Classical Utilitarians ignore sometliing important from the point of view o f 
well-being when they failed to explicitly include these moods in their meaning o f 
happiness? How important in one’s life is being in a happy mood, i.e., being cheerful, 
joyful, high-spirited, etc.?
To answer that question we might want to distinguish between the causes of happy moods 
such as joyfulness, cheerfulness, etc. and the happy moods themselves. Some people are 
made happy by very simple events. The fact that someone smiles at me at the newsagent 
when I buy the newspaper in the morning may cheer me up for the rest o f the day. Other 
people are caused to be in a happy mood by much more complex events, such as, say, 
having achieved the writing o f a long paper. More importantly, some o f the causes of 
happy moods are not necessaiily to be experienced as pleasant by the subject. The writing 
of an article may not itself be pleasurable. And yet, it might cause me to be cheerful. Even 
more, some people may feel happy as a result o f no apparent experienced event at all 
(today I woke up feeling happy). Finally, one may feel happy at the idea o f something yet 
to happen (the idea that tomorrow I go on holiday may make me feel happy now).
Thus, the sources o f one’s happiness in this mood sense need not themselves be pleasant. 
Similarly, not every pleasurable experience will make one happy in this mood sense, i.e., 
cheerfully, joyful, etc. I might find eating an ice cream pleasant and yet fail to be moved in 
any way. Yet, as a psychological generalisation about human beings, it seems true that 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences can be singled out as likely sources of happy and 
unhappy moods. Suppose that I am enjoying walking on the hills. The experience is likely
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to make me feel joyous or cheerful. Similaily, suffering mtense pain for a protracted period 
o f time is likely to depress me.
I believe that happy feelings, such as cheerfulness, joy, etc. are not things we have much 
reason to desire for themselves. Rather, these feelings seem to be the product of activities 
or states that we seem to pursue or avoid in and for themselves. It is because 1 enjoy hiking 
that 1 feel happy when 1 do so, and not the contrary. Also, as pointed out above, 1 might 
very well enjoy that activity without thereby being made joyful by it. More than anything 
else, the role o f mood feelings of happiness seems that of signalling how well an agent is 
faring at tliat precise moment in his life. The Classical Utilitarians’ neglect to give much 
weight to these feelings as important elements in one’s well-being does not seem to be an 
important neglect.
The utilitarians were also right in stressing the importance in one’s life o f enjoyments and 
pleasures. That is especially so if  we take on board Mill’s distinction between higher and 
lower pleasures. It seems that many limnan agents are capable o f enjoying or finding 
pleasurable different kinds of more or less elaborate activities, achievements o f all kinds, 
and even virtuous actions. Wliat 1 am not quite clear about, however, is how pleasure and 
enjoyment would relate to the mood feeling o f happiness itself. Is pleasure/enjoyment just 
the typical cause or source of mood happiness or is itself part o f the meaning of happiness? 
Take an example; suppose 1 am enjoying eating an ice cream. What 1 am in doubt about is 
not the claim that pleasme is a central element o f well-being, but rather whether Mill and 
Sidgwick were right in taking pleasiue to be part o f the meaning of happiness. Am I happy 
every time I enjoy some pleasure? Or is happiness a term more closely related to feelings 
such as joyfulness and cheerfulness that might fail to arise even when I enjoy some 
pleasiue? This, in the end, is a terminological issue and fi om an ethical point of view, not 
much hinges on it. I f  happiness is understood to include pleasure then happiness is an 
important element of a person’s well-being. I f  happiness is imderstood only in the sense of 
the mood feelings then happiness is a much less important pai't o f a person’s well-being. In 
any case, pleasure remains an important component o f well-being.
4.3. A possible disagreem ent on m oods
Daniel Haybron writes:
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... such positive emotional conditions as a predominance o f  joyfulness, high-spiritedness, 
peace o f  mind, etc. would exemplify happiness, while a predominance o f  their negative 
counterparts— depression, anxiety, fear, anger, feelings o f  discontent, etc.— would typify 
unhappiness.'^
However, on Haybron’s view:
To be happy... is not necessarily to fee l happy. A generalized low-level positive mood or 
sense o f  tranquillity might suffice for being happy without predominantly, or ever, 
involving the acute emotion o f  feeling happy. Happiness thus conceived is not a particular 
emotion or mood at all, but consists rather in a subject’s overall emotional or mood state.
If “ [t]o be happy is not necessarily to fe e l happy”, then, contrary to what I claimed above, 
mood happiness or the feeling o f happiness is not an essentially phenomenal state. 
Haybron thinks that happiness consists in a person’s overall emotional state: insofar as 
one’s emotional state is basically positive, one is happy. However, there are some 
perplexing questions about Haybron’s passages above: what is a “generalized mood” or 
“overall emotion”? How would it differ from one that is not so general? What are we to 
associate with “the acute emotion o f feeling happy?” Whatever answers Haybron might 
want to give, note that, accordmg to him, there are instances in which a person is happy 
irrespective o f his feeling happy and instances where the state o f happiness involves an 
“acute emotion o f feeling happy”. It is at this point that my view clearly parts with his. 
That is because of an apparent discrepancy in our respective conceptions o f what the 
correct epistemology o f (mood) happiness ascriptions should look like. It seems to me that 
if one is happy, then one is in a position to Imow that one is happy. But how can anyone 
know that one is happy unless one feels happy? And, what is more, what other 
supplementary evidence beside the fact that one feels happy would one need in order to 
judge correctly that one is happy?
Going back to the last quotation, I would want to think about the agent who, according to 
Haybron, does not feel happy and yet is happy because in ‘a generalized low-level positive
Haybron, 2001, 506.
Haybron, 2001, 506-507.
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mood or sense o f tranquillity’. This agent is in a state not involving ihQ feeling  normally 
associated with happiness. The possibility then may arise that the agent is not aware (even 
after introspection) of his mood. This would be a rather counterintuitive consequence for 
Haybron’s theory, as we tend to think that each person is the best judge o f his internal 
states above all when the state in question is a state such as a feeling.^** On Haybron’s 
theory, this first person authority would be undermined. Suppose, however, that the agent 
is aware o f his happiness. On the basis o f what evidence can he claim that? Suppose that 
the agent replied that he is happy because he is in a generalised low-level positive mood. 
The question would then be the same: what makes him say that? I do not see any solution 
other than that o f saying that he feels a certain way, and that that feeling (in this case the 
feeling o f being in a low-level positive mood) is a feeling of happiness. Mood happiness, 
then, is essentially phenomenal.^*
5. Autonomy and its value
I am here concerned with the notion of autonomy and its alleged value as a part o f 
someone’s well-being. On my definition, autonomy is the capacity to recognise and be 
motivated by reasons and, if  autonomy is part of one’s well-being as we claim, then there 
is reason for an agent to desire it. As we shall see, however, what we have reason to desire 
is not so much autonomy as the capacity itself but the liberty to exercise our autonomous 
capacity.
5.1. The capacity for autonomv
Of course, Haybron may simply deny that happiness in his sense is necessarily a feeling. He might say that 
happiness, at times, is a cognitive state without an affective side and that we might be aware of it cognitively 
rather than by being affected by it. This would be an over-intellectualised account of happiness and 1 do not 
think Haybron is prepared to endorse it.
I might have been unfair to Haybron insofar as his account of happiness is trying to accommodate also 
happiness in its situational sense. In fact, he only implicitly notices that happiness might have these two 
senses, short-term and situational, and seems rather dismissive about the former. That is problematic, 
however, since he takes himself to be giving an account of happiness in what he calls its psychological sense 
rather than its evaluative sense where this distinction is supposed to differentiate the question of what 
happiness is from that concerning whether happiness should be pursued. However, as argued above, when he 
deals with something such as situational happiness, Haybron is thereby dealing with an evaluative sense of 
happiness.
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Traditionally, the understanding of autonomy in terms o f a rational capacity (or, as we put 
it, the capacity to recognise and be motivated by reasons) is associated with Kant. On 
Kant’s view, one is autonomous if  one is in a position to subject one’s will to self-imposed 
maxims that conform to the moral law. Our account is clearly Kantian so far as the idea o f 
a “self-rule” goes. The self-imposed rules do not derive from simple urges one feels 
compelled to act on. To be free is not simply to be able to do what one wants. Our 
autonomous capacity entails the capacity to resist any motive had one seen good reason to 
do so. Yet, my account differs considerably from Kant’s in three respects. Firstly, 1 do not 
claim that every self-governing rule has to conform to the moral law in order for it to 
belong to the realm o f autonomy: there is no necessary link between autonomy and 
morality. Secondly, autonomy as the capacity is determined by an initial allotment for 
which one is not responsible. That allotment is a matter o f luck and is determined by 
causes entirely external to the agent. Nonetheless, someone endowed with a sufficient 
capacity can, tlu'ough her own effort, extend the exercise o f her capacity. Unlike Kant’s, 
my conception o f autonomy is not grounded in any transcendental realm. Rational 
autonomy is a psychological capacity. As a result, and this is the third difference, some 
autonomous beings aie natiually endowed with a greater capacity for autonomous acts and 
the same individual attains different degrees of autonomy at different stages and moments 
of her life. Our position, then, does not endorse another distinctively Kantian feature, 
namely, the idea that all agents must be equal in their possession of autonomy.
5.2. Autonomv as a part of well-being: freedom to exercise autonomous capacities
1 shall claim that autonomy is a part of our well-being. But the sense in which this claim is 
true needs to be articulated. Do agents have reason to desire the capacity for autonomy? 
My guess is that they might but that that is not really a significant prudential value. For 
one, someone who does not have that capacity in the first place cannot have reason to 
desire anything let alone a capacity for autonomy. That, however, does not exclude that an 
agent with a sufficient capacity for autonomy may have good reason to desire to have his 
capacity extended to those areas which could be regulated by his capacity but aren’t. But 
this thought too needs to be made more precise.
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We do not extend the capacity itself. The capacity has been allotted to us with a given 
potential. Rather, we may be able to extend the exercise of om* autonomous capacity We 
could then say tliat, ceteris paribus, there is reason to want to exercise one’s autonomous 
capacity more rather than less. What’s good for one is not the capacity itself, but one’s 
exercise o f it. Suppose that 1 have the capacity to thinlc and act on reasons in several 
spheres o f my active life but that, in fact, 1 do not exercise my capacity in all o f these 
spheres. The claim would be that ceteris paribus 1 would be better off if  1 extended the 
exercise o f my capacity to these spheres of activity too. This may be compaied to a case in 
which an agent has the capacity to appreciate certain kinds of pleasure but has never 
exercised it. Suppose someone has the capacity to find pleasure in the taste o f treasured 
wine but has never exercised this capacity. We may think that there is a ceteris paribus 
good reason for him to want to exercise his capacity for pleasme over treasured wine as 
well.
Though we can conceptually separate the idea o f exercising our autonomous capacity from 
the idea of possessing an autonomous capacity, we cannot in practice tell whether a being 
has the capacity unless it exercised it. Let me demonstrate this point. Agents exercise their 
autonomous capacity whenever they have an opportunity to rationally consider whether 
they have reason to act in a certain way. As in Chapter 4, an act is here understood widely, 
as an epistemic, a practical, or an affective act. Thus, for example, 1 exercise my 
autonomous capacity when 1 consider whether there is reason for me to feel a paralysing 
fear for spiders (given, say, that 1 live in a place where spiders are imiocuous). Or again, 1 
exercise my capacity when 1 consider whether there is reason for me to abandon my 
present career based on my desire to try another type of career. Finally, 1 exercise my 
capacity when 1 consider whether there is reason to believe that God exists when 1 don’t 
seem to have much evidence in favour o f this belief. It would be hard to consider as 
autonomous a being that possessed the capacity for autonomy but that never exercised it. 
This being would never assess his feelings, would never deliberate about his actions, and 
would never thinlc his beliefs tluough for himself. In practice, there would be no way for us 
to tell apai't a being such as this one from a non-autonomous one.
“  It is important to note here the underlying debate. According to A. Moore there is a question whether 
autonomy is a capacity or the exercise of a capacity. He claims that ordinary usage of ‘autonomy’ goes both 
ways and that philosophers too go both ways. See Moore, A., 1991, 159, 183 n. 18. In what follows 1 will 
never use the term ‘autonomy’ and always refer to either the ‘autonomous capacity’ or the ‘exercise of the 
autonomous capacity.’
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One reason to think tliat the exercise of our autonomous capacity is good for us is that it 
would enable us to better understand what choices and actions are good for us. But this 
would mean that the exercise of oui* autonomous capacity is insti'umentally good. What we 
need to understand is whether it is good for us for its own sake. Thinlc about the following 
example. A few worlds away from this one, a Well-Being Agency is part o f the state- 
funded welfare system. The Agency offers to run the life of those citizens whose well­
being persistently falls below the required minimimi standard through their own bad 
choices. Citizens decide whether to have the Agency run their lives for them, for any 
period o f time they wish, free o f charge. It is well known that the Agency has an 
impressive record m bringing citizens’ well-being back on track.
Would M>e citizens o f Earth find an “Agency-option” attractive? Presumably, the Agency 
would still leave us the possibility to exercise om autonomous capacity. We could still 
assess our feelings and beliefs, and deliberate about what to do insofai* as the Agency 
thought that that wasn’t detrimental to us. Whenever the exercising itself was thought to be 
bad for one the agency would block it at its inception by means o f a sophisticated 
technological device implanted in om brain. The Agency would then go on to make its 
own practical choice for us, or implant a certain belief or feeling in us.
Many o f us would find this scenario very unattractive. Someone may claim that what we 
would find unattractive is the feeling o f frustration associated with the frustration of our 
choices. But that is not so. The Agency would block our exercising the capacity at its 
inception. Our thoughts or choices would not be frustrated, as tliey would not have the time 
to arise in the first place. What we find pai'ticularly unattractive, then, is the thought that 
we are not the masters of our own thinking, feelings, and doings. N ot to be our own 
masters in some respect is a loss of freedom. This loss of freedom, however, would be 
more radical tlian that of a slave. A slave can still think freely, he could assess his feelings 
and at least think how he would act were he causally free to act. The loss of control o f our 
own lives would be more radical than that o f the slave. To be able to identify with our life 
as ours, we need to identify with our feelings, beliefs, and actions, and the process by 
which we identify with them is precisely the exercise o f our autonomous capacily. To have 
an extraneous agent implant feelings, beliefs, and choices in us would be alienating. It 
would be an intrusion into om* body and mind. The loss o f the exercise of our autonomous
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capacity would amount to a loss o f control over om lives but, more radically, to a loss o f 
identity. Mill was right: the individual should be left free to be sovereign in that which 
concerns his body and mind.^^
In conclusion, then, to thinlc of the exercise of our autonomous capacity as good for us for 
its own sake, is to think that we have reason to want to keep our own identity, to have 
control over the conduct of our own life, om* beliefs, and our feelings. The aim o f the 
Agency on planet Earth would be a good one: helping people live lives that aie good for 
them. But the Agency would be likely to fail its mission on planet Eaith miless it changed 
its methods. By (partially) taking away the possibility to exercise one’s autonomous 
capacity the agency would eliminate an important part of our well-being. To understand 
the value o f this part of om  well-being is to understand that we have reason to want the 
liberty to exercise our autonomous capacity. If  the Agency intended to increase its chances 
o f success on Earth, it could not force its choices (its thoughts and feelings) on us, but 
begin to remonstrate with us, reason with us, persuade us, and entieat us whenever it felt 
om choices to be bad for us.^ "*
f  See Mill, 1977,224.
Once again I am echoing Mill’s words. See Mill, 1977, 223-224. Some may think that in this paragraph 1 
have confused valuing the exercise of one’s autonomous capacity with valuing the liberty to exercise one’s 
autonomous capacity. There is no confusion. My claim is that having a reason to want for itself the exercise 
of one’s autonomous capacity entails having a reason to want the liberty to exercise one’s autonomous 
capacity.
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6. C onclus ion
One general conclusion can be drawn from this discussion. If I am correct in thinking that 
such diverse intiinsic goods as the ones listed in this chapter can be parts or constituents o f 
well-being, then contrary to Scanlon the concept o f well-being does implicitly or explicitly 
play a very important role in any human agent’s life. If  this picture is correct, we may very 
well have reason to desire many of the things we have reason to do. It will be the task of 
Part III to assess the normative weight o f reasons steimning from well-being. First, 
however, we need to address the worries Scanlon raises concerning the possibility o f a 
theory o f well-bemg.
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Chapter 7 The Impossibility of Theories of Weii-Being
1. Introduction
In his chapter on well-being Scanlon argues against the possibility o f ever finding a theoiy 
of well-being. Scanlon shows that, at a very high level o f abstraction, there are what he 
calls three fixed points that any plausible theory of well-being would have to recognise. 
The list o f these fixed points, however, does not amount to a theory o f well-being. Their 
nature, in fact, is so different that it caimot be captiued by a unified account. I begin by 
stating Scanlon’s charge against the possibility of theories of well-being in more detail by 
formulating it as a five-point charge. Subsequently, I tackle each point by either criticising 
its fitness as a critical point or by showing the way in which our accoimt would obviate the 
difficulty it poses (§2). At the same time I show how Scanlon’s account o f well-being can 
be dissolved into a reason-to-desire account (§3) and finally I provide an analysis o f the 
notion o f self-sacrifice and consider whether it is used consistently by Scanlon (§4).
2. The charge against the possibility of theories of well-being
According to Scanlon, there are three fixed points that should figure in any plausible 
theory o f well-being:
(1) Certain experiential states (such as various forms o f satisfaction and 
enjoyment) contribute to well-being.
(2) Well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree of success in 
achieving his main ends in life, provided that these are worth pursuing or 
rational.
(3) Many goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on that person’s 
aims but go beyond the good o f success in achieving those aims (friendship.
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other valuable personal relations, and the achievement o f var ious forms of 
excellence, such as in art or science).*
According to Scanlon, however, a theory o f well-being is different from a mere list o f the 
ways in which a person’s well-being can be contributed to. Wliat would make this list a 
theory is the capacity to provide the following things; ^
(a) A more unified account of well-being on the basis of which one could see why 
the diverse things Scanlon has listed as contributing to well-being in fact do so.
(b) A clearer account o f the boundary o f the concept— the line between 
contributions to one’s well-being and things one has reason to pursue for other 
reasons.
(c) A standard for making more exact comparisons o f well-being— for deciding 
when, on balance, a person’s well-being has been increased or decreased and by 
how much.
Having set these as the tasks that a theory of well-being should be able to handle, Scanlon 
concludes:
I doubt that we are likely to find a theory o f  well-being o f  this kind. It does not seem likely, 
for example, that we will find a general theory telling us how much weight to assign to the 
different elements o f  well-being I have listed: how much to enjoyment, how much to 
success in one’s aims, and so on. I doubt that these questions have answers at this level o f  
abstraction. Plausible answers would depend on the particular goals that a person has and 
on the circumstances in which he or she was placed. Perhaps a theory might tell us which 
goals to adopt, or at least which ones not to adopt. It does seem that there are answers to 
such questions, but I do not think that that they are likely to be delivered by anything that 
could be called a general theory. Even if  there were such a theory, moreover, it would need 
to be not just a theory o f  well-being, but a more general account o f  what is valuable and 
worthwhile.'^
See Scanlon, 1998, 113-126. 
~ See Scanlon, 1998, 125. 
Scanlon, 1998, 125.
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Let us sum up the points made by Scanlon in this quote as two finther charges against the 
possibility o f theories of well-being;
(d) We are not likely to find a general theory of well-being.
In order to find answers to questions such as what weight is one to give to the various 
things that contribute to one’s well-being, one cannot be operating at the level o f 
abstraction at which theories are nonnally formulated. And finally:
(e) Even if  there were such a general theory it would not be a theory of well-being 
but a theory of what is valuable in general.
Our strategy in the next section is quite simple. Firstly, we will take a close look at 
Scanlon’s three fixed points and decide (1) whether all tlnee deserve to be fixed points and
(2) whether our own reason-to-desire theory of well-being caimot accommodate whatever 
fixed points we agree with Scanlon there should be. If  it can acconmiodate them, then we 
will have answered at least point (a) above, i.e., we will have shown that there is a unified 
account o f well-being on the basis o f which one could see why the diverse things that 
contribute to well-being in fact do so. Subsequently, we will discuss points (d) and (c) in 
this order. A discussion of points (b) and (e) will be postponed until §4.
3. Scanlon’s fixed points
3.1. Are there three fixed points?
We will not spend a long time on Scanlon’s first fixed point. That certain experiential 
states such as satisfaction and enjoyment aie part of our well-being can be accepted quite 
easily. It does not take much experience and reflection to see that pleasure or, as Sidgwick 
would say, pleasurable consciousness, is widely desired and desirable. Scanlon, however, 
takes it that not all the things that contribute to our well-being need be pleasurable in this 
sense. In fact he rejects mental statism  i.e., the thesis that “[sjomething contributes to
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someone’s well-being if, but only if, it affects the quality of one’s experience.”  ^This is an 
important point as the literature on well-being is often divided on the question of mental 
statism. On this issue, we are in full agreement with Scanlon. The rejection of mental 
statism is Scanlon’s reason for introducing his second and most important fixed point. 
Well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree of success in achieving his main 
ends in life, provided that these are worth pmsuing.
What is important for our puiposes is to notice here that Scanlon must take it that his first 
fixed point cannot be entirely captmed by his second fixed point. This follows from his 
claim that there caimot be a unified theory of well-being, i.e., that neither one of his three 
fixed points is entirely reducible to any of the others. In this case, then, there must be 
experiential states that can contribute to a person’s well-being without being among that 
person’s adopted and rational aims. In order to see why Scanlon must think so we must 
look at his second fixed point in detail. First, though, a few words on the third fixed point.
According to Scanlon, many goods that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on that 
person’s aims but go beyond the good o f success in achieving those aims. Examples o f 
such goods are friendship, other valuable personal relations, and the achievement o f 
various forms o f excellence. Scanlon illustrates this thought as follows:
A misanthrope, who cares nothing for friends but to whom others are nonetheless devoted, 
may get some o f  the instrumental benefits o f  friendship, such as the help that friends 
provide, but not those benefits o f  friendship that involve standing in a special relation to 
others, since he does not stand in that relation to anyone. It is debatable whether the life o f  
such a person would be better if  these people genuinely cared about him than it would be if  
they treated him in exactly the same way out o f other motives. Even if  it does make a 
difference, however, it does not make as important a difference as it would in the case o f  a 
person who him self cared about friendship and regarded these people as friends. But even 
though the greater difference that the genuineness o f  friends makes in the latter case 
depends on the person’s having a certain aim, this contribution to well-being is not 
plausibly accounted for simply by the idea o f success in one o f one’s rational aims.^
Scanlon, 113.
 ^Scanlon, 1998, 123-124.
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From this example, we gather that friendship may deliver two kinds o f goods: the 
instrumental goods that friendships normally yield and the good o f standing in a special 
relation to others. The life o f die person who cares about (i.e., who has an aim of) standing 
in that special relation, once his aim is achieved, will be better in the two ways just 
mentioned. Yet, some of the instrumental goods o f friendship stand to be gained whether 
or not one has adopted friendship as an aim. Importantly, we must note here that Scanlon 
uses two closely linked expressions: earlier in the quotation he talks o f “someone’s life 
being made better” while in the last sentence he talks of a “contribution to well-being”. 
Does Scanlon take these two expressions to mean the same?
We would normally talce it that something that contributes to a person’s well-being would 
make that person’s life better and if  a person’s life is better for tlris person then his well­
being has been contributed to. That’s not so for Scanlon. He believes that the broadest way 
in which we can understand the expression hoM> well a person ’s life goes is what he calls 
the choiceworthiness o f this person’s life. To ask how well a person’s life goes is not 
simply to ask how M>ell-offhe or she is in terms o f his or her well-being. Choiceworthiness 
is not simply to be understood in terms of well-being but also in terms o f worthiness i.e., 
the degree to which the quality o f a life is particularly admirable or worthy o f respect. In 
order to clarify this distinction Scanlon tells us that the life of a person who sacrifices his 
own well-being for the sake o f others may be, for that reason, a particularly valuable one, 
and in order for this to be ti'ue tliere must be a sacrifice involved.*’ It follows on Scanlon’s 
account that the life o f a person who is sacrificing his well-being in order to make a worthy 
choice, is choicewoilliy, just like the life of a person who prefers a less worthy option but 
with a higher level o f well-being.
We ought to ask, however, what Scanlon means when he writes that “someone’s life is 
made better” as in the last passage quoted above. Does he mean that the agent is better off, 
i.e., the agent’s well-being has been contributed to? Does he mean that the agent’s life is 
more worthy? Or does he mean both? Scanlon concludes the paragraph about the 
misantlu'ope as follows:
 ^Scanlon, 1998, 112.
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The point is a general one: a life is made better by succeeding in one’s projects and living 
up to the values one holds, provided these are worthwhile; but if  these aims are worthwhile 
then succeeding in them will also make one’s life better in other ways. This is true o f  
friendship because standing in this relation to others is itself a good (albeit one that 
depends on one’s having certain aims), and I believe the same can be said of, for example, 
the achievement o f various forms o f  excellence.^
I believe Scanlon is here claiming that if  the agent has adopted friendship as a rational aim 
then succeeding in this aim will contribute to his well-being. This is in accordance with 
Scanlon’s second fixed point: well-being depends to a large extent on a person’s degree o f 
success in achieving his main ends in life, provided that these are worth pursuing or 
rational. But what does Scanlon mean when he says “but if  these aims are worthwhile then 
succeeding in them will also make one’s life better in other ways”? In light o f his 
distinction between worthiness and well-being, it can only mean that the agent’s life is 
made better with respect to its worthiness. Surely, however, if  this is what Scanlon means 
(and I do not see what else he could mean), we do not have to consider this point as a third 
fixed-point in a theory o f well-being. It might be an important point in a theory o f what 
makes lives more worthwhile. But these would be two distinct kinds of theories.
As Scanlon himself puts it, a more worthy life may be a more admirable life, more worthy 
o f respect. A theory of well-being, however, is concerned with the kind of value that life 
would have for the agent who lives it. The question here is whether an agent has reason to 
desire that life for himself. I f  he does and he is successful in his pursuit o f this life we may 
say tliat a more worthy life will be a better life for the agent in terms o f his well-being. But 
what makes a life more worthy or admirable is not necessarily what makes it more 
desirable for an agent. It may, as in the example we have just considered, or it may not.^ In 
conclusion, then, there is no need for Scanlon’s third fixed point in a theory o f well-being 
though this point might appear as an element witliin a theory o f what makes a life a worthy 
life.
’ Scanlon, 1998, 124.
® We will have a chance to discuss this distinction later in this chapter as well as in Chapter 8. The discussion 
there concerns precisely the difference between two types of agents: those who have spontaneous rational 
desires for worthwhile aims and those who take themselves to have reason to pursue some worthwhile aims 
because they think it is their duty to do so.
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3.2. Are there two fixed points?
In this subsection, we shall see whether Scanlon’s second fixed point cannot accommodate 
things such as experiential states, i.e., the first fixed point. After all, why should it not be 
one o f our rational aims to achieve or maintain a certain level of pleasurable consciousness 
in our lives? 1 guess Scanlon might agree. Yet, he may also claim that instances of 
pleasurable consciousness can make our lives better independently o f our having adopted 
them as an aim. In other words, the first fixed point cannot be reduced to the second fixed 
point. Scanlon’s notion o f a rational aim, then, must be such as not to allow for this 
reduction. It may be worth pointing out that on the reason-to-desire theory, we need not 
distinguish between things that contribute to our well-being in such a way: we would 
simply say that agents have reason to desire pleasure just as achievement or special 
personal relations such as friendship, as long as these ends are indeed recognised as 
intelligible desirability featiues of agents’ ends.
What we have to answer, then, is why Scanlon should think that there are instances of 
pleasurable consciousness that cannot be captured by his rational aim account o f well­
being. In order to answer that question we should follow the rationale that led Scanlon to 
choose rational aims as one of the fixed points, rather than, say, a reason-to-desire account. 
Scanlon begins his examination o f theories o f well-being by looking at actual desire 
satisfaction theories.^ After dismissing this kind o f theory, he turns to hypothetical desire 
accounts o f well-being. According to him, these are affected by the following problem:
the idea o f  an informed desire is often understood as a purely hypothetical notion— what 
the person would desire under certain conditions— and is often used as a way o f avoiding 
appeal to the normative idea o f  what a person has reason to desire. When "informed desire” 
is understood in this way, a notion o f  well-being based on it will lack a sufficiently close 
connection with what a person has a reason to want and to do. It may be likely that a person 
has reason to want those things for which he or she would have an informed desire, but this 
is by no means certain.*”
Scanlon, 1998, 113-114.
'Scanlon, 1998, 114-115.
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Note that Scanlon seems to be aware of the difference between hypothetical desires and the 
“normative idea o f what a person has reason to desire”. The point of this criticism is that 
the hypothetical notion o f informed desires might lack a strong enough comiection with a 
person’s well-being. 1 discussed this problem as it related to hypothetical accounts in the 
last section o f Chapter 4 and 1 agree with Scanlon.
Scanlon thinlcs that one o f the things that can be meant by saying that a person has a desire 
is that achieving or getting that thing is one o f the person’s aims. Scanlon also notices that 
there may be botli a wide and a narrow interpretation of the idea of rational aim. He wants 
to take on board the narrow one because:
... one cannot respond to every value or pursue every end that is worthwhile, and a central 
part o f  life for a rational creature lies in selecting those things that it will pursue. It thus 
makes a difference whether an aim has been adopted, and this is the rationale behind the 
narrow interpretation o f “rational aim”..."
There might be a nimiber of things that agents may rationally adopt as aims. But, o f course, 
we cannot adopt all these aims. Scanlon thinks that when we adopt an aim we form an 
intention and the fact that an agent has adopted an intention malces a difference to the 
agent’s reasons:
If 1 have merely decided (with good reason) that 1 intend to do a certain thing someday, but 
have not done anything about it, then the fulfilment o f  this aim does little or nothing to 
make my life better in the way we are presently discussing. The aims whose fulfilment 
makes a significant contribution to a person’s well-being are ones that that person has 
actually acted upon and, typically, given a role in shaping his or her activities and plans. 
The fulfilment o f  that aim, then, makes a difference to the person’s life by making these 
plans successful ones.*^
Let us siuu up the picture. There are so many things that we take om'selves to have equally 
good reason to adopt as aims. But we cannot pursue all of these things. Thus, we adopt 
some aims and not others. When I adopt an aim, I have the intention to pursue it. The fact
" Scanlon, 1998, 119.
Though Scanlon thinks intentions are not independent sources of reason. Scanlon, 1998, 46. 
Scanlon, 1998, 121.
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that I have gone at least some of the way towards fulfilling this aim changes my reasons.
At this stage, it would no longer be as reasonable to choose the aims previously not 
adopted. This is Scanlon’s narrow interpretation o f rational aims. Now, typically, episodic 
and unplanned instances of pleasur able consciousness may nialce our lives better and may 
do so despite our failme to have adopted pleasure as an aim and having been actively 
engaged in fulfilling our aim. Their contribution to our' well-being is independent o f our 
having adopted them as rational aims. Hence, the rationale for Scanlon’s separation 
between the first and the second fixed point.
In the following paragraphs 1 will attempt to show that (1) Scanlon’s distinction between 
things that contr ibute to our well-being as part o f a successfirl rational plan o f ours and 
things that contribute to our well-being without being par't o f any rational plan o f ours 
should be played down rather than emphasised; (2) if  we can revert from ‘aim’ to ‘desire’ 
and don’t make rational aims a subclass o f aims, we get the reason-to-desire view.
Imagine someone— call him Libero— who abhors precisely having important aims 
structuring his life. Libero dislikes rational plans and working towards their achievement.
He “goes with die flow” and is usually never in the same job, town, and relationship for 
more than a short period of time. He loves change and feels as a loss o f freedom anything 
that prevents change from talcing its coui'se. I think a theory of well-being should allow that 
characters such as this one might enjoy a life that is good for them. That is because it 
seems to be perfectly intelligible that a person found desirable such a life and the goods 
tliat it offers, at least for a period of his or her life. Someone may retort that this person’s 
rational plan is that o f having no rational plan. Though that would sound paradoxical, I 
suppose it would be possible to say it. In his defence, Scanlon may also use the following 
thought:
The term ‘aim’ invites an interpretation that is ... voluntaristic...: an aim is something one 
“adopts,” and having an aim is a matter o f  intending to bring about a certain result. For 
present purposes, however, ‘aim’ needs to be understood in a way that is broader than its 
normal m eaning.... I f  I have the aim o f  being a good son, then succeeding in this
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contributes to my well-being even though there was no moment at which I “adopted” this
aim or consciously formed this intention."
Libero, for example, need not have consciously adopted the aim and the intention o f 
“going with the flow” though tliis aim plays an important role in structuring his activities 
and p l a n s . B u t  on this non-voluntaristic (and rather loose) meaning of ‘aim’ Scanlon’s 
distinction between the broader and the narrower interpretation o f rational aims begins to 
lose its force. Remember that the rationale behind the narrow interpretation of “rational 
aim” is that we cannot pursue every valuable end and thus “it makes a difference whether 
an end has been adopted” and “actually acted upon.” But now it is hard to see how ‘having 
“adopted” aim would differ from ‘being disposed to x ’. “Adopting” the aim of going 
with the flow, for example, would amoimt to no more than having the disposition to see 
that aim as desirable for one. Similarly, it would now be possible to say enjoyment is an 
aim someone has “adopted” even if  this person never adopted it or consciously formed the 
intention to pursue it. But now it really sounds as there were no difference between 
Scanlon’s first and second fixed point.
Scanlon may insist: “adopting” one end rather than an equally rational one and beginning 
to work towards its achievement changes the reasons we have. But the reason-to-desire 
account can capture this thought without any appeal to the “adoption” o f aims. On our 
account, one may say that at t there is reason o f equally strong degree to desire to pursue 
two cour ses o f actions, but that at /+/, when one of the two courses o f action has been 
chosen and pursued to some extent, there is stronger reason to desire and pursue the chosen 
cour se o f action. On this accoimt, the difference is dictated by the degree to which there is 
reason for this person to desire both courses of action at a time; at each time, this degree is 
determined by facts about tire agent, including his circumstances and dispositions.
As a final defence, Scanlon may want to press another char'ge against the reason-to-desire 
account:
Scanlon, 1998,119-120.
Note that someone wanting to defend the explanatory Importance of the concept of well-being contra 
Scanlon, may say something similar of the aim of pursuing one’s well-being: we need not have consciously 
adopted it though it structures our plans and activities.
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Even if we ... Identify “informed desire” with “rational desire,” there remains the problem 
that the objects o f  a person’s informed desires are likely to include many things that are not 
related to the quality o f  the desirer’s own life, intuitively understood. Suppose for example 
that T very much admire a certain person, and therefore desire that her struggle and sacrifice 
will be crowned with success and happiness. This may be a rational desire as well as an 
informed one; it might, quite properly, be strengthened by fuller knowledge o f the person’s 
life and character. Even if  this is so, however, if  I have no connection with her beyond my 
admiration and this desire, then the quality o f  my life is not affected one way or another by 
her fate.'”
We have already examined this type o f charge in Chapter 5, as it was put forward by 
Darwall. Given the tlneat this kind o f charge poses to oui' account, however, we will tailor 
a reply to Scanlon’s own version of it.
Matthew has reason to desire that Jane, a person he very much admires, will find success 
and happiness in her struggle. And yet, if  Matthew has no connection with Jane beyond his 
admiration and this desire, then the quality o f his life, intuitively understood, is not 
affected one way or another by her fate. Why think that the attaining o f the object of 
Matthew’s rational desire will not contribute to his well-being after all? If  Matthew has a 
spontaneous genuine desire that Jane achieves success in her admirable ends, he will 
conceive o f her success as part of what makes his life go better. To at least some extent, he 
identifies his well-being with Jane’s success. This is the familiar phenomenon we 
described as the expansion o f the self. However, if  this description was not true o f 
Matthew, then we should refrain from claiming that he has a genuine spontaneous desire 
that Jane achieves success in her aims. The ‘desire’ appealed to by Scanlon might be no 
more than a whim. The fact that M atthew’s desire might be strengthened by fuller 
knowledge of Jane’s life and character, however, indicates that Matthew’s is a case o f the 
expansion o f the self.
If  the preceding considerations are correct, there is no reason to emphasise the importance 
o f rational aims in the first place, as in fact Scanlon’s own “narrow interpretation of 
rational aim” seems to be so loose as to dissolve into a reason-to-desire account. In 
conclusion, then, and contra Scanlon’s criticism (a), there is no reason to believe that
Scanlon, 1998, 115.
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Scanlon’s tliree-fixed points account could not be reduced to a unified theory o f well-being 
such as ours. On this latter view, just as we may have reason to desire particular non- 
aimed-at instances o f pleasine (or other goods) we may have reason to desire, say, that our 
lives never fall below a certain tlneshold level o f enjoyment.
3.3. The generality of theories and well-being comparisons
At this point, Scanlon might retort that our account of well-being is not a theory because it 
is not still clear that it is a general enough account of the kind theories should be (this is 
his point (d) in §2 above). To define well-being as what there is reason for an agent to 
desire is, I believe, as general and abstract an account as any theory should be. O f course, 
to say that well-being is defined in this way is not yet enough to say that we laiow for each 
and every agent what is most in her interest at any time. But no theory ever needs to be like 
that, not even in the realm of the hard sciences. When we say that e = mc_ and we want to 
calculate the energy of a given body we still have to laiow the value o f its specific mass. 
Similai'ly, we can abstractly say that the well-being is what there is reason for an agent to 
desire but if  we need to know what the well-being of a particular agent is, we need to 
provide some special facts about the agent.
We are now left with Scanlon’s criticism (c), namely, that oui* theory o f well-being cannot 
be considered as a theory, for it camiot “provide a standard for making more exact 
comparisons o f well-being— for deciding when, on balance, a person’s well-being has been 
increased or decreased and by how much.” The question o f comparative judgements of 
well-being is a difficult question as applied to botli intrapersonal and interpersonal cases. 
The literatine on this topic is vast and it is not my intention here to enter this discussion in 
great detail. I shall, however, make a few remarks concerning the way in which I believe 
our account of well-being should tackle this issue.
Wlien looking at comparisons o f well-being— both intrapersonal and interpersonal— we 
are looking at what measure (quantity and quality) of well-being an agent stands to gain or 
lose if  a given state of affairs obtained. The measme of well-being o f a person is cashed 
out in terms o f the arrangement of the various parts constituting the agent’s well-being. At 
this stage, our theoiy o f well-being is of help in individuating what kinds of things are
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good for agents: pleasure, knowledge o f one’s situation, etc. What arrangement would be 
best for each agent, however, can only be determined when considering particular facts 
about the agent in question and her circumstances. Even here, however, our theory o f well­
being can be helpful. On our account, ex ante and ex post desires are taken to be the 
primitive criteria for well-being claims. We may then begin to look at the agents’ 
respective desires to begin to assess the impact o f certain states o f affairs on their 
respective well-being.'^
I am not here claiming that on oiu* theory it is possible to malce exact comparisons o f well­
being. For one thing, however, our theory may help us understand why our capacity to 
make such exact comparisons is limited. We may also wonder whether Scanlon really 
takes it as a necessary requirement for any theory o f well-being to be able to provide exact 
comparisons. That may be inappropriate: Aristotle remarked long ago that our account of 
politics, and we could also add ethics, will be adequate if  it achieves such clarity as the 
subject-matter allows; for the same degree o f precision is not to be expected in all 
discussions. Even if  Scanlon agreed with Aristotle, however, he may still want to 
undermine the plausibility o f our theory qua theory by appealing to points (b) and (e) 
above. We shall address these criticisms m the next section.
4. Scanlon, choiceworthiness, and self-sacrifice
Consider (e): no such thing as ju s t a theory of well-being can be found, as we can at most 
devise a more general accoimt of what is valuable and worthwhile. This claim is connected 
to (b): we are not likely to find a theory of well-being capable o f providing “a clearer 
account o f the boundary o f the concept o f well-being—the line between contributions to 
one’s well-being and things one has reason to pursue for other reasons.” Scanlon’s 
argument supporting (e) and (b) is simple enough:
Of course one needs to assess whether the agent’s spontaneous desires are genuine and converge with the 
judgement of competent Judges.
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Succeeding in one’s main aims, insofar as these are rational, must be a component in any 
plausible notion o f  well-being. But this idea serves as an evaluative Trojan horse, bringing 
within the notion o f  well-being values that are not grounded in it.*^
We adopt many rational aims; some of them an agent has reason to pursue insofar as they 
contribute to her well-being, others insofar as they are worthy aims grounded on values 
other than well-being. However, (via fixed point two) whenever we achieve success in any 
of these rational aims, even those not groimded in our well-being, our well-being is thereby 
contributed to. Hence, we cannot provide an account capable o f drawing the line between 
contributions to one’s well-being and things one has reason to pursue for other reasons (cf.
(b)) and, thus, we cannot find a theory o f well-being but, at most, a more general account 
of what is valuable or worthwhile (cf. (e)).
In Chapter 3, I already offered a reply to this argument: it is not the case that all 
worthwhile pursuits we have reason to will, will contribute to our well-being. Only those 
pursuits we have reason to desire will do so. We shall not rehearse this argument here and 
will take it that Scanlon’s criticisms (b) and (e) have safely been addressed. Also, in 
Chapter 5 ,1 discussed the way our own account deals with the scope problem. An account 
capable o f preserving the boundaries between well-being and rational self-sacrifice is o f 
course capable of drawing the line between contributions to one’s well-being and things 
one has reason to pursue for otlier reasons. Scanlon, however, makes repeated appeals to 
the notion o f self-sacrifice though, as we shall see next, it is not clear how his own account 
is to deal with the scope problem.
4.1. Choiceworthiness. worthiness, well-being, and sacrifice
First, we shall remember that on Scanlon’s account the question o f “how well a life goes 
for a person” from that person’s point of view is understood as how “choiceworthy” that 
life is for the agent. Choiceworthiness is in turn understood as well-being and worthiness. 
Most importantly, Scanlon appeals to the notion o f self-sacrifice to draw a line between 
pursuits that would make a person’s life more worthy and pursuits that would contribute to 
that person’s well-being:
" Scanlon, 1998, 133.
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The life o f  a person who sacrifices his own well-being for the sake o f  others may be, for 
that reason, a particularly valuable one, and in order for this to be true there must be a 
sacrifice involved. ... We might say, for example, that there is a reason to choose a certain 
life because o f  its great value, even though it involves a low level o f  well-being, or that the 
value o f a life did not in fact make it worth choosing given the sacrifice in well-being that it 
would involve.*”
I agree with Scanlon insofar as he claims that tliere may be reason for an agent to choose or 
pursue a certain life because of its great value even though it involves a low level of well­
being. The question that one should ask, however, is whether there is reason for an agent to 
desire that life for himself. I f  there were, then pursuing that life would be in the agent’s 
interest; one would live both the life that is best for one and the most worthy life. The 
virtuous agents described in the last chapter may be the kind o f agents that would 
understand worthy lives in these terms. Even if  an agent took himself to have no reason to 
desire such life, however, he might nonetheless talce himself to have reason to live that life. 
Wliat is unclear is why Scanlon would claim that choosing this life in this case w ould 
make the agent’s life “go better” from the agent’s point of view. Contrary to what Scanlon 
thinks a more choiceworthy life cannot simply be equated to a “a life that goes better for 
the agent.” That’s even more so when one wants to say, as Scanlon does, that this life 
would involve a sacrifice.
To simi up this first criticism we can say that Scanlon has wrongly defined the idea o f a 
life’s choiceworthiness in terms o f “how well a life goes for the agent”. We will return to 
this point later on. Our second, third, and fourth criticisms are also linked to this point. In 
order to discuss them we shall introduce an example Scanlon provides in a footnote:
It may seem that when we [distinguish worthiness from well-being] we are identifying 
well-being with experiential quality, and that when those two are carefully distinguished 
the question o f  well-being turns out to be the same as the question o f  choiceworthiness. But 
this is not so. A person who abandons a valued ambition in order to help his family may 
have made a net sacrifice in the quality o f  his life, by giving up the accomplishments he 
would have made, even if  the experiential quality o f  the life he chooses is no lower than
19 Scanlon, 1998, 112.
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that o f  the life he forgoes. It may, for example, involve more joy and less struggle, stress, 
and frustration. The life he lives could therefore be more choiceworthy and involve no loss 
in experiential quality while still being a worse life for him, in the sense in which I am 
concerned here."”
Let us elaborate this example. Jones is facing the following choice between two possible 
rational aims: either pursue his career as an architect but abandon his family, or live with 
his family whilst renouncing his career ambitions. Suppose now that Jones decides to stay 
with his family. Scanlon wants to say that this option involves Jones’ sacrifice of his career 
ambitions. Scanlon wants us to believe tliat Jones goes for the worthy choice against his 
well-being. Jones has to choose between two rational aims and, if  he chooses rationally, he 
will choose that which he has most reason to choose. But now, and this is my second 
criticism, on the basis o f what can Scanlon claim that the option Jones has most reason to 
choose involves a greater sacrifice on Jones’s behalf? What is to draw the line between 
pursuits involving sacrifices and pursuits that don’t? On Scanlon’s account it may very 
well be the case that choosing his career over his family would constitute an even greater 
sacrifice for Jones. This account simply lacks the conceptual means to even get started as 
to what contributes to one’s well-being and what doesn’t.
My third criticism has to do with the second fixed point. Success in any o f a person’s 
rational aims is sufficient to contribute to this person’s well-being. Suppose that Jones for 
some reason does not choose the option that is best in terms of his well-being. Even though 
his well-being would not be maximised by his choice, given the second fixed point, we can 
assume that his well-being would nonetheless be contributed to. But is it always the case 
that success in any o f our rational aims contributes if  only even minimally to our well­
being? It is certainly not clear from the phenomenology of our ethical life. At times agents 
do act with the belief that the action that they feel compelled to do would not benefit them 
in any way. Is this belief always a wrong belief? I f  it were, then it would have to be 
dispelled as an error. But Scanlon offers no such error theory.
Scanlon, 1998, 385-386, n. 4. Scanlon asks us to assume that the agent’s experiential quality would be 
equal in the two cases. This example is meant to show that how well someone’s life goes cannot be 
accounted by well-being alone, as well as that there is a sense in which well-being is broader than 
experiential quality. We agree with Scanlon’s latter claim and will henceforth ignore it.
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Fourthly, Scanlon’s decision to define choiceworthiness as “how well a person’s life goes 
for him” blurs the notion of rational self-sacrifice. I f  achieving success in one’s rational 
aims always increases one’s life choiceworthiness, can we say, as Scanlon would want us 
to, that someone like Jones makes a net sacrifice? O f course we may suppose that he 
chooses one o f the two options that involves the least well-being for him. And yet, on 
Scanlon’s own terminology, if  the agent acts rationally, we would still have to say that this 
option is the one that makes his life most choiceworthy and, hence, the best life for him. 
Suppose Jones chooses to stay with his family and that makes him miserable (great loss in 
his well-being). Yet, this is what he takes himself to have most reason to do. Would Jones 
say (from a first-personal, non-moral point o f view) that his life is on the whole better for 
him?
These points tell against both Scanlon’s rational aim account o f well-being as well as his 
charges (b) and (e) against a theory o f well-being. A theory of well-being is needed 
precisely because we take it that there is an important boundary between things that 
contribute to one’s well-being and tilings that involve a rational self-sacrifice. This latter 
notion is also blurred by Scanlon’s conception o f choiceworthiness: how well the life goes 
for a person and how good (worthy) the life o f a person is, are two clearly distinct things. 
Though an agent may take him self to have reason to puisne a good (worthy) life, it is 
nowhere clear that a more worthy life will be better for him in any sense, hence it is not 
clear that he has reason to desire it. In the next two subsections we shall consider the 
notion of sacrifice further.
4.2. Sacrifice and spheres of compensation
Scanlon claims that it would be wi'ong to think that well-being may constitute a significant 
category of goods on the basis that it constitutes a distinct “sphere o f compensation.” It is 
important to look at this argument here because in it Scanlon makes frequent appeals to the 
notion o f sacrifice. For well-being to be considered as belonging to a sphere o f 
compensation o f its own it would have to be true that losses in well-being o f one kind at 
one time could be fully made up for by other gains in well-being, but not by considerations 
of other kinds:
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Even if  other considerations constitute good reason for accepting a loss in well-being, this 
loss remains a loss, but (the suggestion runs) when we give up one element o f  well-being 
for another (such as when we give up a pleasure now for the sake o f  a greater pleasure 
later) there is no real loss. This might be put by saying that well-being constitutes a distinct 
“sphere o f  compensation.” This idea is appealing, but mistaken. We do speak o f  making a 
sacrifice when, for example, w e give up comfort and leisure for the sake o f  a family 
member or a friend, or for the good o f  some group, team, or institution o f  which we are a 
member. But it also feels like a sacrifice when we give up present comfort and leisure for 
the sake o f  our own longer life or future health. The fact that in the latter case we will be 
“paid back” in the same coin, our own well-being, does not make this case less like a 
sacrifice than the other at the time that it is made. The term sacrifice is appropriate in both 
cases because we give up something o f  present, palpable appeal for the sake o f  some other, 
possibly more distant concern."'
The thought is that it certainly feels as if  we are making a sacrifice both in the case in 
which we are giving up present well-being for the sake of things other than well-being as 
well as in the case in which we are givmg up present well-being for the sake of future well­
being. The term sacrifice, Scanlon claims, is appropriate in both cases. Hence, the notion 
of sacrifice is not sufficient to single out any special category of goods constituting well­
being. There are several remarks to be made about this aigmnent.
Firstly, we need to note that this passage does indeed suggest that Scanlon takes the notion 
o f sacrifice not to be peculiar to any one sphere of our lives but to our rational action in 
general. The notion o f sacrifice is defined intuitively as “the loss o f something o f present 
or palpable appeal for the sake of some other, possibly more distant concern.” Now take 
the case o f Jones again. On this definition of sacrifice it seems very plausible to say that 
either choice involves a sacrifice. Even if  Jones chose the option involving the greater 
sacrifice that would not guarantee that he chose the option that leaves him with the least 
well-being. The notion of sacrifice then seems completely discomiected from that o f well­
being.
In connection to this point, we shall soon discuss the work o f Raz as someone who clearly 
states that well-being and sacrifice are not essentially connected. Scanlon’s account.
"' Scanlon, 1998, 127.
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however, is incoherent when it claims both (a) that the notion of sacrifice cannot drive a 
wedge between well-being and other kinds of goods and (b) that the “life o f a person who 
sacrifices his own well-being for the sake o f others may be, for that reason, a particularly 
valuable one, and in order for this to be true there must be a sacrifice involved.” If  (a) is 
true, the notion o f sacrifice cannot distinguish losses o f well-being from other kinds of 
losses. If  that is correct than the fact that someone is sacrificing does not show that his 
choice is less than optimal in terms o f his well-being. Hence we cannot assert that his life 
is particularly worthy or valuable because it contains a sacrifice in well-being.
Secondly, Scanlon compares the loss o f well-being tliat one may undergo for the sake of a 
friend or a family member with the loss of one’s well-being for the sake o f future well­
being. But are these really differing cases? Is it not rather the case that in the first case one 
identifies one’s well-being with one’s friend’s or family member’s, and even with the 
interests of the institutions to which one belongs? If one does understand these cases in this 
way then there would be no difference between them and the case of one’s loss o f present 
well-being for one’s future well-being.
Thirdly, sometliing ought to be said about Scanlon’s notion of sacrifice. Our going to the 
dentist certainly fee ls  like a sacrifice even if  in the long run it might be advantageous in 
terms of well-being. If  that is the case, then, having the feeling  of sacrifice is not sufficient 
to distinguish a present loss o f well-being for a future advantage, as opposed to a present 
loss o f well-being for no future advantage. Whatever oui" feelings might be, however, most 
o f us would think that there is a great difference between, say, (a) undertaking a great 
labour for a great reward; and (b) undertaldng a great labour for no reward. While I can see 
why we would have reason to desire (a) for its sake, I can’t see why we would have reason 
to desire (b) for its sake. My guess is that this is so precisely because while it is not clear 
that (a) involves a sacrifice o f our well-being, (b) suggests precisely that. I thiiilc the notion 
o f sacrifice and its Ihik to the notion of well-being need to be given further attention.
4.3. Sacrifice, self-sacrifice and well-being
Raz writes:
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., .while it seems clear that people sometimes do and sometimes have to make sacrifices for 
moral reasons, I do not believe that we always harm our self-interest, or act against our 
expectations regarding our se lf interest, when we make sacrifices. Once we see that self- 
sacrifice is not essentially connected to well-being, it will be easier to understand why an 
agenf s well-being is not, normally, a reason for action for that agent.^^
Consider the last sentence, and focus only on the idea that well-being is not essentially 
connected to self-sacrifice. Let us also note the shift between talk o f ‘sacrifice’ in the first 
sentence and talk o f  ‘self-sacrifice’ in the second. Next, let us look at R az’s 
characterisation of sacrifice:
We mark types, or degrees o f  sacrifice. Whenever we give up (for what appears a good 
reason) something that we deeply care about, we are making a sacrifice. Normally this 
would warrant saying that we are sacrificing the goal or relationship we are giving up (e.g., 
our career). When we do so with great reluctance, we also sacrifice ourselves or (in slightly 
different circumstances) our life.^^
In what follows I will disagree with Raz’s claim that well-being and self-sacrifice are not 
essentially connected. Take our example o f Jones. Suppose that both aims would 
contribute to Jones’s well-being and Jones chooses the one that contributes most to his 
well-being. In this case, I would claim there is no self-sacrifice, that is, Jones is not 
sacrificing his well-being; the only case in which Jones’s rational self-sacrifice would 
occur is the case in which he has most reason to do (and does) precisely that which is not 
the best available option for him. I take this thought to be expressing the idea that well­
being and self-sacrifice are essentially coimected.^'^
Raz may retort that, surely, when Jones chooses his family over his cai'eer he is sacrificing 
something he deeply caies about, namely his career, even if  a family life is what is best for 
him. I would want to concede this point to Raz. It is reasonable to say that Jones is 
sacrificing his career to his family life. Thus, we could agree with Raz when he says “I do 
not believe that we always harm our self-interest, or act against our expectations regarding 
our self interest, when we make sacrifices.” Contra  Raz, however, I think we must
-  Raz, 2000, 221.
Raz, 2000, 223,11.18.
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distinguish the notion o f “sacrificing something we care about for something else we care 
(even more) about” from the notion o f a 5<?//^sacrifice. One can sacrifice one’s career and 
still choose the option that his best for one: no self-sacrifice is involved in this case. Jones, 
for example, may simply realise that he does not live in a world in which his career and his 
family life are compatible pursuits. Tough luck, he may thinlc, but which one of these two 
pursuits do I w ant most? I f  he chooses his family life, there is a sense in which he 
sacrificed his career. But this sense would be very different from the case in which Jones 
chose what he clearly saw as being the less good option in terms o f his own well-being. 
That choice would be self-sacrificial.
Going back to Scanlon with this analysis of the notions of sacrifice and self-sacrifice we 
can say the following. Self-sacrifice only occurs when my life’s choiceworthiness is 
increased at the expense of my well-being. Sacrifices, however, may occur also when our 
well-being is nonetheless maximised by our choices.^^
5. Conclusion
Taking Scanlon’s fivefold charge against the possibility of well-being we can now claim 
the following. Our reason-to-desire theoiy o f well-being provides a unified accoimt on the 
basis o f which one can say why the diverse things contributing to well-being do in fact do 
so. It affords a clearer account o f the boundary o f the concept—the line between 
contributions to one’s well-being and things one has reason to pursue for other reasons. Of 
all the things we have reason to pursue, only those we have reason to desire will contribute 
to our well-being. In this chapter I showed that once certain criticisms o f Scanlon’s
We can also think of self-sacrifice as of net sacrifice.
This distinction may also help to explain another phenomenon of our ethical life. Imagine two characters 
Vincent and Deborah always ready to sacrifice their free time in order to keep the department of history at 
which they both work functioning at its best. Vincent, however, does this virtuously; he identifies his good 
with that of the department. Deborah, on the other hand, does this dutifully. She thinks she has reason to do 
this but she does not see it as a good thing for her at all. On one occasion, the department contacts both 
Vincent and Deborah at their respective holiday houses: their help is badly needed. Both Vincent and 
Deborah decide to shorten their holidays to come and help, though one does so virtuously and the other 
dutifully. On their arrival the head of department thanks them both and, we would think, has good reason to
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account of well-being are taken into consideration, his tlnee fixed points can be expressed 
more simply as what there is reason for an agent to desire. I also argued that it might be 
simply too much to expect an ethical theory to provide “more exact comparisons o f well­
being” and to be more general than the one I have offered. Finally, I have shown the 
problems involved in defining choiceworthiness as “how well a life goes” for the person 
whose life it is. I claimed that one cannot use this definition of choiceworthiness and at the 
same time claim, as Scanlon does, that sacrifice (at least when intended as self-sacrifice) 
drives a wedge between goods that contribute to the worthiness o f our lives and goods that 
contribute to our well-bemg.
do so. Insofar as they both sacrificed something for the department they deserve to be thanked. That is true 
even for Vincent, though we cannot be sure that Vincent’s action was jg^sacrificial.
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Part III Moderate Welfarism
Chapter 8 Welfarism and Moderate Welfarism
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will examine welfarism as defined by Scanlon: M>ell-being is the only 
value or the “master value ”, all other goods ultimately deriving their value from  well­
being. In fact, I will refer to this view as to radical welfarism. I will offer two reasons to 
reject this view and on my way to doing this I will defend the buck-passing account of 
goodness from one important challenge (§2) and clarify the relation between our reasons to 
desire things and om* practical reasons (§3). With Scanlon, I will agree that there are kinds 
o f values that are irreducible to well-being. It follows that not all valuable things give us 
reason to desire them. In this chapter, however, I will put forward a more moderate form of 
welfarism. On this view, when no one else is affected by the agent’s choices and actions, 
there can never be most reason for an agent to do something that is not what he has most 
reason to desire, something that doesn’t bring about the best outcome in terms of his well­
being (§4). This view is a welfarist view insofar' as the agent’s own well-being would be 
the ultimate criterion of practical reason.
2. The buck-passing account: a first challenge to radical welfarism
2.1. The buck-passing account of goodness and radical welfarism
We have already made frequent appeals to the buck-passing account o f goodness 
tlri'oughout the thesis and showed how our own account of well-being is a specification of
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such an account. In what follows, I shall offer a more detailed presentation of this account,
I shall show how endorsing this account counts against radical welfarism, and I shall 
defend this accoimt from one recent challenge. Scanlon writes:
[Contrary to Moore, I believe that] being good, or valuable is not a property that itself 
provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to 
have other properties that constitute such reasons. Since a claim that some property 
constitutes a reason is a normative claim, this account also [i.e., like Moore’s] takes 
goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely the purely formal, higher-order 
properties of having lower-order properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind. ... it 
is not goodness or value itself that provides reasons but rather other properties that do so. 
For this reason 1 call it a buck-passing account.'
To be good or valuable would amount to having other properties constituting reasons to 
respond to a thing in certain ways. More specifically:
To value something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes 
toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard to it. Exactly what these reasons are, and 
what actions and attitudes they support will be different in different cases. ... To claim that 
something is valua6/e (or that it is “of value”), is to claim that others also have reason to 
value it, as you do.^
It might also be noted here that Scanlon is a pluralist concerning value-bearers. He thinlcs 
that we value many different kinds of things, including objects and their properties (such as 
beauty), persons, skills, and talents, states o f character, actions, accomplishments, activities 
and pursuits, relationships, and ideals.
Now consider radical welfarism:
(RW) Well-being is the only ultimate good. All goods ultimately derive their value 
from well-being.
‘ Scanlon, 1998, 97.
- Scanlon, 1998, 97.
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Next consider the fact that the value o f some accomplishments is judged, pai'tly at least, by 
its product or outcome  or in the light o f the performance o f their constitutive acts. As 
Roger Crisp points out:
Outcome-assessments may, for example, make mention o f  aesthetic values. To understand 
M ichelangelo’s accomplishment properly requires understanding the unity, energy, and 
impressive clarity o f  the Sistine ceiling. Likewise, distinguishing Bohr from John Rawls’s 
‘grass counter’, whose aims may include counting blades o f  grass on various lawns, 
involves appeal to a notion o f  importance or significance which is not to be cashed out in 
welfarist terms. Performance assessments, similarly, involve various excellences, the value 
o f  which cannot be reduced to the value o f  well-being. Ruth’s controlled exercise o f  his 
judgement and o f his physical strength partly constituted his accomplishment. ^
Even on a particularly wide imderstanding o f well-being, values such as the aesthetic value 
o f Eui accomplishment cannot be reduced to well-being. It is not on the basis o f what is 
good for an agent that we appreciate whether an object is aesthetically more worthy than 
another. This, however, would have to be what we should say as radical welfarists. That 
this position is fundamentally wrong is shown even more patently by normative 
expressions such as ‘good evidence’. If radical welfarism were true, good evidence must 
mean ‘prudentially good for some being or type of being’. But can anyone plausibly hold 
the position that what qualifies some piece of evidence as good, is the fact that it is good 
for someone in this sense? This claim is implausible.
If  radical welfarism were true, we would have reason to desire aesthetic beauty, good 
evidence, and every other valuable property. But do we reasonably respond to a beautiful 
painting by desiring it? That does not make sense. On the contrary letting go o f radical 
welfarism but still embracing the buck-passing account of value we may say the following: 
an object o, or state o f affairs s, is good if, and only if, it displays other properties that 
provide reason to have a certain pro-attitude towards it, i.e., that give one reason to choose 
it, admire it, prefer it, recommend it, etc. For example, o is good evidence that p, if  it gives 
us reason to believe that p. Or again, suppose that a certain object is o f aesthetic value. In 
this case, the buck-passing view may say that the object instantiates properties that give 
one reason to admire it. In conclusion, we should say that Scanlon is right in thinldng that
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there are different kinds o f values, that well-being is not a master value and thus that 
radical welfarism is false.
2.2. A challenge to the buck-passing account
In ‘The Strike o f the Demon’ Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen level a 
criticism to accounts o f value of the kind defended by Scanlon, which they generically 
refer to as ‘fitting pro-attitude’ accounts of value."' Their chaige is quite simply expressed:
It seems that the analysis in question [the fitting pro-attitude analysis] at best gives a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for value. That there are reasons to have a pro- 
attitude toward an object does not entail that the object in question must be valuable. ... the 
reason for a pro-attitude towards an object may have to do with the value o f  that attitude 
itself. Such a reason may exist even if  the object o f  the attitude is devoid o f  value.”
Their charge is inspired by an example given earlier by Crisp:
since there can be reasons for preferring things that have nothing to do with their value, 
definitions [of value] in terms o f  preferability are false. Imagine that an evil demon will 
inflict a severe pain on me unless I prefer this saucer o f  mud; that makes the saucer well 
worth preferring. But it would not be plausible to claim that the saucer’s o f  mud’s existence 
is, in itself, valuable.”
Crisp’s argument is a reductio ad absurdum o f the claim: ‘if  there is reason to prefer x, 
then X is valuable’. In order to assess tins argument we need to determine exactly what is 
meant by ‘there is reason to prefer a saucer of mud’. Crisp -  after Kupperman -  interprets 
it as meaning that we have reason to prefer its existence to its non-existence. However, it 
might also mean that we have reason to prefer our eating it to our not-eating it, our 
admiring its textur e to our not admiring its texture, our recommending it to a friend to our 
not recommending it to a friend, etc. For the sake o f simplicity, I will take on board
' Crisp, 2000b, 266.
Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen, unpublished.
 ^Rabinowicz & Ronnow-Rasmussen, unpublished, 9.
 ^Crisp, 2000a, 459.
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Rabinowicz and Roundw-Rasmussen’s resolution to substitute the attitude o f ‘favouring’ 
as generically representing all pro-attitudes7 Crisp’s example is meant to show that we 
would have reason to favour the saucer o f mud’s existence. Given that, unlike Kupperman, 
we are not operating under tlie assumption that states o f affairs are the only bearers of 
value, we can simplify further by claiming tliat the example shows that we would have 
reason to admire the saucer o f  m ud  (rather than favouring its existence). However, 
according to the demon example, we have reason to admire it not in virtue o f any 
admirable property inlierent to the saucer of mud. The example as used by Rabinowicz and 
Ronnow-Rasmussen is intended to show that value o f  no kind, fin a l or instrumental, 
supervenes on the saucer o f  mud and yet we have (instrumental) reason to admire it.
2.3. In defence of the buck-passing account
What is the object o f the agent’s valuing  in this example? Rabinowicz and Romiow- 
Rasmussen would say it is the saucer o f mud. The defender o f the fitting pro-attitude 
account, however, defines value in terms o f  there being reason to favour  something; he 
would then put this question as follows: ‘what object, state of affairs, person, attitude, etc., 
is there reason to favour’? The answer she should  and could give in this case is: ‘the 
agent’s admiring the saucer o f  m ud’. Notice the shift from ‘there being reason to admire 
the saucer o f  mud’ to ‘there being reason to favoin admiring the saucer o f  mud’. The buck 
passer could  thinlc this because notliing either in theory or in the example in question 
would stop her from thinking that one should favour one’s admiring o f the saucer of mud 
as that would avoid the pain o f being stricken by the demon. She shoidd  thinlc so if  she is 
to abide by the requirements o f her own account of value. According to this account in 
order for an agent to have reason to favoiu* an object (where that could be a thing, a state of 
affairs, a person, an attitude, etc.) there must be a property in the object that provides 
reason to have a pro-attitude towards it. Given that no such property ever supervenes on 
the saucer of mud, that cannot be the object o f one’s rational favoining. Only the attitude 
of admiring the saucer o f mud can be taken (as a whole) as the object o f one’s rational
’ The attitude of favouring might not be quite appropriate. Take the following example. A piece of evidence 
is good if and only if there is reason to favour it. But what would it mean ‘to favour’ a piece of evidence? 
Clearly, in this case, believing would be a more appropriate response. In what follows, I shall leave this 
problem aside and use ‘favouring’ flexibly.
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favouring, as pleasine (or the avoidance of pain that would ensue from admiring the saucer 
of mud) does supervene on it.
Is this enough to stop the demon example from counting as a counterexample to the buck- 
passing account o f goodness? As long as we can claim that there are instances in which 
having a reason to have a pro-attitude does not entail value, the buck-passing account 
cannot be maintained. The fact that the buck-passer can give a coherent explanation o f the 
demon example does not stop the demon example from counting as a counterexample to 
her theory. She must also be able to show that it camiot possibly count as such, that there is 
some inlierent problem with it. Schematically, the counterexample has this form:
If  F-ing is the avoidance of my pain, then there is reason for me to F.
In this case. F-ing is admiring the saucer of mud.
Therefore, there is reason for me to admire the saucer of mud.
The fact that there also is reason to favom admiring the saucer of mud would not dispel the 
force of the comiterexaniple. However, the buck-passer might advance an argument to the 
effect that there is something implausible with this counterexample. Suppose that on 
another occasion F-ing, i.e., what would make me happy, was my believing in God rather 
than admiring the saucer o f mud. Does it follow that there is reason to believe in God? I 
suppose many would disagree. This point can be made rather emphatically through an 
example crafted for different purposes by the English mathematician and philosopher 
William Clifford (1845-1879):
A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He knew that she was old, and not 
over-well built at the first; that she had seen many seas and climes, and often had needed 
repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. These 
doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy; he thought that perhaps he ought to 
have her thoroughly overhauled and refitted, even though this should put him to great 
expense. Before the ship sailed, however, he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy 
reflections. He said to him self that she had gone through safely so many voyages and 
weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose that she would not come safely home 
from this trip also. He would put his trust in Providence, which could hardly fail to protect 
these unhappy families that were leaving their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere.
He would dismiss from his mind all ungenerous suspicions about the honesty o f  builders
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and contractors. In such ways he acquired a sincere and comfortable conviction that his 
vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he watched her departure with a light heart, and 
benevolent wishes for the success o f the exiles in their strange new home that was to be; 
and he got his insurance-money when she went down in mid-ocean and told no tale.^
Let us refer to the belief that the ship would not sink as the belief that p. Did the ship 
owner have sufficient reason to believe p i  I hope everyone would agree in saying that he 
didn’t. Tliis conclusion relies on the following principle:
(E) There is reason to believe an empirical claim s only on the ground o f features 
that make it credible, i.e, on the ground of the evidence in favour o f s?
That’s because beliefs aim at truth and the truth o f empirical clamis is established through 
the available evidence in their favour. The fact that believing p  was prudentially valuable 
for the ship owner, i.e., the fact that believing p  would make him happy, light hearted and 
save him money, does not count as evidence in favour o f p. Therefore, it does not create 
any reason to believe p. That, however, does not exclude that this fact could count as a 
reason to bring it about tliat the ship owner believed p. Notice the shift between having a 
reason to believe p , and having a reason to bring it about that one believes p. Questioning 
this conclusion would entail questioning (E). Similarly for the demon example. The fact 
that the demon would strike me, might at most be a reason to bring it about that I admire 
the saucer o f mud, or as we put it above, it might give me a reason to favour admiring the 
saucer o f mud. This example would o f coui se rely on a principle different though parallel 
to (E):
(A) There is reason to admire an object x only on the ground of the features that 
make it admirable.
That someone would strike me imless I admired x does not make x admirable. This fact, 
however, might be good reason to bring it about that I admire x. My argument then has the 
following structure. To accept the demon example to count as a counterexample to the
" Clifford, 1879, vol. II, 177-178.
 ^Note that evidence may be taken to play a different role in justifying belief in normative claims such as (E).
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buck-passing accoimt o f value involves rejecting a principle (A) analogous to a principle 
(E), which everyone should accept.
3. From affective to practical reason: a second challenge to radical welfarism
I defined a person’s well-being as what there is reason for her to desire and put forward a 
list o f the parts o f well-being. However, saying that well-being is what an agent has reason 
to desire amounts to saying that our well-being reasons are affective reasons. Desires and 
the normative impulses that typically accompany them smely are affective responses. Yet, 
isn’t it common to identify reasons having to do with one’s well-being with practical 
reasons? We need then to flesh out the connection between affective and practical reason. 
As we shall see, doing so will bring out a second challenge to radical welfai'ism.
The connection between affective and practical reason is expressed by the following bridge 
principle, which we shall call FD or feeling/disposition principle:
(FD) If  there is reason to feel (j) then there’s reason to do that which (j) disposes one 
to do.
Thus, for example, if there is reason to be frightened of x, then there is reason to avoid x. If 
there is reason to be bored by x, then Hiere’s reason not to attend to x. I f  there is reason to 
admire x, then there is reason to praise, reward x. Though desires too are affective 
responses, they differ fiom other feelings insofar as what they dispose us to do is typically 
specified by way of their object. If  I have reason to desire to go for a walk, I have reason to 
go for a walk. There is no need to specify what the desire to go for a walk characteristically 
disposes one to do. This is not so, however, with the other feelings. Take the feeling of 
admiration: the hermeneutics o f this feeling may be such as to specify different 
characteristic dispositions to act, at different times and for different situations and 
societies. The other feelings are not as proximate to action as our desires. We shall come 
back to this point later on.
borrow this formula from Skorupski, 1999a, 38.
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Some thinkers take it that in order to abridge the distance between affective reasons and 
practical reasons we need to postulate that there is reason to desire to do that which a 
feeling reasonably disposes one to do." For example, if  at a piano performance 1 
reasonably feel admiration for the performer, there is reason for me to desire to express 
admiration rather than simply reason to express admiration. 1 disagree with tliis thought. 
That’s because in my view the disposition to desire something is typically accompanied by 
the disposition to see that thing as ultmiately desirable or good for one to have. Now 
consider the concert example again: claiming that there is a reason to desire to applaud in 
this case would entail that applauding would somehow be good for me. If, on the other 
hand, we simply used FD we would get the following: if  1 have reason to feel admiration, 1 
have reason to do that which this feeling characteristically disposes me to do, for example, 
applaud. O f course, in certain cases, 1 might receive expressive pleasure from applauding 
and in tliat respect applauding would be good for me. However, the fact that 1 reasonably 
feel admiration should not be conceptually linlced to my well-being.'^
If what 1 said above is correct, affective reasons may give us practical reasons that are not 
eitlier implicitly or explicitly grounded in om well-being: that’s more evidence that radical 
welfarism cannot be true. Let us refer to these practical reasons as iion-welfarist reasons. 
Note, however, that so far we haven’t said anything about the normative weight o f this 
kind o f reasons for action. This will be one o f our tasks in the next section.
4. Moderate welfarism: a partial defence
Skorupski, for example, believes that FD breaks down into FDD and FDF, where (FDD) states that “if  
there’s reason to desire to a  (or to bring it about that p), there’s reason to a  (to do that which will bring it 
about that p)” and (FDF) states that “If there’s reason to feel (}), there is reason to desire to do that which $ 
characteristically disposes one to desire to do. Thus, for example if there is reason to feel admiration for ,v, 
there is reason to desire that which the feeling of admiration characteristically disposes one to do, say, 
express admiration (through FDF); and if there is reason to desire to express admiration for x, then there is 
reason to express admiration for x. See Skorupski, 1999a, 131.
Alternatively, someone might want to say that unless there is no desire to applaud, the applauding can 
never take place. Assuming that this empirical thesis was true, one might reply by postulating a desire 
instrumental to triggering the action, rather than an intrinsic desire for the action. We should once more recall 
the distinction between desires as ‘passive sensibility’ and the other senses o f ‘desire’.
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I take the two challenges presented above to be fatal to radical welfarism. The question I 
would like to examine next is whether a more moderate form o f welfarism could still be 
endorsed. This form o f welfarism must acloiowledge the two objections just discussed. It 
must deal with (1) the fact that there are values such as aesthetic value that cannot be 
understood in terms of well-being; and (2) the fact that there are practical reasons that are 
not derived from well-being. Finally, to malce our task simpler, we will assume for the rest 
o f this chapter that, when deliberating, agents need not talce into account the way their 
actions affect other agents and/or beings liable to have an interest. We will limit our 
discussion to what tliere is reason and/or most reason for an agent to do considering that 
his or her actions have no impact on any other agent or being liable to have an interest. 
This, o f course, is a very strong assumption to make and will be duly dropped in Chapter 9. 
That is why, even if  we were to find a defensible form of welfarism in this section, it 
would only be a partial defence o f welfaiism.
In light o f  (1) and (2) above and our assumption, I will put forward the following 
formulation o f moderate welfarism:
(BMW) There can never be most reason for an agent to do something that isn’t the 
best outcome in terms of his or her good.
This rather egoistic formula (the ‘E ’ in ‘BMW’ stands for ‘egoistic’) would be welfarist 
because an agent’s own well-being would be the ultimate criterion o f practical reason for 
each agent. The fact that this formulation is egoistic should not worry us here. It is a 
consequence o f our assumption that no third parties are involved in the agent’s 
deliberation, and this assumption will soon be dropped. W hat we should focus on, 
however, is how this formulation fai'es with (1) and (2) above.
4.1. The first challenge
To borrow from Crisp’s own examples, a moderate welfarist may want to say that 
M ichelangelo’s accomplishments ai'e good because we have reason to respond to these 
goods by having a certain pro-attitude such as admiration. In this case, we would say that 
they are aesthetically good. However, he would add, having a reason to feel admiration 
towards Michelangelo’s accomplislnnent does not seem in and o f itself to give anyone a
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reason to pursue  the kind o f accomplishment Michelangelo achieved. The moderate 
welfai'ist may very well continue to assert that in the realm of action an agent’s own well­
being is the only good. The same reasoning applies to the ‘grass coimter’ example: we 
may not need well-being at all in order to understand, appreciate, or judge  how much 
more significant is a life spent trying to find a cure for cancer rather than a life spent 
counting blades o f grass. The moderate welfarist may however insist that the fact that these 
pursuits are more valuable in certain respects (say, by being more excellent) does not 
automatically translate into practical value. There may be more reason to admire the life of 
the scientist, but it does not follow from that that everyone would also have more reason to 
pursue that life himself.
It might be replied that someone other than Michelangelo does not have reason to pursue 
the same kind o f accomplishment as Michelangelo precisely because he or she is not as 
talented and thus incapable o f producing such accomplishment. The really interesting 
question, however, would have to concern someone as talented as Michelangelo or, for the 
sake o f the example, Michelangelo himself. Did he have reason to pinsue the aesthetic 
accomplislnnent he did pursue? I f  so, what kind o f a reason was it? In order to answer this 
question we need to laiow more about the specificities of the case. Suppose Michelangelo 
(with all his talents) has a choice between two types of life. Life 4^ is a life o f artistic 
achievements but without much pleasure and ease; Life 5  is a life o f ease and simple 
pleasures but no great artistic achievements. Remember also our assiunption that 
M ichelangelo’s well-being aside, each o f these two choices yields exactly the same 
outcome from a third-person point of view. Michelangelo, tlien, can worry only about the 
repercussions of his choice on his life. How is Michelangelo to choose? It seems to me that 
there aie two dimensions: the welfarist and the non-welfarist or, in tliis case, the aesthetic 
one. There are also tlnee interesting sub-scenarios:
(M) Given the set o f facts C about Michelangelo, Michelangelo rightly evaluates 
Lije A  as the best life for him, the one that would most realise his well-being.
(M ’) Given the set o f facts C  about Michelangelo, Michelangelo rightly evaluates 
Life A as more valuable from the aesthetic point of view and yet considers Life B 
more valuable from the point of view of his well-being. That is, he might see how a 
life o f  artistic achievement may contain something more admirable but he
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nonetheless might find Life B  more desirable. Suppose that Michelangelo is in fact 
right in his evaluation. Given the set o f facts C ’ about himself and his situation, Life 
B is the better life for liini to live; there is more reason for liim to live that life.
(M*) Given the set of facts C* about Michelangelo, Michelangelo rightly evaluates 
that there is reason for him to live the life of achievement precisely because it 
contains more aesthetic value. The idea is something o f this kind; Life A  is more 
desirable for him because it contains the pinsuit o f a more (aesthetically) valuable 
end.
Firstly, note that these tinee cases are all compatible with moderate welfarism. Secondly, 
something might be said about the difference between (M) and (M*). In (M) Michelangelo 
might be the kind o f person who is not moved in any way by the fact that a life containing 
aesthetic value is better in any sense than a life not containing any. Michelangelo might 
rather be the kind o f person who wants to paint simply because he finds it pleasant. In 
(M*), however, Michelangelo desires to live a life of artistic achievement because artistic 
achievement is aesthetically worthy.*^ That also points at the difference between (M*) and 
(M ’). In the latter case, Michelangelo is simply not the kind of person who finds aesthetic 
value to be a desirability feature to be pursued in one's projects and life.
Finally, we must wonder what case is left open to non-welfarism. Take case (M ’), in which 
Michelangelo has most reason to desire Life B. Suppose someone wanted to claim that Life 
^  is ‘a more valuable life’. What would that mean? Remember drat we are operating under 
the assumption that from a third person or moral point o f view Life A and Life B  are 
identical. Michelangelo can see that Life A contains more aesthetic value. But in what 
sense would that life be ‘more valuable’? We should imagine that this claim involves the 
idea that aesthetic value is somehow a higher kind of value than pleasure and thus any life 
instantiating it would be a more valuable life. This claim, however, would be false if it also 
entailed that Life A  is more choiceworthy and thus that Michelangelo has more reason to 
choose that life. On what grounds would he have more reason to choose it? He would be
Let us stress that in (M*) Michelangelo does not think that aesthetic achievement is valuable because it is 
he who does it. Michelangelo can recognise the value of aesthetic achievement without finding it good for 
him as a personal endeavour as in (M’). In (M*) however, Michelangelo finds that a life spent attempting to 
achieve beautiful work of arts would be good fov him. In this sense aesthetic achievement is especially 
valuable to him.
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made worse off by this life and no one else but him would be affected by his choice. A 
non-welfarist, however, might defend the following claim:
(PR) Excellence has practical value as such; it should always be pursued 
irrespective of its contr ibution to well-being.
This position, o f course, needs a substantive argimient. Such arguments are often found in 
perfectionism. Before entering a discussion of perfectionism, however, let me note that so 
far I have shown moderate welfarism to be compatible with the existence of a good 
number o f non-welfarist values. The unsolved problem posed by perfectionism, however, 
is the same kind o f problem raised by the second challenge against radical welfarism: there 
are reasons fo r  action that are non-welfarist. The discussion o f perfectionism, then, leads 
us straight to tackle the second challenge.
4.2. The second challenge
(EMW) seems plausible as it allows all kinds o f pro  tanto reasons for actions arising from 
reasonable feelings. Thus if, say, my feeling of admiration for something is reasonable, I 
may have a pro tanto reason to do that which the feeling of admiration characteristically 
disposes one to do, say, express admiration by applauding. Yet, on (EMW) I cannot have 
most reason to do that action if  it clearly goes against my interest to do so. Thus, all pro  
tanto reasons for actions are, as it were, placed under the filter of an agent’s well-being: 
could it be shown that they were not in the agent’s best interest, then there camiot be most 
reason for the agent to do them.
Take the performance example once more. I find that the performance was admirable and 
rightly take it that there is reason to applaud. Yet, suppose that, due to a bad wrist 
tendonitis, the pain I would feel if  I clapped my hands would exceed the expressive 
pleasure I would get from applauding (if indeed I got any). Surely, there is reason for me to 
applaud. But it seems intuitively correct to say that that reason is never going to be strong 
enough to override reasons stemming from my well-being. Some might not agree. If they 
don’t, however, and assmning that my choice has no negative effects on any third parties’ 
interests, what arguments can they give to show that even in this case there is most reason
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for me to do that which affects my well-being negatively? At this point we can look at 
perfectionism as providing an answer to this question. More specifically, let us look at 
Thomas Hurka’s version o f perfectionism:
This moral theory [i.e., perfectionism] starts from an account o f the good human life, or the 
intrinsically desirable life. And it characterizes this life in a d istinctive way. Certain 
properties, it says, constitute hum an nature or are definitive o f  hum anity— they make 
humans humans. The good life, it then says, develops these properties to a high degree or 
realizes w hat is central to hum an nature. D ifferent versions o f  the theory may disagree 
about w hat the relevant properties are and so disagree about the content o f  the good life. 
But they share the foundational idea that what is good, ultimately, is the developm ent o f  
human nature.'''
Let us tliinlc back to (M’): Michelangelo rightly evaluates Life A as more valuable from the 
aesthetic point of view and yet considers Life B more desirable from the point of view of 
his well-being. Hurka’s version o f perfectionism would require Michelangelo to choose 
Life A, irrespective o f Michelangelo’s own well-being, if  it could be shown that that would 
most develop Michelangelo’s hmnan nature. We have here two distinct normative ideals: 
the development o f human natuie and the piusuit of one’s own well-being. In this example,
I am assuming that tire first would give Michelangelo most reason to choose Life A, while 
the second would give Michelangelo most reason to choose Life B. More precisely, 
M ichelangelo’s choice has to be conceived as one between the following two options: 
developing his human natiue at the price of a loss of well-being, or failing to develop his 
hmnan nature and do what is most in his interest. Note also that Michelangelo camiot in 
this example be the kind o f person for whom developing his human nature is a part o f his 
well-being.'^ What we have to show on behalf o f the moderate welfarist is tliat, though the
Hurka, 1993, 3.
Writers such as McNaughton and Rawliiig might not accept this last point as they fail to notice that there is 
a conceptual distinction between welfarism and perfectionism. Look for example at the following passage: 
“[Welfarism] does not state that what determines whether some action or outcome instantiates some 
particular value is the bearing of that action or outcome on human welfare. ... [Rather i]n determining what 
constitutes an achievement we just are, in part, determining what it is for a life to go well." And “in 
determining which qualities or character are excellences we are determining what the good life for humans 
is.” McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 157-158; 158 n. 2. McNaughton and Raw ling seem to conflate two 
things: on the one side, what things can make a life a good life, and on the other, what things enhance a 
person’s well-being or make his life go well for him. Contrary to what they seem to think, though 
determining an excellence may determine what it is for a life to be a good human life, it is possible for a good 
human life not to be good for the agent whose life it should be. To claim the contrary, would require a 
substantive argument. At any rate, one cannot simply assume a conceptual identity between a life’s
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perfectionist ideal may afford agents with reasons for action, there can never be most 
reason for an agent to do something tliat is not in his best interest.
We must remember that well-being is essentially connected to the notion o f self-sacrifice: 
if something is a rational self-sacrifice for x then it will not be the best option in terms o f 
x ’s well-being and vice versa. Now, to say that reasons stemming from the perfectionist 
ideal can never override reasons concerning oiu own well-being, is to say that it can never 
be rational to make a self-sacrifice for the sake o f personal perfection. Consider (M ’): if  
under the perfectionist ideal Michelangelo chose Life A, a life o f lesser well-being, his 
choice would amount to a self-sacrifice. Is this self-sacrifice rational? Remember that 
Michelangelo rightly evaluates that Life A  is not the best life in terms of his well-being. He 
does not have a desire to live this life and does not conceive of it as good fo r  him to live. 
Furthermore, we can also suppose that Michelangelo is aware that no one else would be 
affected by his choice. If  he did not choose Life A, though some people may still think less 
o f him, his moral responsibility would not be engaged.'®
We are now faced with the following substantive issue about reasons: can perfectionist 
considerations ever make it rational to self-sacrifice? I would want to answer negatively. If 
upon his perfectionist choice of Life A, Michelangelo ended up leading a miserable life, I 
believe it would be appropriate for anyone to ask Michelangelo to provide some 
justification for his choice. Why renounce a much better life for yourself? It would be 
natural to point out to Michelangelo that as a result of his choice no one else would fare 
better while he would fare worse. It would be natural for many o f us to assume that 
Michelangelo in fact wrongly assessed the situation: we would think that after all Life A 
must have been what Michelangelo had most reason to desire, as in case (M*). If, on the 
other hand, Michelangelo chose Life B, the life o f well-being, his choice would not be 
found very puzzling. Michelangelo, we would thinlc, chose what was best for him: what 
could be wi'ong with that when no one else was affected by his choice? The perfectionist
choiceworthiness and its well-being. In the words of Sumner: “there is no logical guarantee that the most 
developed specimen will also be the best off, or that their undeveloped rivals would not be faring better”. 
Sumner, 1996,24.
I use the term ‘moral’ here to mean that Michelangelo would not be blameworthy for his choice. I will say 
more about the link between morality and blameworthiness in Chapter 9 §3.2. On a different note, one could 
say that what is important to Michelangelo is that others as well as himself did not “think less of him.” But 
that would not be part of the example at hand. It would be relevant if dignity or self-esteem was to be
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ideal simply seems to lack the substantive normative force to ever justify self-sacrifice. To 
say that, hovyever, is not to deny that moderate welfarism allows (a) that the perfectionist 
ideal can afford agents with pro tanto practical reasons and (b) that these pro tanto reasons 
could become sufficient insofar as tliey aie compatible with the agent’s best interest.
Finally, note that Hurka’s perfectionism is intended as a frill-fledged moral theory. Flurka 
writes that the good life is that which develops human natine and that the development of 
human natme is ultimately good. I take these claims to mean that it is ultimately good that 
each individual has a good life. As we saw, however, the good life may not be good for the 
agent whose life it is, as it may involve the agent’s self-sacrifice. On this view, then, it can 
at least in principle be the case that what is ultimately good is sometliing that is not good 
for any human being in particular, and that would indeed be a counterintuitive moral 
theory.
5. Conclusion
Let us draw some conclusions concerning the first part o f our defence o f moderate 
welfarism. This view is weaker than radical welfarism in two important respects. Firstly, it 
allows for the existence of other values outside the realm of action. We need not appeal to 
well-being in order to understand, appreciate, or judge the value o f a work o f art or of any 
other form of achievement. In this respect, I am in agr eement with Scanlon when he claims 
that well-being is not a “master value” . Secondly, even within the realm o f action, 
moderate welfarism allows for non-welfarist practical reasons. Next we tested the truth of 
the claim that there can never be most reason for an agent to do something that is not 
compatible with his or her well-being, when no third parties are affected by the agent’s 
choice. We did so by examining a case o f conflict between reasons stemming from our 
well-being and non-welfarist perfectionist reasons. We argued that in the case of conflict 
between these two types o f practical reasons, welfarist reasons seem to always carry 
greater reason-giving force. Our discussion, however, has been conducted under the 
assmnption that no third parties would be affected by one’s choice. In Chapter 9, we shall 
drop this important assumption.
subsumed under the idea of human perfection rather than the idea of well-being though I do not know of any
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Chapter 9 Moderate Welfarism, Morality, and Ethics
1. Introduction
I concluded Chapter 8 claiming that there can be practical reasons that aren’t grounded in 
an agent’s own well-being, though I argued that that there can never be most reason for an 
agent to do something that is not the best outcome in terms of his or her own good. This 
conclusion was reached imder the assumption that the agent’s choice would not affect the 
interests or well-being of any third individual. In this final chapter, I shall defend moderate 
welfaiism while dropping this assiunption. As we shall see, there can be several versions of 
moderate welfarism. I will defend a imiversalistic or, more precisely, an impartial version 
of moderate welfarism that will ultimately be stated as follows:
(MW) There can never be most reason for an agent to do something that does not
bring about the best outcome in terms of the impartial good.
The impartial good is a welfarist notion, as I will take it to be a positive function o f the 
well-being o f all individuals and nothing else. By ‘im partial’, I mean that reasons 
stemming from consideration o f the impaitial good are both universalisable and agent- 
neutral: we will call these reasons impartiality reasons. In what follows we shall examine 
the meaning o f these terms in greater detail (§2). (MW) is a form o f welfarism as it takes it 
that the impartial good is the ultimate standard o f practical reason. Just as (EMW), 
however, (MW) recognises the possibility of non-welfarist reasons. In this chapter, I will 
focus on one specific kind o f non-welfarist reasons, which I shall call morality reasons i.e., 
reasons that stem from feelings such as blame, guilt, shame and disdain (§3). Morality 
reasons typically single out our moral duties and obligations, and the actions that are 
morally wrong, right, permissible and so on. They reflect the deontological principles 
embodied in a conmuinity at a time. As we shall see, they can both be agent-relative and 
agent-neutral. If  (MW) is true, however, there cannot be most reason to act in accordance
reason to believe that.
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with a morality reason if  the ‘morality-action’ is not what brings about the best outcome 
under the idea o f the impartial good.’^
It may be objected that morality reasons do not enjoy any rational authority o f their own, 
that it can be demonstrated in all cases that they are reducible to or derived from the 
impartial good. Thus, an even more direct form o f welfarism than that expressed by (MW) 
would be true. This would be the claim o f what I shall call a pure form o f teleology, a 
position I intend to resist in two ways: firstly, by claiming tliat judgements about morality 
and judgem ents about the impartial good stem from different epistemologies (§4); 
secondly, by claiming that if  moral reasons were reducible to reasons stemming from the 
impartial good, where this was understood as nothing other than the positive fimction o f 
the well-being o f all individuals, then it must be the case that moral notions such as 
fairness are components o f individual well-being. I will claim that fairness is not a 
component of individual good (§5).
These two arguments should incline us to accept the conclusion that morality reasons are 
independent from the impartial good, that they cannot be derived from it. To say that, 
however, is not to say that tliey are not correctible by it (§6). I will defend a conservative 
holistic position: morality reasons are embodied in a given social-historical context. The 
practices they involve pai'tly constitute the ethical life of agents in a determinate society.
To say that, however, is not to say that they cannot be submitted to rational scrutiny from 
the standpoint o f the impartial good. Finally, I will examine how (MW) fares with the 
possibility of supererogatory actions, with Bernard Williams’s charge of the dislocation of 
ethical life, and with a charge coming from the rational egoist camp (§7).
2. From the good of one to the good of all: the impartial or general good
In this section, I shall introduce the notion of the general good. We must trace at least some 
of the details o f what is involved in the step that takes one from recognising that each
” To call reasons stemming from consideration of the general good impartiality reasons is not to say that 
morality reasons cannot display a form of impartiality. What is clear, however, is that impartiality (intended 
as agent-neutrality and universalisability) is not a defining feature of all morality reasons. As we shall see, 
some of our moral constraints are typically agent-relative (for each x, x has reason to care for x ’s offspring).
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agent’s well-being is valuable to him or her, to recognising that well-being is valuable tout 
court. As we shall see, this discussion cannot be conducted without a brief account o f the 
structure of agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons.
2.1. Universalisability. agent-relativitv. and aqent-neutralitv 18
The largest part o f this thesis explored the importance of well-being from a first-personal 
point o f view. We concluded that something cannot be part of an agent’s well-being unless 
there is reason for him or her to desire it. Subsequently, we saw how this affective reason 
yields a practical reason tlnough the bridge principle (FD). We also saw that not all of our 
reasons to do something stem from our desires. It would not be true to claim that there is 
reason to do something if  and only if  there is reason to desire to do that thing. However, it 
would be true to say tliat if  there is reason to desire something, i.e., if  that thing is good for 
an individual, then, tlnough (FD), there is reason for that individual to pinsue that thing. 
This would be the thesis that, through (FD), well-being affords agent-relative practical 
reasons:
(WB) (y) (If something is for y ’s good, then y  has reason to pursue it)
where y  ranges over persons, i.e., agents with a capacity to thinlc and act on reasons. An 
important feature o f an agent-relative reason such as (WB) is that it is universalisable. Had 
it not been universalisable (WB) might have looked as follows:
(IE) (y) (If something is for my good that gives y  reason to pursue it) 19
Every person y  has reason to desire and pmsue my well-being. This thought would be non- 
universalisable because it contains the non-incidental rigid designator in the reason- 
predicate: if  it were eliminated the fimdamental thought of the sentence would be lost. It is 
important to notice here that I use the term ‘universalisable’ in such a way that a 
universally quantified principle which nonetheless contains a non-incidental rigid
The views expressed in this subsection are influenced by Mackie, 1992, Chapter 5 and Skorupski, 1999, 
Chapter 3.
Sidgwick referred to what we here formulated as principle (IE) as to “irrational egoism”. Sidgwick, 1907, 
420-421.
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designator is not Tmiversalisable’, Universalisability should not be confounded with 
universality understood as the following thesis:
(UT) (x) (y) {(p) (if under circumstances C, x has a reason R to 0, then, under 
circumstances C, y  has a reason R to 0)
Here, x and y  are both agents and could be identical, and (f) stands for the set o f actions 
open to both x and y  under circumstances C. (IE) is not universalisable even though it 
complies with the universality thesis (UT). Universalisable principles can always be 
expressed in impersonal terms while that is not necessarily the case for universal 
principles. Principle (IE), for instance, camiot be recast in impersonal terms. If  I uttered 
(IE) and (IE) were true then everyone would have reason to pursue Rodogno’s well-being. 
That is not the case for (WB): the well-being to be promoted here is not necessarily mine. 
Each individual’s well-being gives him or her reason to act so as to promote it: on (WB) 
we cannot say that Rodogno’s well-being is valuable because it is Rodogno’s. We might at 
most say Rodogno’s well-being is valuable to him because it is liis, and just as we can say 
this for his case we can extend it to all other agents.
To say that (WB) is universalisable, however, is not yet to accept that well-being is an 
agent-neutral value. Universalisability is not what distinguishes agent-neutral from agent- 
relative reasons. Wliat would an agent-neutral reading of (WB) look like?
(U) (x) (y) (0) (if < -^ing enhanced x’s good that would give y  reason to 0)
For eveiy person x, and every person y , and every action 0 open to x if  it were the case that 
0 enhanced x ’s well-being that would g ivey  reason to 0. This is an agent-neutral reason. 
However, (U) could not possibly be the agent-neutral construing o f (WB), as it expresses 
quite a different thought from (WB). According to (U), the reason-giving fact is that the 
action in question would enhance the well-being o f someone. In the case of agent-relative 
reasons such as (WB), however, the reason giving fact is precisely that the well-being that
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stands to be enhanced is the agent's OM>n}^  I f  the indexical {his or her) in the reason 
predicate cannot be eliminated without changing the sense o f the sentence, then we are in 
the presence of an agent-relative reason. Agent-relative reasons cannot simply be construed 
as agent-neutral reasons.^' The reverse is also true. In general, any agent-neutral reason- 
predicate, can be converted into an agent-relative predicate, 0 is an R-ing by y. That, 
however, does not show that it expresses an agent-relative reason.^^ Agent-relative and 
agent-neutral reasons, then, are mutually exclusive.
2.2. The impartiality thesis
This discussion has an important bearing on our thesis. So far we have defended the claim 
that well-being has agent-relative practical value.^^ It is open to each agent then to wonder 
why his or her well-being would count more than anyone else’s. My well-being, one could 
thinlc, is as important to me as anyone else’s well-being is important to him or her. So, for 
example, just as I have good reason to desire to do what enhanced my well-being, 
everyone else would have reason to desire to do what enlianced his or her well-being. If an 
agent grasped this much, then he would grasp the universalisability o f agent-relative well­
being reasons. The agent who grasps tliis thought, however, might be able to reason a step 
further. He might see how there is reason for him not to take any action likely to affect 
someone else’s well-being negatively, precisely because he sees that each agent’s well­
being is valuable to him or her. Once again, to realise this would amount to realising that 
this reason is universalisable. However, this time the agent will have embraced more than
Note also that (IE) is also agent-neutral but not universalisable. On (IE) everyone has reason to promote
my well-being. The reason-giving fact is that it is my well-being, not that the well-being that is being
promoted is relative to the agent in question.
Contra Nagel, 1971, Chapter X. Note that in this work, Nagel refers to agent-relative and agent-neutral 
reasons as respectively subjective and objective reasons.
The following example will illustrate this point. Compare;
(N) ();, (j)) (if 0-ing increased the number of needy people being relieved, then y has a reason to 0)
(T) ();, (j)) (if <j)-mg is the relief of needy people by y, then y  has a reason to 0)
(N) is definitely an agent-neutral reason. In (T) we can find an occurrence of an agent variable in the reason 
predicate but that does not show that the reason expressed by the reason predicate in (T) is agent-relative. For 
(T) has exactly the same force as (N) in which the reason is agent-neutral. (N) and (T) are analytically 
equivalent. “There is no possible world in which one of them is true and not the other. And it’s a priori that 
there is not.” Skorupski, 1999, 53.
Remember that we endorse the buck-passing account of goodness: this allows us to say in this case, that if 
there is agent-relative reason to desire o then o has agent-relative value, or is valuable relative to an agent.
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simple universalisability. He would not be thinking that enhancing other people’s well­
being is good insofar as it is good for him. Rather, what would motivate his actions would 
be the idea that well-being is valuable irrespective o f the person whose well-being it is. 
This is tlie idea of impartiality. This idea is expressed by (U), the thesis that well-being 
provides imiversalisable agent-neutral reasons.
If each individual’s well-being has some weight, then each agent has reason to consider 
how the well-being of each individual is affected by his or her actions. This last point 
brings in the idea that (U) involves an impartial positive function o f the well-being o f all 
individuals, which we will henceforth interchangeably call the good o f all, the impartial or 
general good, or the good tout court. The function is impartial in the sense that it is both 
agent-neutral and universalisable: it takes everyone’s well-being into account and gives no 
one individual special weight. It should also be noted that this function is neutral with 
respect to a number o f impar tial distributive principles. Egalitarians could accept (U) while 
arguing that there is reason not to errhance an individual’s good if  that diminishes equality. 
(U) is also compatible with the principle o f Pareto-optimality: if  the well-being o f an 
individual is improved and the well-being o f no individual is diminished, there is an 
increase o f the general good; to improve that individual’s well-being is a good thing. Irr 
turn, the Pareto principle is compatible with a number o f distributive principles such as 
aggregate well-being maximisation,^'' lexirnin^® distributions, and tlureshold principles.^® It 
is not the task of this thesis to argue in favoirr o f any o f these principles in particular. 
Rather, in this section, I shall only localise the level of investigation at which the question 
o f what principle should be favoured is to be discussed and the methods that should be 
used to solve this question.
Note that aggregate maximisation would have not been compatible with the Pareto Principle, had the latter 
been formulated so as to express the necessary as well as the sufficient conditions for something to count as 
an increase in the general good.
For example, Rawls, 1971, 83: “first maximize the well-being of the worst-off representative man; second, 
for equal welfare of the worst-off representative, maximize the welfare of the second worst-off representative 
man, and so on until the case which is, for equal welfare of all the preceding n-1 representatives, maximize 
the welfare of the best-off representative man.”
For example, Skorupski, 1999, 90-91: “... the principle which I call Threshold Justice ... holds that one 
should maximize aggregate utility subject to a threshold below which no individual is allowed to fall. ... 
Unlike leximin. Threshold Justice does not proscribe any improvement, however massive, to someone’s 
position when it is offset by a deterioration, however small, in the well-being of someone less well-off. And 
unlike the principle of aggregate utility, it does not allow indefinite worsening of a person’s position so long 
as that is offset by compensating gains of well-being to others.”
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The discussion concerning the shape o f the impartial function o f the well-being o f all 
individuals, is not directly concerned with theories of justice. Someone involved in our 
discussion would not be in the process o f determining what institutions, actions, practices, 
and characters would yield the most just society. He would be determining a less practical 
principle; in the words of Mill, he would be dealing witli the ‘ultimate standaid of practical 
reason’. O f course, whatever principle might be agreed upon at this level would provide 
some o f the guidelines informing our decisions at the more practical level. Determining the 
shape o f the ultimate standard o f practical reason is a process intended to determine the 
truth of a type o f normative claim. In Chapter 4, we sketched the dialogical epistemology 
involved in determining the truth o f this type of claim. As we mentioned there, there is no 
guarantee that the reasonable inquirers involved in this process would ever converge on 
one single principle. Importantly, however, the attempt to define tlie impartial good cannot 
be conducted in a vacuum; it must be informed by empirical facts about hmnan beings and 
about the form of their moral and social interactions. Specialised knowledge o f the human 
and social sciences might be required.^^
3. Morality the institution
Sometimes we might find ourselves in a situation in which we can see that there is most 
reason to act in a certain way though it is clear that we are under no moral obligation to do 
so. The best action, as it is sometimes put, might go beyond the call o f duty. The possibility 
o f supererogatory actions offers initial plausibility to an important distinction, namely, that 
between what we will call ‘morality the institution’ or ‘the system of morals’, on the one 
side, and ‘morality conceived as pme practical reason’ or ‘morality conceived from the 
standpoint o f pure ethical theory’, on the other. Below, I will refer to tlie reasons stemming 
from each o f the elements o f this distinction as respectively, morality reasons and 
impartiality reasons or considerations stenmiing from the impartial good. I have already 
said something about the impartial good. In this section, I will explain what kind of reasons 
we take morality the institution to afford.
The importance of this remark will become fully clear in §7.2.
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3.1. Morality reasons and the feeling of blame
Different philosophers have attempted to characterise morality the institution, i.e., the set 
o f practices embodied in the customs, the laws, and the traditions o f a community 
understood positively or ideally, by reference to the blameworthy. Mill, for one, wrote:
We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be 
punished in one way or another for doing it... It is a part of the notion of Duty in every one 
of its forms, that a person might rightfully be compelled to fulfil it. Duty is a thing that may 
be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. Unless we think that it might be exacted 
from him, we do not call it a duty... There are other things, on the contrary, which we wish 
that people should do, which we like or admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise 
them for not doing, but yet admit that they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral 
obligation; we do not blame them, that is, we do not think that they are proper objects for 
punishment. ... I think there is no doubt that this distinction lies at the bottom of the 
notions of right and wrong..
Someone cannot be held to have done something morally wrong, to have failed to do that 
which she was morally obligated to do, unless she is an appropriate object of blame and 
punishment. More recently, both Gibbard and Skorupski have taken up and developed 
Mill’s view.^^ One noticeable difference between Mill on the one hand and Gibbard and 
Skorupski on the other is the way in which being ‘to blame’ is understood. For the latter, 
being to blame is imderstood in terms o f what it would be rational for other people to feel 
about the agent. Mill, on the other hand, seems to shift between someone being worthy of 
the blame feeling and it being rational for someone to blame the agent where that refers to 
the action o f blaming. In Millian fashion, however, both Gibbard and Skorupski would 
roughly agree with the statement tliat:
(B) 0 is morally wi'ong if  and only if  the agent ought to be blamed for doing 0.30
Mill, 1998, 93, V14.
Gibbard, 1990, Chapter 1,40-5; Chapter 7. Skorupski, 1999a, Chapters II and VII.
Gibbard would actually say: “An act is wrong if and only if it violates standards for ruling out actions, such 
that if an agent in a normal framework of mind violated those standards because he was not substantially
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As just explained, here the blaming refers not to the action but to the feeling. The other 
side o f the blame feeling is guilt. Thus, the agent who should reasonably be blamed for an 
action should feel guilt. The system o f morals, then, commands us to follow a set o f rules 
or principles that can be expressed as both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons for 
action stemming from the blame feeling. Principle (K) should do as an example o f an 
agent-neutral moral reason:
(K) (y) (0) (if 0 is the killing of an imiocent person, that gives y  reason not to 0) 31
that is, there is reason for everyone not to Idll an imiocent person. As for a typical example 
of an agent-relative moral reason we may look at (F):
(F) (y) (0) (if 0 is the caring fo ry ’s child, that gives y  reason to 0).^^
that is, there is reason for everyone to cai*e for his or her children. To say that (F) and (K) 
are moral reasons is to say that were it the case that respectively 0-ing and not 0-ing were 
open to y  and y failed to act accordingly then y would be blameworthy and has reason to 
feel guilty. It is important to explain here what we mean by saying that 0 is an act ope?7 to 
y. By that it is implied that on this occasion 0-ing was within y ’s physical power, or that y 
can be held responsible for failing to realise that 0-ing would yield y ’s killing o f an 
innocent person or y ’s failiue to care for his or her child. In certain circumstances, a 
cognitive deficiency such as inattention cannot be appealed to to show the non-opemiess of 
0-ing to the agent. Wlien, however, an action is not open to an agent in this way then it 
would be uni'easonable to blame someone for doing or failing to do that action. If  someone 
surreptitiously hypnotised me, put a loaded gim in my hand and ordered me to shoot an
motivated to conform to them, he would be to blame. To say that he would be to blame is to say that it would 
rational for him to feel guilty and for others to resent him.” Gibbard, 1990, 45. As for Skorupski, he would 
stress that (B) is not intended to be a strict definition of moral wrongness. In fact, he takes wrongness to be 
the semantically primitive term, though liable to some forms of conceptual analysis. He would describe (B) 
as a characterisation of the concept of moral wrongness. See Skorupski, 1999a, Chapters II and VII.
For each agent y and each action 0 open toy, if it were the case that y  is the killing of an innocent person, 
that would givey reason not to 0.
For each agent y and each act 0 open toy, if it were the case that 0 is the caring for y ’s child, that would 
givey reason to 0.
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imiocent passer-by, it would not be reasonable for someone else to blame me and for me to 
feel guilty, though of comse it would be reasonable for me to feel regret.
The moral practices of a society can be revised from within. The process is holistic: 
suppose that at time t it is not reasonable to blame the perpetrators o f the 0-ing practice. 
However, progressively, reflection and new information reveal that the spirit o f that 
practice is in open contradiction with a large number o f other moral practices, the 
breaching of which is reasonably blameable. No external substantive criterion needs to be 
appealed to in order to revise the 0-ing practice. The internal coherence o f the morality 
system as regulated by the blame feeling would suffice. Or again, suppose that under a 
certain general state o f knowledge within a society it is considered reasonable to feel the 
blame feeling for a certain type o f action. Some new psychological findings, however, 
show that agents performing that action aie typically incapable of refraining from it. They 
lack the psychological power to do so. Our moral attitudes towards this practice should 
reasonably be altered.
3.2. Morality reasons and the feeling of sham e
Some philosophers, however, think that the blame feeling camiot alone characterise the 
morality system in the way just described. Rawls, for example, writes that:
All by them selves, a morality o f  shame or o f  guilt is but a part o f  a moral view. ... Guilt 
and shame, rem orse and regret, indignation and resentm ent, either appeal to principles 
belonging to different parts o f  morality or invoke them from contrasting points o f  view. An 
ethical theory m ust explain and find a place for these distinctions, although presum ably 
each theory will try to do so in its own way.^^
Williams, offers the following analysis of guilt and shame:
W hat arouses guilt in an agent is an act or om ission o f  a sort that typically elicits from 
other people anger, resentm ent, or indignation. W hat an agent may offer in order to turn 
this away is reparation; he may also fear punishm ent or may inflict it on himself. W hat
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arouses shame, on the other hand, is som ething that typically elicits from  others contempt 
or derision or avoidance. This may be equally an act or omission, but it need not be: it may 
be some failing or defect. It will lower the agent’s self-respect and diminish him in his own 
eyes. His reaction... is a wish to hide or disappear, and this is one thing that links sham e as, 
m inim ally, em barrassm ent with shame as social or personal reduction. M ore positively, 
shame may be expressed in attempts to reconstruct or improve oneself.^'
It is not my task here to examine the appropriateness of Williams’s analysis o f these two 
moral feelings. It is important, however, to mention something else Williams has to say 
about the importance o f guilt and shame relative to certain societies, namely that of 
Homeric Greece. Williams notes that in that particular society the contrast between these 
two feelings wasn’t in fact so sharp. Shame seemed to cover all or almost all the ground 
that guilt covers for us today. Williams then considers and rejects the claim that the 
Greeks’ concept o f shame was the same concept as om* concept of guilt:
Even though som e reactions in those societies were structured in the sam e way as our 
reactions o f  guilt, they were not simply guilt if  they were not separately recognised as such; 
ju s t as sham e is not the same w hen it does not have guilt as a contrast. W hat people’s i
ethical emotions are depends significantly on what they take them to be. The truth about |
Greeks societies, and particular the Homeric, is not that they failed to recognise any o f  the 
reactions that we associate with guilt, but that they did not m ake o f  those reactions the 
special thing that they became when they are separately recognised as guilt. ... One thing 
that a  marked contrast between shame and guilt may express is the idea that it is important 
to distinguish between “m oral” and “nonm oral” qualities. Shame itse lf is neutral on that 
distinction ...'35
Williams goes on to suggest that in our present day society moralists have artificially put 
too much emphasis on the distinction between the moral and the n o n m o ra lA s  interesting 
as these issues may be, it is not my task here to discuss them in further detail. I need not 
determine here whether guilt and blame cannot, when taken alone, provide a full
Rawls, 1971,485.
Williams, 1993, 89-90.
Williams, 1993,91-92.
“It is said that we make a lot of the distinction between the moral and the nonmoral and emphasise the 
importance of the moral. But how far, and in what ways, is this really true of our life, as opposed to what 
moralists say about our life? Do we even understand what the distinction is, and how deep it really goes?” 
Williams, 1993,92.
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characterisation o f morality, as suggested by Rawls. Nor will I attempt to determine how 
much truth there is in Williams’s suggestion that moralists overestimate the importance in 
OUI' ethical life o f guilt and its emphasis on the distinction between the moral and the 
nonmoral. This discussion, however, is relevant to our purposes in the following way. 
Even if  morality the institution could not fully be char acterised in terms o f the blame 
feeling and feelings such as shame were relevant to its fullest characterisation, my point 
would still hold: the source o f  morality the institution rests Mnthin the affections. That has 
an important consequence. Our morality reasons belong in the first instance to affective 
rather than practical reason. In a manner similar to the reasons grounded in our own well­
being, the practical import of morality reasons is mediated by bridge principle (FD). We 
shall soon see the importance of this claim.
4. Teleology, deontology and the epistemology of their reasons
Taking stock o f the nature o f our morality reasons as illustiated in the last section, I can 
now begin to show the impossibility o f deriving our morality reasons from the impartial 
good. This task will occupy this as well as the next section. This terminology (e.g., 
“deriving oui' morality reasons from the impartial good”) refers to a fundamental debate in 
ethics that needs a short preamble.
4.1. Pure deontology and pure teleology
The discussion concerning the relevance or importance of well-being in ethical theory 
would be very much simplified if  it could be shown that welfarism was true because all our 
reasons, including our morality reasons, are in fact simply derived or deduced from the 
general good. Such a view we will call pure teleology, where by teleology I mean the 
theory of ends, the theory of what is desirable either agent-relatively or agent-neutrally. 
Pure teleology claims precisely that the morally obligatory is derived from (or stands in 
some relation o f dependence to) the good. At the opposite pole from this view we find 
what we may call pure deontology, where by deontology I mean the theory of duty, the 
theory o f the morally right and wrong action, of the morally obligatory, the morally
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forbidden and permitted; deontological principles are principles o f m orality . Pure 
deontology claims that the morally obligatoiy is prior to the good and the bad and is most 
clearly stated by Kant:
the concept o f  good and evil m ust not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it 
would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) 
after it and by means o f it."^ ’
The position I will henceforth defend does not correspond to either one o f these views. I 
believe it is mistaken to conceive o f the relation between these two conceptual categories 
as one o f dependence o f the one on the other. In fact, both the morally obligatory and the 
good are independent from one another, though as I will attempt to show judgements about 
the good can be appealed to in order to criticise, inform, and correct judgements about the 
morally obligatory.
In this section, I will attempt to show that morality reasons do not share a common 
epistemology with impartiality reasons. More precisely, I will claim that judgements about 
morality reasons stem from the feelings while judgements about the impartial good don’t. 
The distinction in the epistemology o f these claims points at the idea that these types of 
claims are about different types o f things, with different meanings. It is not immediately 
clear to the mind that judging that a state of affairs brings about the most good is judging 
that that is what we are morally obligated to bring forward. It is on the other hand much 
more intuitively cleai’ how a justified feeling o f guilt identifies someone’s failure to act on 
a moral obligation.
4.2. Different epistem ologies
I presented morality the institution as the set o f practices embodied in the customs, the 
laws, and the traditions of a society. I suggested that the feelings of blame and guilt, and/or 
o f shame and disdain, were at the basis o f our morality judgements. Recall now our 
discussion concerning spontaneity in Chapter 4. There, I claimed that to acknowledge that
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there is reason for a person to feel something is to reflectively accept a spontaneous 
impulse o f one’s affections. In the case o f well-being, it is to reflectively accept one’s 
desires as rational. Similarly, for om- moral judgements: to say tliat an action is wrong is to 
reflectively endorse one o f the moral feelings just mentioned. These moral affections are 
the primitive criteria in establishmg judgements about morality. That also explains why a 
bridge principle (FD) is required in order to mediate from the affections to action.
Contrary to morality reasons, the affections are not the primitive criteria for judgements 
about impai'tiality reasons. Rather, using a somewhat Kantian terminology rid o f its 
transcendental underpinnings, I would say that our pure willing is such a criterion. Our 
‘pure’ willing is here understood as what one is disposed to will when one does away with 
all emotions or affections. I would claim that what one is disposed to will unconditionally 
in this way is an impartial function o f the good o f all. To acknowledge that there is reason 
to act in a certain way in certain circumstances irrespective of what one takes oneself to 
have reason to desire or to feel, is to reflectively accept a spontaneous impulse o f one’s 
will: the content o f this impulse is embodied by the general good. Judgements about what 
one has reason to will, then, do not involve the feelings and hence do not require a bridge 
principle such as (FD).
Some may take it to be farfetched to think that acting in accordance with the impartial 
good is what one would spontaneously will when no affections are involved. My reply 
consists in a rehearsal o f the thought process that takes rational agents from recognition of 
the agent-relative value o f well-being to recognition of its agent-neutral value. The starting 
point is the realisation that we all have reason to pursue our own well-being: I can see that 
my well-being is valuable to me just as youi's is valuable to you. From there, an agent may 
move fru'ther and recognise that each agent’s well-being is impartially valuable: my well­
being is just as valuable as everyone else’s, therefore there camiot be most reason for me to 
do an action that doesn’t bring about the best outcome when considering the well-being of 
all. A state o f affans involving greater impartial good is better than one involving less; 
there is then more reason to pursue it even if  that involved a loss in my well-being. This 
realisation does not involve the affections but proceeds purely from rationality.
Kant, 1996, Critique o f Practical Reason, 190, (5:63).
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To say that, however, is not to say that this process involves no heteronomy. The feelings 
do play a role in this picture. It must be remembered that the general good is a positive 
function of each individuaTs well-being. But well-being and the practical reasons it yields 
involve our affective side. Someone with no capacity to feel, and more specifically, 
someone with no capacity to desire, would not be able to find any instance o f well-being 
intelligible, let alone a positive function o f the well-being o f all individuals.^^ In other 
words, one cannot begin to appreciate the agent-neutral value o f the general good, unless 
one has the capacity to feel and desire and thus imderstand the agent-relative value of each 
person’s well-being.^^ Importantly, tlie same kind o f point can be extended to morality 
reasons. I f  morality and its reasons stem from the feelings, someone with no capacity to 
feel cannot find this type o f reasons intelligible; in fact he or she would not find any 
particular instance of (FD) intelligible.'"'
Finally, let me say a word about motivation. Recall the discussion concerning the 
normativity o f well-being in Chapter 3. There, I claimed that for any agent to have the 
capacity to be motivated by the description of a state as one tliat is good for her, she must 
also have the linguistic/intellectual capacity to understand what it is for something to be 
good for her. To say that an agent has both capacities, however, is not to say that she will 
unfailingly be motivated by each and eveiy judgement about her well-being, as that would 
exclude the possibility o f acting against one’s better judgement. The same applies to the 
general good. An agent may recognise that something is good tout court and yet fail to be 
motivated to act accordingly.
In conclusion, morality and its reasons are sepaiate from the general good and its reasons 
insofar as their epistemic somces are different. The primitive criteria for our judgements 
about morality are our moral feelings, while the primitive criterion for our judgements 
about the impartial good is our pure willing. The distinction in the epistemology of these
To realise that the impartial good involves heteronomy in this way is crucial in avoiding a charge that has 
often been put to Kant, namely, that pure practical reason is an ‘empty formalism’. The charge applies to 
Kant if it is understood as meaning that the attempt to derive moral obligation from the a priori idea of a 
rational requirement (the universality of reasons) as such is empty. For a discussion of this point, see Wood, 
1990, Chapter 9.
It would be interesting to compare this claim with G. E. Moore’s idea that something must be good 
absolutely in order for it to be good for  someone. See Moore, 1903, 99.
Another facet of the ‘empty formalism’ charge against Kant is thus uncovered: the categorical imperative 
cannot yield a substantive doctrine of moral duties without a given context of ‘ethical life’. These two sides
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claims indicates that these types of claims are about different types of things, with different 
meanings. It is not immediately clear to the mind that identifying the best state o f affairs is 
identifying what we are morally obligated to bring about. It is on the other hand much 
more intuitive to think that a justified feeling of guilt identifies someone’s failure to act on 
a moral obligation. The fact that we directly rely on our feelings to know what our moral 
obligations aie while we do not do so in order to find out about the impartial good should 
explain this divide. If  this is true, then, the pure teleologist cannot claim that morality is 
simply derived from the good. Importantly, however, our position does not entail that the 
impartial good has no bearing whatsoever in determining the meaning o f “wrong”. This 
fundamental point will be developed only after having discarded another attempt to show 
that morality can be derived from the good.
5. What things the impartial good cannot consist of
A pure teleologist might be unimpressed by our argument from epistemology. He might 
argue that the notions constituting the morality systems, notions such as right, wrong, 
rights, duty obligation, fairness, and desert, are rather unclear notions and that is precisely 
why they need to be grounded  on a clearer foundation  such as the impartial good.'" In 
order to make this claim, however, the pure teleologist must be able to defend the claim 
that all o f these concepts can be captured by the notion of the impar tial good. John Broome 
and Amartya Sen both seem to defend precisely that claim (though as we shall see they 
might refuse to take on board the fomidationalist rationale I presented as bacldng this kind 
of objection). In what follows, I will focus on one moral notion in particular, namely, 
fairness, and see whether it can indeed be reduced to or included in the notion of the 
impartial good. Success in showing that it cannot reinforces our thesis concerning the 
impossibility o f deriving moral notions from the good.
of the empty formalism charge give reason not to consider pure deontological ethics at least in their Kantian 
form as a valid alternative.
1 do have someone like Sidgwick in mind. See Sidgwick, 1907, Books iii and iv.
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5.1. Broome's fairness
Broome considers the following example taken from Diamond.''^ There is a kidney 
available for transplant, and two people, P  and Q, who need it to survive. The choice 
facing a hospital administrator is between tossing a coin to decide who is to get the kidney 
(alternative A) and giving it directly to Q (alternative B). It may be plausible to suppose 
with Diamond that choosing randomly, e.g., by tossing a coin, would be best as it would 
give each person a ‘fair shalce’. It is important to mention that Broome takes the example 
not to involve any feelings on behalf o f the patients. For example in A  we cannot postulate 
that the belief that Q is not being treated fairly would cause Q to have the negative feeling 
o f disappointment. Each person will either receive a kidney or not, without explanation. 
The process o f choice cannot affect their feelings. I f  the preference for A is rational, then 
according to Broome, A is better than B. What makes it better is precisely the fact that A 
possesses the property o f being a fairer outcome. At this point Broome qualifies his 
position as follows:
My term ‘outcom e’ may be a little misleading. It does not refer particularly to the results o f 
an act rather than the act itself. The outcom e in a state o f  nature includes everything that 
happens in that state, both before the state is revealed and after. It includes history. I f  
alternative A  is chosen rather than B,  and state heads comes up, then the outcom e includes 
the fact that is chosen. I f  A is fair, its fairness will be a part o f  the value o f  the outcome.^'''
Taken in isolation there is nothing wrong with Broome’s claim that the value o f an 
outcome may include the unfairness o f a choice. This claim, however, becomes 
problematic when is taken in conjunction with another claim, one that both Broome and I 
endorse. The impartial good, we saw, is a positive function o f the well-being of each 
individual and nothing else. Broome endorses this same thesis, which he calls the Principle 
o f Personal Good and which he states as follows:
The following discussion is in Broome, 1991, 111-115. 
Broome, 1991, 114.
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(a) Two alternatives are equally good if  they are equally good for each person. And (b) if  
an alternative is at least as good as another for everyone and definitely better for someone, 
it is better,.4 4
Given this principle, if  alternative A is better, then it must be better for P; in other words 
P ’s well-being or personal good would be enlianced if  A obtained. We have been told, 
however, (1) that what makes the alternative better is precisely the fact that it is fairer, and 
(2) that no feelings o f any kind were involved in the example. It follows then that fairness 
or being treated fairly is what increases P ’s well-being; it is part o f his well-being or 
personal good.''® What we should ask now is whether fairness can in fact be a part o f a 
person’s well-being.
Being treated unfairly typically carries with it diminution of other aspects o f a person’s 
well-being. When we are treated unfairly, our well-being is normally decreased to the 
extent to which being treated imfairly deprives us o f some other good which we might 
have otherwise attained. Taking the kidney example, in the unfair alternative B it is clear 
that P  is deprived o f his well-being in all its components, as he is deprived o f all his 
chances to survive. In alternative A, on the other hand, he has a fifty percent chance to 
maintain his well-being with all its components. To take another example, a panel unfairly 
choosing a less qualified candidate for a job might deprive the other candidate o f his 
chance to pursue liis projects and achievements; gaining knowledge o f the unfair treatment 
may cause disgust and great disappointment in the qualified candidate and, to that extent a 
loss o f well-being; but keeping the truth hidden from him may also amount to a loss o f 
well-being insofar as knowledge about one’s situation is part of a person’s well-being. The 
fact that being treated unfairly typically cairies with it diminution o f other aspects o f a 
person’s well-being is indicative— though not a sufficient argument—that fairness is not 
itself a part of well-being.
Let us then try to isolate the putative good o f ‘being treated unfairly’ from the other 
categorial ends through a thought experiment. Imagine two possible worlds JV and W': in 
each o f the worlds Rea enjoys precisely the same amount of each o f the other goods
Broome, 1991,165.
Elsewhere Broome explicitly writes: “Unfairness, as I have described it, is plainly an individual harm.” 
Broome, 1991, 198.
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constituting her well-being, but in W  she is treated more fairly than in W \ It does not seem 
to me that Rea has prudential reason to choose to live in W rather than W \  That should be 
clearer when the following is considered. Suppose that ceteris paribus, her well-being in 
W ’ is slightly increased. It would seem now that she has good prudential reason to choose 
to live in W ’ rather than W, though that is the imfair world."^^
Judgements about fairness cannot be represented as judgements about what an agent has 
reason to desire for itself though, as we just saw, being treated unfairly often produces loss 
in well-being. Rather, judgements about fairness are moral judgements, judgements about 
what is morally obligatory. Like many other morality judgements, they often enter our 
deliberation as constraints and not as what would maximise utility or the value o f 
outcomes."*^ Suppose that the best outcome is the outcome including the fewest 
nonviolations of rights because that would be the fairest outcome. Suppose that Outcome X  
is the best outcome but that bringing about X  involves the violation o f someone’s right and 
there is a moral constraint C not to do so, as violating someone’s right would be unfair to 
this person. If  this moral constraint is to be taken seriously at all then one cannot bring 
about X  even though X  had been postulated to be the fairest outcome.
This example should show that the fairness o f an action, a process, a choice or a state of 
affairs is not the type o f property that lends itself to the teleological rule that more is better 
than less. Wliat one could at most say is that more is better than less subject to a constraint, 
namely, that no one is treated unfairly. To admit this much, however, is to admit that 
fairness camiot be derived from the goodness o f outcomes; if  fairness is what makes an 
outcome good, then it would be true that more fairness is better than less. But as we just 
saw above fairness camiot be understood in this way. This point is reinforced by our 
previous point that fairness is not a component o f an individual’s well-being: if  we are 
right in tliinldng that it isn’t, and the impaitial goodness of outcomes is a positive function 
o f each individual’s well-being and nothing else, then fairness cannot appear as a 
constituent o f the good impartially conceived. Fairness is a concept that belongs to 
morality and its reasons; it is independent from the good and cannot be derived I t o i i i  it.
Similar points are made by Crisp & Moore, 1996, 612; and Skorupski, 1999a, 105-06.
In what follows, 1 will be rearranging an example taken Aom Nozick’s discussion of side-constraints. See 
Nozick, 1974,28-33.
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Once again, however, this claim does not exclude the claim that the impartially conceived 
good has no bearing on our moral reasons including the ones concerned with fairness.
5.2. S e n ’s  consequential evaluation
Sen does not take himself to be a fomidationalist teleologist o f the kind we described at the 
start o f this section. He writes:
It is neither that ‘the good’ comes first, and then ‘rights and duties’, nor that rights and 
duties congeal first followed by the good, but that they are linked concepts that dem and 
simultaneous consideration. W hile considerations o f  freedoms, rights and duties are not the 
only ones that m atter (for example, well-being does too), they are nevertheless part o f  the 
contentions that we have reason to take into account in deciding on what would be best or 
acceptable to do. The issue surely is simultaneityK This d iffe rs ... from  ‘sequencing’ 
(beginning, first, w ith ‘the good ... free o f  deontic notions’ and then proceeding to rights 
and duties)...'*^
Though Sen clearly avoids taking tlie fomidationalist stance we described above, he still 
believes that the best interpretation o f familial' moral notions themselves involves, at least 
in part, their inclusion as factors that contribute to the value of states of affairs. This view 
is best seen at work in Sen’s treatment of the notion o f rights: the value o f states of affairs 
takes into accoimt the intrinsic value o f protecting rights and the disvalue of having them 
violated. Before tackling this claim we shall notice three important features o f Sen’s 
‘Consequential Evaluation’ of states o f affairs. Firstly, the evaluation is intended to be 
‘comprehensive’ insofar as it includes consideration of (a) the final/culmination outcome,
(b) the act in itself, (c) the motivation behind the act, and (d) the process by which the 
motivation was arrived at. Secondly, the evaluation is ‘situated’: it is impartial but not 
impersonal, i.e., conducted from the point o f view of the agent and not from the point of 
view o f the world. Finally, consequential evaluation avails itself o f a maximizing 
conception of rationality
Sen, 2001, 61. Note that Sen may be taken to use the notions of “what is best” and “what is acceptable” as 
interchangeable. I can think of cases where what is acceptable is not what is best and vice versa.
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I have already discussed the impossibility of placing rights understood as side-constraints 
under the idea o f a maximizing rationality, and will not discuss this point further.^® 
Another relevant issue arising from Sen’s discussion, however, concerns the nature of 
situated valuations. Sen believes that a good reason for including actions in general and 
right-violating actions in particular as components of states of affairs in a consequentialist 
framework is tliat a system of moral thinking that has this form has tlie morally appealing 
property o f requiring agents to take responsibility for their actions and their consequences 
in the proper way. According to Sen, states of affairs have different values when evaluated 
ifom different ‘positions’. Taking Williams’s well-known example o f Jim and the Indians, 
Jim would attach special negative value to his killing one of the Indians.^' What we need to 
understand, however, is precisely what kmd o f value is negative in relation to Jim. We 
should all be in agreement with at least this much, that one’s reason not to kill an innocent 
person is the agent-neutral reason (K):
(K) (y) (0) (if 0 is the killing o f an innocent person, that gives y  reason not to 0).
If there are any moral principles at all, then sm*ely (K) is one of them. At least part o f Jim’s 
reluctance in Idlling the Indian is generated by his awareness o f being in breach of such a 
fundamental moral principle. The reason-giving fact as described by (K) is not the killing 
o f an innocent person by Jim, but the killing o f an innocent person tout court. Had the 
sweat-stained-khalci-shirted captain picked Jim’s travel companion, Jack, rather than Jim, 
then Jack would have been in exactly the same situation as Jim insofar as he would have
See Sen, 2000.
See §5.1. in this chapter. It might be objected that an instrumental theory of rights may recognise that 
rights do not involve absolute prohibitions. According to Scanlon, on this theoiy, “to claim that people have a 
certain right is to claim that they have a certain important interest that can be protected only if others’ 
freedom to act is constrained in certain ways. ... But we also recognize that absolute prohibitions against 
interfering in these ways would be unacceptably costly to others. So, in order to be defensible, rights have to 
be understood as admitting of exceptions. In deciding whether a defensible right would have to incorporate a 
certain exception, we must take into account not only the relative seriousness of the interests in question (the 
interest that the right is meant to protect and the interest that would be sacrificed without the exception) but 
also the degree to which the secure protection that the right is meant to provide would be undermined by an 
exception of the kind in question.” Scanlon, 2001, 44-5. I would like to make one comment about the 
instrumental theory Scanlon is putting forward. Suppose that we all have a right to be treated fairly. Scanlon 
writes that “to have a right is to claim that people have a certain important interest”. What would be the 
particular ‘interest’ being protected by the right to be treated fairly? Is it some aspect of each individual’s 
well-being? But in that case, the right in question should be directly concerned with the protection of that 
aspect rather than with fairness. Alternatively, then, ‘being treated fairly’ may itself be part of each agent’s 
well-being. But that, as we saw above, is implausible.
Smart and Williams, 1973, 98-9. Jim, however, will have to take notice that it is he who is also, though less 
directly, involved in the death of twenty Indians.
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been asked to do sometliing that everyone has reason not to do. To realise this much is to 
realise that the reason not to kill an innocent person is an agent-neutral one. As we saw 
above, that agent-relative indexicals (the killing by Jim  of...) can appear* in the formulation 
o f this principle is not enough to show that the principle is itself agent-relative. Yet, we 
should also all agree with Sen (and Thomas Nagel and Williams among others) that there 
could be a special agent-relative or position-relative disvalue for Jim (and/or Jack) in the 
killing o f this innocent person. Wliat kind of disvalue?
I would claim that this disvalue can only be understood in terms o f the agent’s self-interest 
or well-being. Given certain facts about Jim, there could be many ways in which the killing 
o f an innocent person may have special prudential disvalue for liim. Jim for example may 
find the thought of having killed a person extremely disturbing and that unpleasant thought 
may haunt him for the rest of his life. The whole situation may also strike Jim as one in 
which the value o f his autonomy (another part o f his well-being) is being clearly 
diminished. A choice is forced upon him against his will and the two options open to him 
are options he would have not him self rationally chosen. Also, Jim may, to a smaller or 
greater extent, have reason to desire to act virtuously and it may seem to him that the 
choice he has been offered leaves him no room to act virtuously. Finally, if  we changed the 
example a little, we may imagine that Jim in fact Icnows and is a good friend of the Indian 
he is supposed to sacrifice in order to save the others. The thought that it is he who has to 
take his friend’s life may be particularly horrible precisely for the special relation that 
binds him to his Indian friend.
Sen, o f course, camiot agree with our claim that the special disvalue to the agent is to be 
understood in terms o f the agent’s self-interest, as that would go against the spirit of the 
type o f moral reasoning that Sen intended his position-relative evaluation to capture. It 
would be mistaken to explain the wrongness o f the killing by appealing to the agent’s self- 
interested objection to the killing. The reason giving fact is that an innocent person would 
be killed. In this type o f case, our moral thinking would tend to focus on the claim o f the 
victim to have his life preserved rather than on any of the putative killer’s self-interested 
o b je c tio n s .S e n  might want to reply to our objection by drawing a distinction between the 
idea of a state o f affairs having special disvalue when evaluated fi'om  a particular position
I am indebted to Scanlon’s discussion of this point and the one following it. Scanlon, 2001,47- 8.
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and the idea that it is bad fo r  the person who is occupying that position. Darwall, for 
example, claims that there is a:
... difference between what is good from the agent’s point o f view and w hat is for her good
or welfare.^^
An agent can o f course thiiilc that it is good that x  obtains without thinldng that the 
obtaining of x is good for her in any way. I have endorsed this claim tlnoughout this thesis. 
The problem for someone like Darwall or Sen, however, is that when an agent claims that 
it is good that x obtains she is not deliberating hom  an agent-relative point o f view; she 
must thinlc that it is good taking everyone’s interests into account. And how can she think 
that and yet be deliberating ‘from the agent’s point of view’? Someone might insist, 
however: there are things that are “good from the agent’s point of view” but are not “good 
for her” and aie not good tout court. I am not able to thinlc of any one thing fiilfilling this 
description and therefore think that the concept Darwall or Sen are trying to single out is an 
empty concept. Jim, for example, might thinlc that it is good from his point o f view that he 
does not kill the Indian though that is not good for everyone. However, we put forward a 
case for thinlcing that “good from his point of view” is to be read as “good for him”. If  it 
were not, then, the disvalue o f killing from Jim’s point of view would consist in an agent- 
relative non-self-interested reason not to bring the killing about. This reason, however, 
would look very much like the moral principle (K) and, as argued above, though (K) may 
appear to be agent-relative it in fact is an agent-neutral reason.
In conclusion, even if  the evaluation o f the good and the various moral notions was 
simultaneous and claimed by Sen to be non-derivative, there are problems about fitting 
moral constraints into the maximising structure o f Sen’s consequence sensitive evaluation. 
What is more, we saw that one o f the steps intended to bring in moral notions within 
consequence sensitive evaluation, namely, situated evaluation, displays features that go 
precisely against the spirit o f customary moral thinking. In the light o f the conclusions 
reached in this as well as in the preceding section, we can look at a non-derivational (and 
non-simultaneous) way of fitting considerations stemming from the impartial good with 
our morality reasons.
Darwall, 2002b, 14.
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6. The corrective view , co n serva tive  holism , and m oderate w elfarism  
6.1 ■ Moderate welfarism and the corrective view
The view I would like to defend claims that though our morality reasons and the 
obligations they place us under cannot simply be derived from consideration o f the 
impartial good, this type o f consideration can be appealed to in order to correct, inform, or 
criticise oiu* moral judgements. Given that morality reasons stem from the feelings, they 
ought to be mediated by the bridge principle (FD) when entering the realm o f action. On 
the other hand, reasons stemming from the impartial good are principles o f pure practical 
reason, unmediated by the feelings: they straightforwardly belong to the realm of action. It 
is at precisely the stage at which our morality reasons are mediated by (FD) to enter 
practical deliberation that they meet with considerations concerning the impartial good. It 
is at that stage that the ultimate standard of practical reason is given the chance to correct 
the actions stemming from our reasonable moral feelings.
In Chapter 8, we gave the following provisional statement of moderate welfarism under the 
assumption that no third party would be affected by the agent’s choice:
(BMW) There can never be most reason for an agent to do something that doesn’t 
bring about the best outcome in terms o f his or her good.
A complete statement of moderate welfarism, i.e., one including morality and impartiality 
reasons, however, should look as follows:
(MW) There can never be most reason for an agent to do something that doesn’t 
bring about the best outcome in terms of the impartial good.
Let us begin to comment on this principle by saying something about its place in our moral 
psychology. On our statement o f moderate welfai’ism, it is not the case that for each action 
an agent has reason to perform, her action needs to be done out o f the belief that it shall
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bring about the best outcome for all. If, however, on one occasion, the agent sees that her 
action is in breach o f the good impartially conceived, she should refrain from doing it. The 
impartial good works as a constramt.
Next, let us look at the way in wliich (MW) regulates the interaction between impartiality 
reasons and other kinds o f reasons. Consider reasons stemming from an agent’s own well­
being first. Wlien the normative impulse accompanying our desire for an object passes the 
scrutiny o f reason, we may correctly take ourselves to have reason to desire that object 
and, through (FD), we may take ourselves to have pro tanto reason to pursue it. If, 
however, we recognise that reasons concerning the general good tell against the pursuit of 
that object, there cannot be most reason to pursue it. This does not mean that the initial 
prudential reason is stricken out o f existence; it does not become null. We can still 
recognise it as a prudential reason and can feel its motivational pull as a reason (not as a 
mere desire). However, the ultimate standard of practical reason would tell us that it should 
stand defeated by weightier considerations, i.e., considerations for the good of all.
The same kind of pictuie applies to reasons ai'ising from morality the institution. We saw 
how it would be plausible to think tliat many if  not all of these reasons can be characterised 
by the blame feeling. These reasons too stem from affective reason. Just like desires, these 
feelings lend themselves to a first round o f rational validation internal to their 
hermeneutics. I may feel guilty or ashamed but is it reasonable to have such feeling in 
these circumstances? Is it reasonable for someone to blame me for something I am in no 
way responsible for? If  on one occasion the answer to these questions were negative, then 
we would not be in the presence o f any moral reason. I f  the answer were positive, 
however, then there would be such reason. In that case, through (FD) there may be reason 
to do that which the feeling in question characteristically disposes one to do. If, for 
example, there is reason to blame someone, then there is reason to express blame, punish 
him, withdraw recognition, etc., once again in accordance to the norms internal to the 
blame feeling. Yet, once we enter the realm o f practical reason, the reasons to do that 
which the blame feeling chaiacteristically disposes one to do are checked by the constraint 
o f impartiality. If  it could be clearly shown that to express blame in that instance was to 
bring about widespread havoc and misery, for example, then there camiot be most reason 
to do it.
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6.2. The corrective view and conservative holism
The corrective view is a form of conservative holism in practical reason. The conservative 
ho list in theoretical reason believes that something like a Cartesian method o f 
enquiry— one that begins by dismissing all o f one’s previously held beliefs and proceeds 
by reconstructing a system of beliefs by applying purely rational criteria to pure data— is a 
non-starter. Similarly, the conservative holist in practical reason holds that the point o f 
departure for reforming a set o f practices is always situated within the specific social and 
historical context in wliich those practices exist. One should not start by withdrawing from 
these practices. Given a set o f practices and an ultimate criterion o f practical reason it is 
possible to identify, tluough the criterion, the places at which these practices need revision. 
Conservative holists believe that systems o f practices cannot be revised m  bloc; their 
revision can only be piecemeal.
One objection to en bloc revision would be a practical one. How could we suspend 
acceptanee o f the moral practices of a society en blocl There is, however, also an objection 
in principle to such revisions. Conservative holists believe that most systems o f practices 
spontaneously respond to the rational end, i.e., the general good. The notion o f well-being 
already appears in the content o f some moral requirements: we may for example be 
required to promote the well-being of others. More widely, it is believed that the systems 
of practice may display a general tendency towards the general good. Mill and Sidgwick 
famously argued that our maxims o f justice and our common sense morality could be 
systematised under the idea of the general good. To say this does not mean that agents are 
generally motivated to act so as to maximise the general good. It is rather to show that 
whatever motivations agents are typically disposed to act on within a certain system of 
practice tends, to at least some degree, to realise the general good. The problem, however, 
is that these systems also respond to other ends corrupting their flinctioning: egoism, i.e., 
the pursuit o f one’s well-being even when in clear conflict with the general good, is one 
such end. Hence, the need for rational revision or co rrec tio n .T h e  conservative holistic 
position I am trying to sketch is nicely summarised in the following quotation from Mill:
am here indebted to Skorupski, 1989, 323-25.
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There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard w hatever to work ill, if  we suppose 
universal idiocy to be conjoined with it; but on any hypothesis short o f  that, mankind must 
by this tim e have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects o f  som e actions on their 
happiness; and the beliefs which have thus com e down are the rules o f  morality for the 
m ultitude, and for the ph ilosopher until he has succeeded in finding better. T hat 
philosophers m ight easily do this, even now, on many subjects; that the received code o f  
ethics is by no means o f  divine right; and that mankind have still m uch to learn as to the 
effects o f  actions on the general happiness T admit, or rather, earnestly maintain.^^
I would endorse the content o f tins quotation with the simple substitution o f the word 
‘good’ instead of Mill’s ‘happiness’. In §7.2., when defending moderate welfarism against 
charges o f over-demandingness and ethical dislocation, the relevance o f this discussion of 
conservative holism will come to full light.
6.3. The impartial good, duty, and the extension o f  morally wrong’
Morality reasons arise independently from reasons concerning the impartial good, yet I am 
claiming that the impartial good has a bearing in determining the extension o f “wrong”. 
We saw that our moral practices are regulated by a type o f rationality internal to the 
feelings from which they stem. However, when the moral affections enter the realm o f 
action, it is possible to apply a criterion that is external to them. This criterion is the 
ultimate standard o f practical reason, the good impartially considered. If  an action or a 
practice stemming from a particular system o f morality is in clear conflict with a principle 
derived fr'om the reflectively agreed upon impartial good, then there cannot be most reason 
to piusue that action or practice.
Mill, 1998, 70, II24.
This of course implies that considerations of impartiality are always overriding. Someone may want to 
challenge our position radically. Why should the impartial good have the role of ultimate standard of  
practical reason and its reasons be always overriding? The justification for this relies on the conclusions 
reached in Chapter 8. There we argued that when operating under the assumption that our choices will not 
affect anyone else’s well-being, considerations stemming from the agent’s own well-being enjoy greater 
rational authority over other kinds of reasons. When that assumption is dropped, it is hard to resist the 
thought that the kind of consideration enjoying greater rational authority must be some positive function of 
that which matters most to each individual taken singularly.
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If  the extension o f “morally wr ong” were exhaustively determined by its internal criterion, 
however, a serious problem would arise. Take a case of conflict between a morality reason 
and an impartial reason, a case in which what we have most reason to do goes against a 
moral obligation. It would be morally wrong to 0 and yet 0-ing brings about the best 
outcome, i.e., there is most reason to do a morally wrong action. This, I thinlc, would be 
unacceptable, as it would clash with the claim to categoricity that our moral obligations 
seem to enjoy. It might be worth rimning tliis argimient in more detail.
Many believe, and I am inclined to jo in  them, that to say that 0-ing is morally wrong 
conceptually involves either one of two theses; a weaker thesis to the effect that if  an 
action is morally wrong then there is reason not to do it, and a stronger thesis to the effect 
that if  an action is morally wr ong then there cannot be most reason to do it. Let us refer to 
these two theses as to respectively the weak and strong categoricity thesis. In what follows,
I will assume that strong categoricity is tr ue. To assert this thesis is to accept that morality 
reasons always override prudential reasons. In order to see why this would be the case one 
should understand what is involved by the idea o f blameworthiness. At this stage, the 
debate becomes very much a conceptual one and here I shall simply state my inclination to 
accept the truth of the following thesis: to say that there is reason to blame someone means 
inter alia that considerations o f rational self-interest camiot ever completely exculpate the 
blameworthy agent. If  in one case they could, that would be sufficient to show that we 
were not after all in the presence o f a blameworthy action.^^
David Brink considers as plausible a view that dissociates the categorical nature of morality (by categorical 
he here means non-hypothetical) from its rational authority. Morality and the norms it delivers are compared 
to etiquette and its norms. Its norms are categorical as they apply to agents even when it is not in the agents’ 
interest to abide by them. Morality, however, does not deliver categorical reasons. Brink believes that there 
are two senses of ‘reason’. Morality reasons, like etiquette reasons, exist “when the relevant sort of 
behavioral standard or norm” exists. “The other sense o f ‘reason’... signifies more than the existence of a 
certain sort of behavioral norm; it indicates that there is a reason to behave in accordance with such a norm 
such that failure to behave in that way is ceteris paribus or pro tanto irrational. If there is reason, in this sense, 
to act on a norm, then practical reason endorses this norm.” Brink, 1992, 8. Brink claims that only prudential 
reasons are reasons of the latter kind. The idea that morality reasons are norms of the same kind as the norms 
delivered by etiquette seems to me profoundly mistaken. Norms of etiquette as such, I would claim, provide 
no justificatory reasons at all. The fact that a norm is socially approved does not in and of itself confer any 
value to it. An agent can appeal to a certain socially approved norm in order to explain his action; that, 
however, might not at all provide a justification for it. Many societies past and present approved of many 
unjustifiable practices and norms. Social practices may even explain why we pursue some actions that are 
very detrimental for our own well-being (think about the widespread practice of heavy drinking and smoking 
in pubs). The goodness of an action for an agent in particular and thus (through the buck-passing view) the 
reason an agent has to desire and pursue this action, is not derived from or delivered by any of the system of 
norms Brink has in mind. Just as a system of norms may deliver the wrong prudential dictates, a system of 
norms may deliver the wrong moral dictates. That I take to be sufficient proof that (socially approved) 
systems of norms of this kind do not as such provide justificatory reasons for either prudence or morality.
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Suppose then that the strong categoricity thesis was true. Its truth would entail that moral 
reasons enjoy greater rational authority over other types o f reasons, such as prudential 
reasons. That, however, would still leave our initial question unsettled. We would still not 
be in a position to assert whether tlie extension o f ‘morally wi'ong’ can only be determined 
through the moral feelings or whether, as I would like to suggest, it could also be 
determined by the impaitial good. Compare strong categoricity:
(SC) There can never be most reason to do an action that is morally wrong.
with the idea o f the impartial good as the ultimate standai*d of practical reason:
(MW) There can never be most reason to do an action that does not bring about the 
best outcome in terms o f the impartial good.
Now consider the case in which 0-ing has two features: it is morally wrong and it is what 
brings about the best outcome in terms o f the impartial good. According to (SC) there 
cannot be most reason to 0. Yet, if  there were only one action that we have most reason to 
do, according to (MW) it would be false to claim that there cannot be most reason to 0, 
and, in fact, there would be most reason to 0. In this case theses (SC) and (MW) would be 
contradictory. If  we did not allow for the possibility that the impaitial good determines the 
content o f our moral obligations (if our moral obligations were always exhaustively 
determined by their internal criterion) then tliis kind of conflict could always arise; we 
would have to renounce one o f these two theses. These theses are however worth being 
preserved conjointly. On the one hand, losing (SC) would amount to losing what many 
would take to be a defining feature o f our moral obligations. On the other hand, we would 
want to have a thesis capable o f accommodating supererogation and (MW) is fit to do that.
I f  we could not appeal to a rational criterion outside the morality system such as the
This point leaves someone holding the position described by Brink with either of two options. One may deny 
that moral reasons are justificatory reasons; but then one must come up with a good explanation for the 
asymmetry between prudential and moral reasons: on what grounds should the former be taken to belong to 
practical reason and not the latter? After all, as just shown, systems of norms also deliver non-justificatory 
prudential reasons. Alternatively, one may accept that moral norms are reasons ‘endorsed by practical reason’ 
on a par with prudential reasons. Let us simply set aside the former option as too counterintuitive. Now, then, 
moral reasons and prudential reasons must be considered as at least on a par and this brings home the weak 
categoricity thesis: if an action is morally wrong, there is reason not do it.
208
Chapter 9
impartial good, we could not explain how in certain circumstances agents have most reason 
to do an action that goes beyond the call o f duty.
We are thus left with the following pictine. Wlien the criterion internal to morality declares 
0-ing morally wrong and yet there is most reason to 0 under the idea of the impartial good, 
then our morality judgement concerning the wrongness of 0-ing ought to be revised. It 
does not follow from this that we are under a moral obligation to do all and only those 
actions that are considered to be the best under the idea o f the impartial good. If 0-ing were 
supererogatory, for example, we may have most reason to 0 without being morally 
obligated to do so. It would be morally permissible not to 0 and to do one’s duty instead.
In conclusion, then, given that deontological principles cannot simply be deduced from 
consideration o f the impartial good, moderate welfarism as expressed by (MW) is to be 
understood as a corrective conservative holistic position. (MW) is still a welfarist position 
as the ultimate standard o f practical reason is the impartial good and this is a positive 
function o f tlie well-being of all and nothing else.
7. M oderate W elfarism: tow ards a com p lete  d efen ce
We are now to consider how this version o f moderate welfarism fares when confronted 
with certain thorny issues in ethical theory: supererogation, over-demandingness, and 
rational egoism. I will provide no furtlier presentation of these issues than that which is 
offered in the following three subsections.
7.1. Supererogatory actions
The first important issue arising from our formulation of moderate welfarism has to do 
with supererogation.^^ An agent might have most reason to do something that goes beyond
It might be useful, throughout this subsection, to keep this example of supererogation in mind: “Fred is 
holed up in a defensive position with his fellow soldiers. He is fighting against an evil enemy whose victory 
would greatly damage the general good. Now a grenade is thrown in. Fred’s got three options. His best
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the call o f duty. More precisely, though he has a moral obligation to act in a certain way, 
consideration o f the general good suggests that he has more reason to act in a 
supererogatory way. It is crucial to bear in mind that cases o f supererogation do not 
involve moral conflicts. Supererogatory actions go beyond duty, not against it. Unlike the 
case discussed in the last section, then, whatever the agent chooses to do is morally 
permissible. The agent may either simply attend to the call o f duty or do the supererogatory 
act: either way he would not be blameworthy. The agent, however, has most reason to do 
the supererogatory action, even though he is not under a moral obligation to do it. In the 
case in which the agent decided to stick to his moral duty, he is less than optimally 
rational, as he does not do what he has most reason to do. We shall get back to this issue 
presently.
First, however, the following should be noticed. Often the agent who goes beyond the call 
of duty is a lover of virtue in the sense that he takes himself to have reason to desire to do 
the supererogatory action. Alternatively, he might rightly envisage the supererogatory act 
as an achievement, and have reason to desire to pursue it as such. It is perfectly fine to let 
well-being reasons play an active role at this level. Taking both the personal and the 
impartial point of view into account, the agent would consider the supererogatory action to 
be more choiceworthy. This, however, does not exclude the case in which an agent can 
clearly see that he has reason not to desire the supererogatory action but simply reason to 
pursue it, and yet does not pursue it as he is not morally obliged to do so.
This takes us to our* second remark. Presumably, what morality requires in a given society 
at a given time may not always be as determinate and clear-cut as we might want; this is 
mostly so in societies where moral practices are commonly submitted to rational validation 
and scrutiny. The same goes for what is required by considerations stemming from the 
impartial good. Certain agents may have good reason to believe that what duty requires 
one to do on a certain occasion is not quite what they would see as optimal to do. Other
chance of saving himself is to run away, his next best is to take evasive action by throwing himself to the 
ground. But he could also throw himself on to the grenade. This last action, he knows, would save the most 
people. For he knows that his comrades won’t run away—they can see that they have an obligation to stay at 
the post and go on fighting, and they’ll do that. But they won’t throw themselves on the grenade either. So if 
he throws himself on it, stifling its impact, more soldiers will be saved and the chance of resisting the evil 
enemy will be greater. This, then, is the action that will most promote general good. Coming to this 
conclusion, he throws himself on the grenade. ... the right moral assessment is that Fred went beyond the call
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agents, however, may disagree and may do so in two ways: they may disagree either about 
what duty requires or about what the impaitial good requhes.^^ Ideally, the two parties 
would have to engage in rational dialogue concerning that practice. But even then, 
agreement is not guaranteed. If  even the reflected opinion concerning certain practices is 
not in agreement, different individuals or groups of individuals might be warranted, at least 
temporarily, in holding contrasting beliefs as to what there is most reason to do. 
Importantly, for our initial problem, it would be misplaced to state in these kinds of cases 
that there is most reason to do one rather than tlie other action and/or practice. Agents who 
can’t see why there would be most reason to do the supererogatory action cannot be 
considered as less than optimally rational when doing ‘only’ what they are morally 
required to do.
7.2. Dem andinaness and dislocation
The corrective view may be M>rongly considered to be a version o f tlie view that the general 
good provides the justification for all moral reasons: for example, a principle o f action is 
morally wrong to the degree to which it fails to bring about the most general good. In the 
last thirty years or so, consequentialist moral theorists have been pressed with the charge 
that the impartiality required by their theories was too demanding on the agents who tried 
to put it in practice in their daily lives. Agents who seriously attempted to follow its 
prescriptions would become alienated and schizophrenic, incapable o f pursuing their own 
projects and aims or connnitting to special relationships with their friends and loved ones 
without a sense o f culpability or strain. In the words o f Williams, these theories often 
involved “one thought too many” in the motivation o f the agent. That I should save my 
wife rather than a stranger from drowning because it is my wife is all I should be motivated 
by when choosing to save her rather than the stranger. But according to Williams, this is 
not what these theories prescribe.
of duty. Fred and his comrades had an obligation not to run away; but they did not have an obligation to fall 
on the grenade. Our morality is not heroic... ” Skorupski, 2001,72-73.
It would be interesting to see how present Western opinions concerning abortion would fit this way of 
setting out the problem.
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As a response to tliese charges, some consequentialists (and even some deontologists) have 
adopted the strategy o f separating two levels o f thinking or inquiry: the ‘intuitive’ level (or 
decision-theoretic) and the ‘critical’ level (or as it sometimes referred to, the ‘standard of 
rightness’).^ ® Though their principle o f impartiality (be it Kantian or Utilitarian) had a 
justificatory role, it needn’t appear at the level of om* every day motivation.^* This kind of 
move was already familiar through J. S. M ill’s and Sidgwick’s forms o f multi-level or 
indirect utilitarianism. Williams, however, charges tliis type of defence with what we may 
call the dislocation problem.
Williams’s charge
It might be worth quoting Williams at length on this issue:
These styles o f  indirect utilitarianism  involve a special view o f  the dispositions that are 
exercised at the everyday or intuitive level; and this raises a serious question: Is there 
anyw here in the mind or in the society that a  theory o f  this kind can be coherently or 
acceptably located? The theory finds a value for these dispositions, but it is still an 
instrumental value. The dispositions are seen as devices for generating certain actions, and 
those actions are the means by w hich certain states o f  affairs, yielding the m ost welfare, 
com e about. This is w hat dispositions look like when seen from outside, from the point o f 
view o f  the utilitarian consciousness. But it is not what they seem from the inside. Indeed, 
the utilitarian argum ent implies that they should not seem like that from  the inside. The 
dispositions help to form the character o f  an agent who has them, and they will do the job  
the theory has given them only if  the agent does not see his character purely instrumental ly, 
but sees the world from the point o f  view o f  that character. M oreover, the dispositions 
require the agent to see other things in a noninstrum ental way. They are dispositions not
See Stark, 1997, for a defence of deontological theories from the charge over-demandingness.
Ashford, 2003, offers another reply to the charge of over-demandingness. Having shown that even Kantian 
contractualist accounts such as Scanlon’s, 1998, Chapters 4-5, fall prey to this charge, Ashford suggests that 
“The extreme demandingness of both contractualist and utilitarian obligations to those in need is not an 
objection to either view... but an appropriate response to morally salient features of the current state of the 
world. In our world, we would expect any theory grounded on the claim that each person has equal moral 
status to hold that agents have extremely demanding obligations to give aid... It can plausibly be claimed that 
both utilitarian and Kantian contractualist obligations to those in need would be considerably less demanding 
if the state of the world were relevantly different.” Ashford, 2003, 292-293. Or again: “...if  we take seriously 
the central tenet of enlightenment moral theory that each person has equal moral status, we may have to 
accept that our current moral obligations to those in need are drastically more demanding than our 
commonsense moral thinking tells us.” Ashford, 2003, 275.
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only o f  action, but o f  feeling and judgm ent, and they are expressed precisely in ascribing 
intrinsic and not instrumental value to such things as truthtelling, loyalty and so on.
There is a deeply uneasy gap or dislocation in this type o f theory, between the spirit o f  the 
theory itself and the spirit it supposedly justifies. There is a distinction that is supposed to 
bridge the gap or, rather, make us accept it: the distinction between theory and practice. But 
when one asks whose theory is in question, and whose practice, the distinction turns out to 
have very little power.*’"
To show his point about the problems afflicting this distinction, Williams looks at the way 
both Sidgwick and Richard Hare put it forward. The former expounds a version o f indirect 
utilitarianism Williams refers to as “Government House utilitarianism.” The idea is that 
enlightened utilitarians might be able to live by rules that should not be divulged to the 
masses, as that would be likely to produce more harm than good by weakening moralit}^ 
According to Sidgwick, it would also follow from this view that, for example, it may be 
right to do and privately recommend what it would not be right to advocate openly. Or 
again, it may be right to teach openly to one set o f persons what it would be wrong to teach 
to others.*’^  In Hare, one finds that the distinction between theory and practice is cashed out 
in psychological rather than social terms. There is the time for theorising and the time for 
practice. Williams, finds that:
It is difficult to suppose that a  thorough commitment to the values o f  friendship and so on 
can merely alternate, on a tim etable prescribed by calm and activity, w ith an alien set o f  
reflections. M oreover since the reflections are indeed alien, some kind o f  willed forgetting 
is needed, an internal surrogate o f  those class barriers on which Sidgwick relied, to keep 
the committed dispositions from being unnerved by instrumental reflection when they are 
under pressure.^'*
Williams draws the conclusion that the kind of life the utilitaiian agent would be required 
to live is a dislocated one,^^ one with an unacceptable gap. In Sidgwick’s case, the gap is 
social: the agent has to treat his fellow human beings according to their utilitarian 
intellectual enlightemiient. Regarding Hare, the gap is a personal one and, I would add.
Williams, 1985, 107-108.
“  See Sidgwick, 1907, 489-490.
Williams, 1985, 109.
Williams writes: “The discussion in the present chapter concerns what kind of life, social or personal, 
would be needed to embody such a theory.” 1985, n. 12, 215.
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somehow more radical: the agent’s theoretical reflections about his actions cannot 
systematically be brought to bear on the practice o f his actions. Some sort o f an invisible 
moral hand ensures that the agent’s typical motivation and/or dispositions in action are o f 
the right Idnd.
A reply from the conservative holist
Our formulation o f moderate welfarism acknowledges the force of W illiams’s point. We 
laid so much stress on the fact that our well-being reasons and our morality reasons arise 
independently from the general good. The general good, however, functions mainly as a 
constraint. We are not deriving our reasons for action, morally and otherwise, from it. 
Individuals are situated in a determined social-historical context. What they take 
themselves to have reason to feel and do is partly determined by their socio-historical 
context. Conservative holism, takes stock o f that, and proposes only to correct the 
practices embodied in this context when they conflict with the general good.
Does this position involve levels o f thinking? Would it be an alienating, or over­
demanding position? Or would it prove to involve an unacceptable gap in the agent’s 
psychological outlook? In Sidgwickian spirit, I would like to distinguish between two 
levels o f thinldng: that o f the agent’s day-to-day moral deliberations and that of the moral 
theorist, or again, the level o f ethical life and the level o f ethical theory. As we shall see, 
however, this distinction is nowhere as clear-cut as Sidgwick’s nor does it carry the 
problems pointed out by Williams. Our (ethical) life may confront us with choices that 
involve going beyond what one is morally required to do. We examined these cases under 
the heading o f supererogation. We also saw that agents may have reason to desire to 
choose the supererogatoiy action. Wliat is more, to allow agents to make a direct appeal to 
consideration of the general good in their everyday lives is to allow the possibility of 
experiments in individuality: some agents may have reason to desire to live supererogatory 
lives as a way of realising their autonomy.
It is important to notice, however, that our view does not impose this kind o f act upon 
everyone. One should remember that going beyond the call o f duty must be morally
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permissible and not morally required. Also, it may very well be that what makes a 
supererogatory action the best impartial outcome is precisely the fact that it would be an 
isolated instance.*’*’ It is not implausible to think that if  all of the agents in a society were 
required to go beyond the call o f duty at every time, as a result the general good would 
suffer rather than be enhanced. Yet, though we do not have most reason to go beyond the 
call of duty at all times, it is not implausible to thinlc that all of us may at any time face 
choices in which there is most reason to go beyond duty and even against it.
The question arises, however, as to who is to determine what actions would bring about the 
best outcome under the idea o f the general good. It is at this stage that ethical theory and 
ethical theorists are needed. We mentioned already in §2.2. that determining even just the 
form o f the positive function o f the well-being o f all individuals involves reflective 
discussion as well as contributions from specialists working within the human and social 
sciences. Is there anything wrong with this? I do not thinlc so. Just as we might rely on the 
specialised knowledge o f medical doctors to tell us what things to do in order to conduct a 
healthy life and thus preserve our well-being, we might rely on tlie specialised knowledge 
of philosophers, sociologists, economists, etc. in order to get some guidance about what the 
best possible aiTangement for all might be.
Though I have appealed to Sidgwick in order to draw the distinction between ethical life 
and ethical theory, it should be noticed that drawing this distinction does not necessarily 
involve the type o f ‘Government H ouse’ utilitarianism attributed to Sidgwick. The 
specialists are first and foremost individuals situated in a determinate socio-historical 
context like all other individuals. Their ethical lives will be similar to all others. To be 
specialists in ethical issues makes them ethicists and being an ethicist does not at all 
involve having access to some secretive truth that should not be divulged. Unlike 
Sidgwick’s enlightened utilitarians, ethicists are not in the business o f deriving the right 
from the good but only in that o f determining the impartial good and how, if  at all, it 
conflicts with morality. Maybe they may find out before others that certain practices are 
not in the interest o f  all; they may in that case decide to adapt their ways o f life 
accordingly; they might publish papers to divulge their findings; they might lobby the 
government to issue some new directives. The same goes even if  they discovered that
Think back to the example of Fred and the grenade. If Fred and, say. Jack both threw themselves on the
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certain practices would bring about greater general good only if  a minority o f the 
population were allowed to live by them. It must also be remembered, however, that 
contrary to Sidgwick oiu* conception of individual well-being includes both autonomy and 
Icnowledge as intrinsic ends. To keep certain facts hidden from the rest o f the public would 
seem to conflict with both ends. It is not excluded in principle that such specialists might 
discover facts that are best kept away from public laiowledge. But given the normative 
importance o f these two ends for each agent’s well-being it seems unlikely in practice that 
a case might arise in which infringing these two values would be compatible with the best 
outcome under the idea o f the impaitial good.
Echoing Williams’s words from the long quotation above, I will conclude as follows. Our 
conservative holistic version of moderate welfarism does not dislocate agents’ ethical life. 
Agents can, from their everyday level of thinking, keep ascribing intrinsic and not 
instrumental value to such things as truthtelling, loyalty and so on. On some occasions, 
however, an agent may be confr onted with a real life situation in which he takes himself to 
have most reason to do something that goes beyond or even against the call o f duty. The 
agent may realise that there is a constraint not to do what does not bring about the best 
outcome under the idea of the general good. Sometimes what is involved by this idea may 
seem to be straightforwardly clear. At other times it is not. An agent, then, may rely on the 
informed opinion of those who have spent time thinking about these issues. Wliat is more, 
agents may differ in their capacities to recognise and abide by the constraints set by the 
impartial good. Though it is implausible to think that the impartial good could set 
constraints on all of us at all times it would be a bit too convenient to think the opposite. 
What balance to strike between these two extremes should pose itself as a difficult question 
from the point o f view o f ethical theoiy as well as from the point o f view o f any reflective 
agent.
7.3. Why should moderate welfarism be impartial?
grenade the result would probably be sub-optimal and not what there would be most reason to do.
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In Chapter 8 ,1 discussed moderate welfarism under the assumption that the agent’s choice 
would not affect tliird parties. Under that assimiption, we attempted to defend welfarism as 
thesis (BMW):
(BMW) There can never be most reason for an agent to do something that doesn’t
bring about the best outcome in terms of his or her good.
I f  this same thesis were thought to hold even after having dropped the assumption we just 
mentioned, then (BMW) would amount to what we may call a moderate version of rational 
egoism. That’s because even though (BMW) could accept the possibility of morality and 
impartiality reasons for action, it would disallow tlie possibility o f there being most reason 
to do these actions when in conflict with one’s well-being.
Rational egoism, however, is undermined by the distinction between what we called 
virtuous moral agents and conscientious moral agents. If  rational egoism were true, we 
could not accommodate the possibility o f acting conscientiously. It would never be the 
case that an agent has most reason to act morally if  that is incompatible with his well­
being. And, yet, many times that seems precisely to be what happens; we act believing that 
there is ‘nothing in it’ for us; in these cases it is out of a sense of duty that we choose to act 
morally. Rational egoism would have to explain away this phenomenon of our ethical life, 
our sense o f duty, as based on an error. It would have to show that rational self-sacrifice is 
a chimera. (MW), on the other hand, can allow for both the possibility o f rational self- 
sacrifice and that o f conscientious action. This is a reason to prefer it to (BMW) as a better 
version o f moderate welfai ism.
More positively, I believe pm*e impai'tialism can be defended tlnough an argument we have 
already presented. Realisation on behalf o f an agent that well-being has agent-relative 
value may take the agent one step further towards the realisation that every agent capable 
of well-being has reason not to desire that any action involving a negative impact on his or 
her well-being be performed. Next, the agent will have to grasp what bearing this 
realisation has on his actions. Some agents may simply not be able to recognise that 
anything follows concerning their actions. I would say that this type o f agent does not have 
the capacity to ever be motivated by the thought that an action having a negative impact on 
another person’s well-being gives reason to consider whether it is appropriate to do it or
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not. This type o f tliinker, however, must accept that others have no reason to have any 
regard for their well-being, as to thinlc so would make them irrational.*’^  Something else 
must be said about the possible deficiencies in the psychological/cognitive outlook o f these 
agents.
Nagel sees a parallel between intertemporal and interpersonal distribution o f harms and 
benefits. He argues for agent-neutrality by analogy witli prudence. Prudence requires that 1 
act now for something that is in my futm*e interest. Failure to recognise prudence involves 
temporal dissociation, i.e., failure to see the present as just one time among others. 
Similarly, agent-neutrality requires one to take into account other people’s interests. 
Failure to recognise them involves personal dissociation, i.e., failine to recognise oneself 
as just one person among others.*’^  Failure to be motivated by agent-neutral judgements 
amounts to a form o f practical solipsism, i.e., “the inability to draw fully fledged practical 
conclusions about impersonally viewed situations.”*’^  I can see why I  should be motivated 
to remove my foot when a piece of fuiiiitiu'e is about to land on it. However, I am unable to 
be motivated to avoid dropping the same piece of furniture on someone else's foot even 
though I can, merely in virtue o f the fact that it is his foot and that may harm him. Such a 
dissociated agent is unable to cognise the principle that other people are real and so are 
their interests. This agent could still act altruistically tlnough internal motivating factors 
such as self-interest, love, and sympathy. The principle of the reality o f other persons, 
however, is a formal principle of our rationality capable o f motivating our actions on its 
own. Agents lacking it, we shall conclude, will be cognitively or rationally deficient to 
some extent.
N agel’s argmnent, it seems to me, does not give enough weight to the separateness of 
persons. To discuss that thesis, however, would lead us astray and I would rather 
emphasise my agreement with the core o f Nagel’s argument. Grasping the agent-relativity 
and universalisability o f well-being reasons should ipso facto  point any intellect towards 
recognising reasons not to harm other people’s interests; it should ipso facto  point at their
Their position would amount to that labelled as (IE) or irrational egoism above. Everyone has reason to 
promote my well-being, because it is my well-being (but I have no reason to promote anyone else’s but my 
well-being).
This type of argument can be traced back to at least Sidgwick. See for example Sidgwick, 1907, 418-19. 
More recently it has been greatly elaborated by Parfit, 1984, esp. Part II.
^  Nagel, 1971, 114.
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agent-neutrality. W hat should we say, however, about those who cannot grasp this 
primitive link and thus fail to ever be motivated to act accordingly? I believe their 
cognitive incapacity is serious. In fact, it is so serious that these agents cannot be held 
responsible for their non-compliance to the dictates stemming from these reasons. 1 do not 
believe, however, that there are many genuine cases of these. For all the other thinkers it 
would be sufficient to grasp that every agent has reason to desire his or her well-being, to 
also grasp that each agent’s well-being must be given equal or impartial consideration. 
Understanding that well-being has special value will in most cases direct the thinker’s 
intellect towai'ds well-being’s impartial value. To understand the impartial value o f well­
being is to understand that one’s well-being is as valuable as anyone else’s and typically be 
motivated to act accordingly. To understand that, however, does not imply that one will 
unfailingly be motivated to act accordingly.A position Xhsii fully recognises the impartiality 
of well-being will no longer be compatible with (BMW).
7.4. Concerns from the deontoloqist camp
We have begun to defend moderate welfarism from objections coming from two camps: 
rational egoism and pure teleology. We did not say much, however, about pure deontology 
and shall not tiy to argue against it here. 1 shall, however, aclaiowledge some of the 
concerns that pure deontologists may take to affect our account. More precisely, 1 am 
thinking o f the discussion o f Nozick and side-constraints as we broached it in §5.1. Does 
even our indirect and corrective moderate welfarist view allow that it is possible, at least in 
principle, to sacrifice the good of someone for the sake of others? Wouldn’t that be morally 
impermissible, as it would conceive o f people as o f expendable resoinces? If  our view 
allowed that, then 1 am inclined to thinlc that there would be some irreparable tension in it.
Whether the impartial good would in principle ever allow the infringement o f rights as 
side-constraints would depend on what distributive principle is reflectively agreed upon. If 
the principle is aggregate maximization à la Mill, then we could grant the deontologist his 
worry: there would be an inescapable tension, at least in principle, between the impartial 
good and some o f our moral practices. In principle, aggregate utility can always be 
increased by systematically sacrificing the well-being of an individual or o f a class o f 
individuals. Our fimdamental moral attitudes tell us that that is unfair just as is it is unfair 
to punish someone who did not deserve it. But aggregate maximization is not the only
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distributive principle. It is the task o f ethical theory to explore the ways in which other 
distributive principles could accommodate this fundamental tension.
8. C on clu sion
To defend moderate welfarism along the lines we have sketched above is to defend the 
thesis that well-being still occupies a central role in ethics. O f coui'se, this version of 
welfarism is not as strong as that which some welfarists would want to defend. In this as 
well as the last chapter we did not exclude the possibility o f non-welfarist reasons, i.e., 
reasons for actions unrelated to the well-being o f each person taken agent-relatively or 
agent-neutrally. Abstracting from moral and impartial considerations, however, the reasons 
grounded on a person’s own well-being seem to enjoy greater rational authority. Thus, 
even though the possibility o f other kinds o f reasons for action is not excluded, their 
reason-giving force seems to be checked by reasons concerning one’s well-being. 
Similarly, when moral and impartial considerations are brought back into the picture. The 
existence of independent morality reasons is undeniable, or at least so 1 have argued. What 
these reasons enjoin us to do, however, can be corrected. Reasons stemming from the 
impartial good enjoy greater rational authority over both morality reasons and reasons 
stemming fr om consideration o f one’s own well-being. This should be read as a statement 
o f (MW).
My version o f moderate welfarism encounters opposition from at least three different 
camps: rational egoism, pure deontology, and pure teleology. 1 spent the most time 
defending moderate welfarism against pure teleology, by showing the implausibility of 
deriving the right from the good. 1 also sketched a brief defence against rational egoism 
and W illiams’s charge might also be taken to share some of the worries o f deontology 
(though surely not from a point o f view such as K ant’s). However, some o f the 
deontologists’ most fundamental worries could not be fully addressed in this thesis. 
Concerning the tension between the impartial good and rights as side-constraints we could 
only point at the irreparable tension between our moral attitudes on the one side and 
aggregate maximization o f well-being on the other. 1 suggested that someone wanting to 
solve this tension might only have the option o f exploring the possibilities offered by
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different distributive principles, ones that can be brought closer to some o f our most 
fundamental moral attitudes.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have described the role o f well-being in ethics. In Part I, I argued that the 
concept of well-being does play an explanatorily important role in the thinking of a rational 
agent. I arrived at this conclusion by distinguishing levels of thinlcing activity as well as by 
considering the implicit rather than explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. 
Conti'ci Scanlon, 1 also claimed that the concept o f well-being is not necessarily a concept 
shaped by moral assumptions (at least on his definition o f what it is for something to be 
moral). We concluded this part of the thesis by illustiating the relation between the idea of 
well-being, its parts and its sources. Well-being is an inclusive good. The idea o f well­
being is an insubstantial regulatory ideal. An agent has reason to desire the various parts of 
well-being for their own sakes (where that doesn’t mean that we have reason to desire 
them irrespective o f context) imder tlie idea o f his good or well-being. I f  on one occasion it 
could be shown that it would be detrimental for me to desire an instance o f enjoyment it 
cannot be most rational for me to desire it, unless considerations other than my own well­
being are also in play. 1 believe tliat Scanlon has gone too far in playing down the 
explanatory importance o f the concept o f well-being. 1 take Butler’s picture to be much 
closer to our intuitions at least to the extent that it firmly established the explanatory role of 
self-love as a principle of action. My own picture has the advantage o f assigning to well­
being the explanatory role Butler understood so well.
According to Scanlon, we can at most offer “a theory of what is valuable in general” rather 
than a unified theory o f  well-being. That’s because, on his account, a person’s well-being is 
largely contributed to by achieving success in his rational aims and not all o f a person’s 
rational aims are chosen for their contribution (nor do tliey contribute) to that person’s 
well-being. In Part 11,1 put forward a unified theory o f well-being. 1 did so firstly by taking 
on board Scanlon’s own buck-passing account of value and, with some help from Mill, by 
arguing that the ‘good for a person’ is what there is reason for this person to desire. To say 
this, however, does not exclude that an agent might have reason to pursue many things he 
does not have reason to desire. Secondly, 1 showed that Scanlon’s rational aim account 
should be reduced to the reason-to-desire account. Thirdly, 1 claimed that a person’s life 
worthiness shouldn’t be confused with this person’s well-being. Sure enough, many
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individuals talce themselves to have reason to pursue more admirable lives. That, however, 
does not imply that there is reason for each o f us to desire this type o f life for oneself. 
Fourthly, I defined the notion o f rational self-sacrifice, I illustiated how our account of 
well-being is not affected by the ‘scope problem’, and I showed how Scanlon seems to be 
using the notion o f self-sacrifice inconsistently. Much of this part o f the thesis was 
dedicated to a number o f different though connected projects: the defence contra Darwall 
o f the claim that well-being is itself a normative notion; the description o f the expansion of 
the self as a defence of the claim that we have reason to desire all and only things that are 
parts o f our good. Finally, I raised various specific issues that concern the particular 
components of well-being.
Having determined the explanatory role o f well-being from a first-personal point o f view, 
and having offered a systematic account o f well-being, in Part III, I began to sketch the 
normative role o f well-bemg both first-personally and impartially. With Scanlon, I agreed 
that well-being cannot be a “master value”. Yet, I argued in favour o f a moderate form of 
welfarism, a view that talces a positive function o f each individual’s well-being to afford 
the ultimate criterion o f practical reason. The last two chapters do not afford a complete 
defence o f moderate welfarism. I would however consider the ideas I formulate in these 
chapters as providing the framework within which further research in normative ethics 
should be pursued.
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